Follow-on studies and investigation related to the chemical hazards potential study Final report by Christensen, M. S.
l
I
I
I
l
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
l
I
NSL 65-136-I
MARCH 1966
FOLLOW--ON STUDIES AND INVESTIGATION
RELATED TO THE
CHEMICAL HAZARDS POTENTIAL STUDY
A FINAL REPORT FOR
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER
HOUSTON, TEXAS
SUBMITTED IN RESPONSE TO
CONTRACT NAS 9 - 4795
M.S. CHRISTENSEN
PROGRAM MANAGER
VICE PRESIDENT
AND
MANAGER
SYSTEMS DEPARTMENT
NORTHROP SPACE LABORATORIES
3401 West Broadway, Hawthorne,California 90250
NORTHROP CORPORA110N
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19660013065 2020-03-16T22:53:40+00:00Z
II
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
i
I
I
I
I
I
STUDY PERSONNEL
This study was administered under the technical direction of the
Space Simulation Laboratories department. Following is a list of the
personnel who offered significant contributions:
NORTHROP
W. Anderson
M. Christensen
W. Dickinson
M. Fairchild
Dr. W. Martin
J. Rudy
W. Schreyer
M. Shapiro
O. Shev
H. Spielman
AGBAB IAN- JACOBSEN ASSOCIATES
Dr. M. Agbablan
C. Bagge
D. Barels
Dr. L. Jacobsen
J. Karagozlan
R. Savage
H. TsWao
NSL 65-136-1
I
I
I
I
!
I
I
i
i
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
ABSTRACT
This study has explored the hazards entailed in the proposed opera-
tion of a space chamber containing spacecraft with loads of cryogenic
Hydrogen and Oxygen on board. Hazards ensuing from leakage, partial
spill, or total rupture of tankage were assessed. Mathematical analyses
were performed, to compute the effects upon the structure of explosive
reactions from released gases under several chamber pressures. An
experimental program was run concurrently, to support the analysis.
Suggested modifications for the chamber are offered (including
costs and schedules for accomplishment), to improve its structural re-
sistance to computed dynamic effects. Recommendations are furnished for
fire hazard detectlon/suppression systems (including costs and schedules
for accomplishment). Recommended operating procedures, to improve
safety of operation, are presented.
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NORTHROP SPACE LABORATORIES
SECTION I. 0
SUMMARY
Stress analysis studies investigated the effects of explosive
reactions from full and half loads of Hydrogen and Oxygen, occuring at
normal atmospheric conditions and at hard vacuum. A test program was
developed for investigating the nature of reactions under a limited set
of conditions, and a schedule was set which enabled accomplishment of
basic tests in each defined area of interest. A summary of findings is
given as follows:
TASK A - Explosions at vacuum do not represent a hazard to the chamber
or the closures because the internal pressure rise during the
explosion would not exceed the external pressure. However,
damage to fragile internal components could be expected
because of the high temperatures encountered.
Explosions cannot occur at atmospheric conditions if the
combustible gases are completely mixed with and diluted by
the chamber air. If separation or stratification of the com-
bustible gases occurs, dangerous explosions can occur at
atmospheric conditions which might result in damage to the
Main Access Door, the Main Lock Doors, and the Lunar Plane
Support Structure. Modification recommendations are discussed _
in Section 3.1.5, page 3-114.
TASK B - The major hazard is considered to exist during Stand-by
Conditions - not while the chamber is actually in service.
Gas detection systems are recommended for both stand-by
(atmospheric) and operating (vacuum) conditions. Fire-detection
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NORTHROP SPACE LABORATORIES
systems and fire suppression systems for stand-by conditions
only are recovmnended. The reconlnended suppressant is high-
expansion foam.
TASK C - Tests indicate that a total spill of the full Apollo cryogenic
fuel storage into the evacuated Chamber A would result in
gas mixtures which are readily ignitable. Partial fuel spills
or half load spills_vuld result in mixtures found to be
below lower reaction ranges. Following a total or partial
H2+O 2 spill into Chamber A at atmospheric pressure, if the
spilled gases completely mix with the chamber air, no fire
or explosion hazard would remain because the air dilution
results in a non-lgnitable mixture. Only undiluted temporar-
ily separated or stratified volumes or localized gas "pockets"
such as inside the Service Module or the chamber dome would
present specific hazards. Gas mixtures trapped (or restrained)
_nslde the Service Module could be highly explosive. If a
spill of both 02 and H2 occurred inside the Service Module
the excess would vent out Into the surrounding chamber. With
the chamber at atmospheric pressure, the gases would vent only
to approximately 15 psi, and a very explosive gas mixture
comprising approximately 20% of the full cryogenic storage
could remain in the Service Module for long periods.
Detonation of the gas mixture contained in the Service Module
would result in damage to the chamber because of both blast
pressure effects and fragmentation of the Service Module.*
*Powerful detonations were indicated by a series of tests performed
using frangible plastic canisters to simulate the Service Module
filled with an exploslve H2+O 2 mixture. These containers were exploded
within a simulated Chamber ,,An at various pressures. Pressure measure-
ments and high speed motion pictures in color were made of the
explosions. (Further details on pages 3-36 and 4-37).
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NORTHROP SPACE LABORATORIES
At vacuum conditions the gases will vent out of the Service
Module rapidly with little probability for containment of
sufficient gases at a pressure high enough to explode
violently.
This hazards study was performed over a very brief time span
(3 months) which did not allow for probability studies, nor
for a thoroughly comprehensive, exhaustive test series to
explore all possible conditions of hazard. Under most
conditions representative of a fuel spinn in Chamber A,
detonation reactions are difficult to attain - only combustion
flame waves appear likely.
TASK D - Thermal shock effects do not represent a hazard to the
chamber at vacuum or under ambient conditions. The total
rupture of LH 2 and LO 2 tankage is of negligible significance
- no structural failure. Effects of LN 2 spill at ambient
_onditions are of minor consequence - local permanent deform-
atlons at the bottom head are possible. Careful manipulation
of thermal shroud zone-control valves can minimize this hazard.
1-3 NSL 65-136-1
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NORTHROP SPACE LABORATORIES
SECTION 2.0
INTRODUCTION
Northrop Space Laboratories has performed a Hazards Study for the
NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, at Houston, Texas. The topic investigated
was the hazard associated with operation of Chamber A in the Space
Environment Simulation Laboratory (SESL), specifically when containing
an Apollo vehicle with cryogenic Hydrogen and Oxygen on board.
This document comprises the Final Report for the project, delivered
at completion of the 13-week study period. An Interim (oral) Report was
delivered at NASA, Houston, after 6 weeks of effort, to summarize
progress to that point, and to outline the course of work for the
remainder of the study.
2.1 BACKGROUND
The Space Environment Simulation Laboratory (SESL) at the Manned
Spacecraft Center has been designed to perform qualification and thermal-
vacuum testing of full-scale spacecraft in the size range of Apollo and
similar vehicle systems. The simulated environments include hard
vacuum, cold black space, and solar radiation capabilities. Chamber A
will accommodate the C_and Module and Service Module portions of the
Apollo system (See Figure 2.1-1).
During the conceptual design of the facility, it was assumed that
all tests could be conducted with dummy fluids in all fuel tanks aboard
the spacecraft. However, during construction of the chamber, numerous
problems were occurring in the development of space vehicles which led
to requests for considering possibility of use of certain real fluids
on board test items to be installed in the chamber. These inquiries
2-I NSL 65-136-1
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FIGURE 2.1-1 CHAMBER A - SPACE ENVIRONMENTAL SIMULATION LABORATORY
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resulted in the performance of a Chemical Hazards Potential Study during
the latter part of 1964 (by Northrop Space Laboratories). General con-
clusions from that study were to the effect that hypergolic fluids
should absolutely not be introduced into the SESL. Furthermore, it
suggested that stringent limitations be placed on quantities, if cryo-
genic fuels were to be introduced.
The above study also referred to the hazards of potential explo-
sions within Chamber A_ but _t did not go into a detailed explosion-
dynamics analysis nor did it include any testing program for this
purpose. During the time since publication of that report, the decision
has been made that cryogenic Hydrogen and Oxygen must be loaded aboard
the Apollo Service Module during tests in the SESL in order to assure
the Module' s qualification. With this requirement stated, and with the
hazard potential of the cryogens having already been made apparent, the
need for further detailed inquiry into this explicit hazard was evident.
These factors led to the undertaking of this present study - a detailed
investigation into cryogenic Hydrogen/Oxygen hazards, including ana-
lytical work in explosion dynamics, and a parallel testing program to
support the analysis.
2.2 SCOPE OF STUDY
The contract for this work outlines the study requirements under
the heading ,,Exhibit A, Statement of Work". (Further directions are
also included within the Request for Proposal which led up to this
project.) Specifically, the work is divided into 4 task assignments
which are su_marlzed as follows:
TASK A - CRYOGENIC USAGE
I. Determine loads due to explosion hazards.
2. Calculate chamber capability and response.
3. Suggest modifications; estimate (+__20%) Cost & Schedule.
I
I
TASK B - FIRE HAZARD, DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION
I. Analyze hazardous operating conditions and Ignition
Source s.
2. Analyze detection techniques; determine suitability.
I
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TASK B - (continued)
4. Recommend equipment; estimate Cost & Schedule for
installation.
TASK C - FLAMMABILITY AND EXPLOSIVITY
I. Laboratory testing.
2. Data analysis
TASK D - CYROGENIC SPILLS & LEAKS
I. Determine problems associated with LH 2, LO 2, LN 2
spills.
2. Stress Analysis for Ambient and Vacuum conditions.
3. Assess hazard.
Tasks A and D are analytical studies concerned with structural
analysis of Chamber A, and were performed by the subcontractor team of
Agbabian-Jacobsen Associates (AJA).
Task B is an analytical study of proposed safety systems, performed
by NSL. Task C (also performed by NSL) is an experimental program con-
cerned with the nature of Hydrogen/Oxygen reactions, to furnish data for
use in Task A.
The present study is limited to considering the hazard potentials
of cyrogenic Hydrogen and Oxygen (and Nitrogen). The conclusions of
this report will include recommendations for dealing with these hazards,
such as: structural modifications or additions, safety system instal-
lations, required safety precautions, specified operation procedures,
etc.
2-4 NSL 65-136-1
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NORTHROP SPACE LABORATORIES
SECTION 3.0
ANALYTICAL STUDIES
In this section are included all the findings of the analytical
studies. The sequence of reporting is somewhat inverted (relative to
the contract 'Task" assignment sequence) in order that the work (Tasks
A and D) of the contractor team, Agbabian-Jacobsen Associates (AJA),
may be presented in smooth continuity. The experimental findings
(Task C) are presented in Section 4.0. The analytical findings for
Chamber A will appear in this order:
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.1
Theoretical Analysis for Explosive Effects (Task A)
Critical Thermal-Shock Stresses Due to Cryogen Spills (Task D)
Fire Safety System Recommendations (Task B)
ANALYSIS OF CHAMBER A STRUCTURE AND SUBSYSTEMS FOR CRYOGENIC
EXPLOSIONS
3.1.1 Chamber and Vehicle Configuration
The chamber is a cylindrical structure with spherical ends. It is
supported in a vertical position with columns along the periphery of
the cylinder. Figures 3.1-1 and 3.1-2 show the basic characteristics
of the chamber and the position of the space vehicle during testing.
The vehicle is supported in a near central position on the lunar plane
by a space frame approximately I0 feet in height.
The service module (which is the lower portion of the vehicle) is
approximately 12.5 feet in diameter and 14.75 feet in height, The con-
figuration shown in Figure 3.1-3 is used in assessing the confined
explosion hazard. This is further discussed in Section 3.1.2.
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3.1.2 Definition of Hazard
3.1,2.1 Criteria
There are two cryogenic hydrogen tanks and two cryogenic oxygen
tanks within the service module. The maximum storage condition is 56
pounds of cryogenic hydrogen at 250 psi pressure and 640 pounds of
cryogenic oxygen at 900 psi pressure. Rupture of the tanks will cause
a rapid dispersal of the cryogens_ and if an ignition source is present_
an explosion potential will exist.
The Statement of Work states that the following conditions should
be analyzed.
a. Cryogenic hydrogen and oxygen are released and ignited in
Chamber A.
bo The storage tanks may be filled to full capacity or half
capacity.
c. A detonation source may exist with the two initial conditions_
(I) chamber is at vacuum_ (2) chamber is at atmospheric
pressure,
In order to perform a theoretical analysis three cases are formu-
lated in this study, each case producing an environment that could in-
duce a pressure or fragment hazard to the chamber and subsystems.
Case I: The cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen spill inside the service
module and the mixture ignites before any appreciable
venting occurs. The resulting explosion approximates a
confined condition within the service module and an
equivalent TNT explosion is derived. The chamber may
initially be at vacuum or atmospheric pressure.
Case II: The cryogenic spill in the service module vaporizes and
vents to the chamber. After complete venting to the
chamber and uniform mixing with any air present_ a
source of ignition can create a flame front with and
without a detonation. The chamber may initially be at
vacuum or atmospheric pressure.
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Case III: Violent expansion of the gases and droplets into the
vacuu_ occurs as a result of failure of the cryogenic
fluid containers. The energy release (referred to as
a mechanical explosion) results in a dynamic pressure
pulse into the chamber.
The results of the analysis for each case are described in the
following subsections.
3.1.2.2 Case I: Confined Chemical Explosion
a. Introduction
The hazards considered in this part of the program are assoc-
iated with the effects of explosions resulting from ignition of spills
of mixtures of the cryogenic fluids, hydrogen and oxygen, while they
are still within the confines of the service module. The hazards to
the space chamber due both to the fragmentation of the service module
and to the blast pressures are estimated for spills of a full load and
a half load of cryogenic fluids when the chamber is evacuated or filled
with air at one atmosphere.
The cryogenic oxygen is held in two storage tanks within the ser-
vice module at a pressure of 900 psig_ and the cryogenic hydrogen is
held in two storage tanks at a pressure of 250 psig. Since the fluids
are stored at pressures above the critical pressure for each fluid, it
is assumed that the fluids are in the supercritical state. The specific
volume or density of each stored fluid is determined from the weight of
the fluid and the volume of the respective storage tank. The tempera-
ture is then determined from the P-V-T relationship for each fluid.
It is assumed that the hydrogen is in the para-hydrogen form, which is
the equilibrium form of cryogenic hydrogen. The values used in this
study for the storage tank dimensions and the corresponding properties
of the stored cryogenic fluids are listed below.
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Storage Tank Diameter
Storage Tank Volume
Fluid Weight in Each Tank
Fluid Pressure
Fluid Density
Fluid Temperature
Hydrogen Oxygen
OR _vJ_ in 9_ in
i0 ft3 5.3 ft3
28 ibs 320 ibs
250 psig 900 psig
2.8 Ibs/ft 3 60 Ibs/ft 3
63°R 228°R
Detailed drawings of the service module are not available, so that
the dimensions and locations of various components are estimated from
measurements made of cutaway sketches of the service module. (See
Figure 3.1-3 for isometric view of assumed configuration). The service
module has a diameter of 12.5 feet and a length of 14.75 feet. The
space within the module appears to be at least 50 percent occupied with
storage tanks, structural members, and other equipment. Therefore, the
free space volume is assumed to be 900 cubic feet. It appears that all
sections of the service module have fairly large openings to a common
central space. However, there are horizontal panels separating the
cryogenicstorage tanks. The cross-sectional area for venting to the
outsidecannot be determined with any degree of certainty. Nevertheless,
for purposes of this study, it is assumed that gases can flow between
the several module sections with little or no resistance, but that vent-
ing of gases to the outside is restricted by a much smaller opening.
Therefore, the vent area is assumed to be i00 square inches, which is
equivalent to a one inch annular opening, such as might exist around
the rocket nozzle.
The reader is referred to Section 3.1.2.4 (Case III: Mechanical
Explosions) of the report for a more detailed description of the physical
phenomena occurring when a high pressure supercritical fluid is spilled
into an evacuated or lower pressure space. Upon a rupture of the cryo-
genic tanks the fluids rapidly expand into the free space within the
module to a pressure dependent on temperature and quantity of fluid.
It is assumed that the rapid expansion of the cryogenic fluids at high
velocities causes a rapid mixing between these fluids, and between the
fluids and any air when present. The higher gas pressure within the
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service module causes the fluids to be ejected through the vent area at
rates dependent on intern_! pressure, and at a steadily decreasing rate
until the service module and chamber pressures are equal. The gradual
warming of the service module and contained gases following a rupture
causes a continual slow ejection of gas until ambient temperatures are
reached. Therefore_ the time of ignition of the spilled fluids is an
important factor which determines the level of the confined explosion
hazard. In this study, the predicted explosion effects are determined
for various periods of ignition delay between an ignition occurring
simultaneously with the spill and an ignition after the service module
pressure is in equilibrium with the space chamber pressure.
In order to determine the TNT equivalence of explosions derived from
cryogenic spills, it is necessary to understand the interactions between
the spilled fluids_ the ambient air_ if present_ and the service module
structure_ as well as the interaction between the exploding gases and
the module and chamber structures. The time dependence of various phen-
omena affecting the conditions of the spilled fluids must be recognized
in the evaluation of the hazard magnitude and duration. Thus, the
mobility of the fluids in question provide a transient hazard situation
following a spill_ in addition to the longer duration hazards occurring
after equilibrium is attained. The following paragraphs discuss the
procedure and physical data used to calculate the TNT equivalence of
explosions possible in the event of cryogenic spills within the service
module.
b. TNT Equivalence for Confined Explosions
The explosive effects of TNT have been studied and previously
reported in the literature. The effects of exploding given amounts of
TNT within the service module can be predicted by using the available
experimental data with appropriate correlations for the service module
and chamber configurations. Therefore_ it is necessary to determine the
TNT equivalence of explosions due to ignition of the spilled cryogenic
fluids.
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The force of a cryogenic fluid explosion can be related to the
force of a TNT explosion, for which damage effects can be estimated.
To obtain the TNT equivalence it is necessary to estimate the energy
released by an explosion of equal weights of TNT and the cryogenic fluids
and transferred to the confining structure or surrounding atmosphere.
The energy transmitted from the expanding products of a detonation into
the blast wave is given by the following equation:
A = P (vf (3 l-l)a - vi)
where A = the work done on the atmosphere per unit weight of explosive,
P = the ambient atmospheric pressure, 14.7 psia,
a
vf = the specific volume of the explosion product gas,
v. = the specific volume of the explosive mixture before detona-
I
tion.
The TNT equivalence factory f , is the ratio of the value obtained
from Equation 3.1-I for the explosive in question to the value for TNT,
and is defined by the following equation:
* Pa(Vf " Vi)H (3.1-2)
f = Pa(V f - Vi)TN T
where f = pounds of TNT equivalence per pound of cryogenic gas mixture.
Equation 3.1-2 may be modified as follows by assuming that the ex-
plosion product gas is a perfect gas and that vf _v i for TNT:
. (nfTf - niTi) H
f = (3.1-3)
(nfTf) TNT
where n = moles of gas generated per unit weight of explosive,
Tf = the absolute gas temperature corresponding to vf.
The final temperature of the reaction products, Tf, is obtained by
assuming that all the heat generated by the explosion is absorbed in
raising the temperature of the explosion products. The value of
(nfTf)TN T recommended by Cook (Reference 3.1-1) is I.I x 105
moles/°K/kg.
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The equation for the combustion of the spilled cryogenic gases
with no dissociation may be written as follows:
1.4 H 2 + 02 = 1.4 H20 + 0.3 02
From the above equation, the values of n. and n. for Equation 3.1-3 are
I I
obtained as follows:
(1.4 + 0.3)1000 1700
= --= 49 moles/kg confined gas,
nf = 1.4(18) + 0.3(32) 34.8
(1.4 + I)I000
n --i 34.8 = 69 moles/kg confined gas.
I
I
I
I
I
The temperature, Tf, of the combustion product gas is determined
by using an enthalpy balance, where the heat of reaction is used to
raise the temperature of the reaction products. The resulting tempera-
ture, Tf, for no dissociation is 4320°K. The value of the TNT equiva-
lence is calculated from Equation 3.1-3 as follows:
* 49(4320) - 69(50)
f = = 1.9 kg TNT/kg confined gas.
I.I x 105
It should be noted that the U. S. Bureau of Mines measured an
equivalence value of 2 pounds of TNT per pound of stoichiometric liquid
hydrogen and solid oxygen mixture.
I
I
I
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The damage effects for exploding TNT are based on measurements
made at atmospheric pressure. In the case of the chamber at ambient
pressure, the chamber pressure is essentially constant at one atmosphere.
However, in the case of the evacuated chamber, the pressure varies from
zero to a value less than atmospheric pressure during the venting.
Since the explosive force applied to the space chamber by a blast wave
is directly proportional to the pressure within the chamber_ Equation
3.1-3 must be multiplied by the ratio of the actual space chamber
pressure to one atmosphere pressure to obtain TNT equivalence for
cryogenic mixtures spilled in the evacuated chamber. Accordingly, the
equivalence factor for blast wave damage to the space chamber is depend-
ent on the chamber pressure as follows:
Unpublished data
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where PE and Pa
pectivelyo
fE = 1"9 PE/Pa (3.1-4)
= the chamber pressure and one atmosphere pressure, res-
Similarly, the fragmentation energy expended on the service module
is directly proportional to the pressure within the service module prior
to the explosion. Therefore, to obtain the fragmentation effect on the
service module it is necessary to modify the equivalence factor as
follows:
fM = 1.9 P/P (3.1-5)a
where P = the gas pressure within the service module.
Experiments indicate that the explosion energy yields are often
less than the theoretical calculated values because of incomplete com-
bustion usually due to non-uniform mixing of the reactants. Most exper-
iments undertaken to determine explosive characteristics of cryogenic
fuels and oxidizers involve the simultaneous spilling and subsequent
ignition of the cryogenic liquld reactants in an uncontained ambient
atmosphere. Therefore, it is not surprising that the reactants produce
only 5 to 20 percent of the theoretical explosive yields under the above
conditions (Reference 3o1-1).
Releasing the reactants in a closed container not only provides
a better chance for mixing, but ensures a greater pressure rise with
attendent higher explosive energy yields upon ignition. Investigators
at A.E.R.E° Harwell (Reference 3.1-2) obtained explosive yields between
60 and 80 percent of theoretical values for contained gaseous mixtures
of hydrogen and air. On the other hand, when they ignited liquid hydro-
gen as it spilled on solid air in the same container, the explosive
yields varied between 22 and 42 percent of theoretical. The latter
values reflect the fact that complete mixing was impossible because the
solid oxygen was not dispersed sufficiently well in the liquid hydrogen,
and that unburned hydrogen was expelled from the container by the ex-
panding gases.
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When high pressure supercritical fluids are spilled in close prox-
imity within an evacuated or ambient pres_ire container_ a degree of
mixing similar to that obtained for gases is expected. In the particu-
lar situation of this study, the horizontal panels separating the cryo-
genic tanks are expected to cause some stratification of the spilled
fluids. Therefore, a factor of 0.5 is used to reduce the theoretical
TNT equivalence factors calculated in this study. However, to allow for
the better mixing expected with time after a spill in a closed container,
the above mentioned factor is increased linearly with time, so that a
value of 0.8 is attained when the service module pressure drops to the
ambient chamber pressure.
c. Time Dependence of Confined Explosion Hazard
In order to determine the level of the confined explosion haz-
ard as a function of ignition delay time, it is necessary to estimate
the quantity of spilled cryogenic fluid contained by the service module
as a function of time after a spill. The amount of cryogenic fluid
within the service module is proportional to the confined gas pressure.
The rate of venting of the cryogenic fluid from the module is dependent
on the gas pressures in the service module and space chamber, the ser-
vice module and space chamber, the service module volume, the vent area,
and the gas properties. The fluid flow relationships applicable to the
venting process are presented below.
Whenever a gas flows through a restriction between two regions,
where the ratio of the downstream to upstream absolute pressures is less
than the critical pressure ratio, the gas flow rate at the restriction
cannot exceed the sonic velocity of the gas. The critical pressure ratio
for hydrogen, oxygen, and air is 0.53. Pressure-time relationships both
for sonic and for sub-sonic flow regimes are considered in this section.
The isothermal change in pressure of a contained perfect gas with
time when it is being vented at sonic velocity is related to the system
geometry and gas properties by the following relationship which has been
derived from the equation given by Perry (Reference 3.2-3) for sonic
flow through an orifice:
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.... (3. I-6)
de V L M / [_%/+ 1/ ]
where P = pressure of contained gas (gas pressure within the service
module),
0 = time,
S = cross-sectional area of vent,
V = volume of gas container,
g = gravitational constant,
%/-- specific heat ratio of gas_
R = gas constant_
T = absolute temperature of gas,
M = molecular weight of gas.
For an isothermal process, the integration of Equation 3.1-6 yields
an equation which can be used to determine the pressure-time relation-
ship for sonic flow conditions:
8 = g _g7 RT/ log e (3.1-7)
where P = initial contained gas pressure (within the service module).
o
Similarly, for the sub-sonic gas flow regime, the isothermal change
in the contained gas pressure with time for a perfect gas is related to
the system geometry and the gas properties by the following relation-
ship (Reference 3.1-3) :
[2 g RT P (P - PE )]1/2
dPd__= - O.71 s_[ M -] (3.l-S)
where PE = the external gas pressure (within the space chamber).
Integration of the above equation for an isothermal process gives
the following pressure-time relationship:
I' t1/2
e = 1.4 _ RT l°ge 112 -- - -- (3.1-9)
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The effect of the assumption of an isothermal process for the
derivation of the above equations on the calculated values is discussed
for each chamber condition separately in the following sections.
(I) TNT Equivalence Factors for the Evacuated Chamber.
This part of the study is concerned with the hazards
associated with ignition of the spilled cryogenic fluids within the con-
fines of the service module when the space chamber has been evacuated.
The determination of the actual conditions of the fluid mixture as a
function of time after a spill is very complex and dependent on several
unknown factors, such as the service module volume, vent area, the de-
gree of mixing, fluid flow paths, the temperature, area, and heat capa-
city of exposed surfaces in the service module, etc. In view of the
above uncertainties, several assumptions have been made and are dis-
cussed below.
Since the liquid or solid particles formed upon expansion of the
cryogenic fluids are in equilibrium with the vapor, contact with warm
surfaces causes rapid vaporization. Heat transfer rates to boiling
fluids are generally around I000 times greater than heat transfer rates
to the fluid vapor. The exposed surfaces within the service module are
very likely to have sufficient area and heat capacity to vaporize any
solid or liquid particles in contact with them. In addition, a signifi-
cant fraction of these particles will be vented with the gas stream.
As was mentioned previously, the flow equations were derived for an
isothermal process condition. The actual temperatures of the expanding
fluids vary from the initial storage temperatures to temperatures near
the melting points. The normal boiling point temperatures of the fluids
have been used to determine the average gas temperature, which intro-
duces a maximum error of less than 20 percent in the initial and final
flow rates. Assumption of the perfect gas law tends to compensate for
the above error with regard to the initial service module pressure.
Thus, the use of the normal boiling point temperature and an isothermal
process probably introduces less error than several of the other assump-
tions mentioned above.
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The average temperature of the spilled fluids is the mole ratio
average of their normal boiling tem_.peraturesobtained as follows:
T = nHTH + nOT0 = 28 (36.6) + 20 (163) = 89OR
nH + n o 28 + 20
where nH andn 0 = moles of hydrogen and oxygen, respectively.
The average molecular weight of the spilled fluids is obtained as
follows:
WH + WO 56 + 640
M = = = 14.5
nH + n O 28 + 20
The specific heat ratio, y, is assumed to be 1.4 for the gas mix-
ture. When the above gas properties and the previously mentioned values
for the service module volume and vent area are substituted into
Equation 3.1-7, the following relationship is obtained:
8 . 3°4 loge (__.9_o) (3.1-10)
Similarly Equation 3.1-9 is simplified to the following equation:
(po _ PoPE ) 1/2+ eo" PE/2 (3.1-11)
P- PE/2
The initial service module pressure is calculated as follows:
p . nR______T= 48 (10.7)(89) . 51 psia
o V 900
,
For a space chamber volume of 300,000 cubic feet , the final space
chamber pressure after complete venting, and while the gas is still
cold, 89°R, is as follows:
n R T 48 (10.7)(89)
= = 0.15 psla
PE = V 3 x 105
A net volume of 300,000 cubic feet has been estimated by allowing for
internal equipment that occupies approximately 20,000 cubic feet.
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Thus, the chamber pressure increases from zero to 0.15 psia as the ser-
vice module pressure decreases from 50 to 0.15 psia, and they are relat-
ed approximately as follows:
PE = 0.15 - 0.O03P (3.1-12)
The amount of cryogenic gas confined by the service module is pro-
portional to the pressure, P, within the module.
Values obtained for the gas pressures and the equivalent TNT quan-
tities as a function of the ignition delay time after a simultaneous
spill of the full load of cryogenic fluids are listed in Table 3.1-1.
The initial confined gas pressure shown in Column (2) of Table 3.1-1 is
the value calculated above from the perfect gas law using the assumed
service module volume and average temperature for a full load spill.
The ignition delay time after a spill shown in Column (i) is obtained
for the confined gas pressure shown in Column (2) by using Equation
3.1-10 for pressures down to 0.29 psia and Equation 3.1-11 for pressures
between 0.29 and 0.15 psia. The chamber pressure shown in Column (3)
is obtained from Equation 3.1-12 using the values of the confined gas
pressure shown in Column (2). The weight of the confined gas shown in
Column (4) is directly proportional to the confined gas pressure shown
in Column (2) starting with the full load value of 696 pounds of oxygen
and hydrogen.
The theoretical TNT equivalent weights shown in Columns (5) and
(6) are obtained by multiplying the weight of the confined gas in Column
(4) by the TNT equivalent values calculated by Equations 3.1-4 and
3.1-5, respectively. The effective TNT equivalent weights shown in
Columns (7) and (8) are obtained from the corresponding values shown in
Columns (5) and (6) by applying the mixing factor, which varies from an
initial value of 0.5 to a final value of 0.8 linearly over the time
period from 0 to 6 seconds ignition delay time after a spill, and re-
mains at 0.8 thereafter.
The same procedure is used to calculate the values for spills in-
volving half of the full load of cryogenics, i.e., one tank each of
hydrogen and oxygen. The values obtained for the confined gas pressure,
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and the equivalent TNT quantities as a function of elapsed time after a
half-load spill are !isted in Table 3.1-2. The chamber gas pressure
after a spill is only one-half the value for a full-load spill, i.e.
only 0.075 psia, Values of the TNT equivalence for the blast effect are
not listed because they are less than one pound of TNT, i.e. negligible.
(2) TNT Equivalence Factors for the Ambient Chamber.
This part of the study is concerned with the hazards
associated with ignition of the spilled cryogenic fluids within the con-
fines of the service module when the space chamber is at a pressure of
one atmosphere. In this case, expansion of the cryogenic fluids does
not progress to the point of solidification of any material because the
expanded gas pressure remains above the triple point pressure. Since
the temperature drop of the expanding gas is correspondingly less than
during expansion into a vacuum, the use of the normal boiling tempera-
tures for the average fluid temperatures in an isothermal process, pro-
duces a smaller error in the estimated flow rates than was mentioned
for the evacuated chamber. The comments made previously about the un-
certainties and assumptions involved in the analysis of spills occurring
when the chamber is evacuated, also apply for spills in the ambient
pressure condition.
The average temperature of the mixture of air and spilled fluids
within the service module is found by assuming that all of the air orig-
inally in the service module before a spill is mixed with the cryogenic
fluids. The air in the service module is assumed to be at 540°R. The
moles of air in the service module are found from the perfect gas law
as follows:
PV 14.7(900)
n _ _
a RT I0,7(540_ = 2.3 moles confined alr,
The average temperature of the spilled fluids in the air within the ser-
vice module is the mole ratio of their normal boiling temperatures and
the air temperature, obtained as follows:
AJA 3-19 NSL 65-136-1
!
T -- rtHTH + n0T0 + n Ta a = 28(36.6) + 20(163) + 2.3(540) = ll0OR
nH + no + na 28 + 20 + 2.3
The average molecular weight of the spilled fluid mixture is obtained
as follows:
WH + W0 + Wa 56 + 640 + 67
M s -- = 15
nH + n o + na 28 + 20 + 2.3
Substitution of the above gas properties and the previously men-
tioned values for the service module volume and vent area into Equation
3.1-7 gives the following equation:
0 = 3.1 loge (_--9-°) (3.1-13)
Substitution of the above values into Equation 3.1-9 gives the following
relationship:
0 -- 2.1 log e (3. I- 14)
The service module pressure after a spill prior to any venting is
found from the perfect gas law as follows
p = nRT = 50.3(10.7)(110) = 66 psia
o V 900
The complete venting of the spilled fluids into the space chamber raises
the chamber pressure to 14.9 psia, so that the chamber pressure remains
essentially constant at 14.7 psia during the venting period. The tran-
sition between sonic and subsonic flow occurs at a service module
pressure of 28 psia. The amount of cryogenic gas confined by the service
module is proportional to the pressure within the module.
The amount of air mixed with the spilled cryogenic fluids in the
service module is only 5 percent by volume. Therefore, the values of
nf and Tf are assumed to be essentially the same as those calculated for
spills in the evacuated chamber, and the TNT equivalence factor is
based on only the confined cryogenic gas weight.
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The values obtained for the confined gas pressure, and the equiva-
lent TNT quantities as a function of elapsed time after a full-load
spill are listed in Table 3.1-3. The procedures used to calculate the
values in Table 3.1-3 are described in the previous section regarding
the values in Table 3.1-1.
The calculated values obtained for a spill involving half of the
full load of cryogenics are listed in Table 3.1-4.
d. Summary of the Confined Explosion Potential for the Spilled
Cryogenics
The equivalent TNT weights for the blast pressure and frag-
mentation potential effects associated with a full-load spill in a
vacuum are plotted as a function of ignition delay time in Figure 3.1-4.
It should be noted that the confined cryogenic gases escape from the
service module very rapidly. Thus, the amount of delay time before ig-
nition determines the magnitude of the fragmentation hazard from a con-
fined explosion. It should also be noted that the maximum energy
release requires the simultaneous rupture of all storage tanks and simul-
taneous ignition of the confined gases; and the confined explosion hazard
becomes negligible after an ignition delay of only 15 seconds.
Because of the very low chamber pressures resulting from the vent-
ing of the cryogenic gases, the blast pressure from a confined explosion
is negligible throughout the venting period. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the unconfined explosion effect (see Section 3.1.2.3) will
predominate if the vented cryogenic gas in the chamber warms sufficient-
ly to sustain a detonation.
The equivalent TNTweights for the fragmentation effect associated
with a half-load spill in a vacuum are plotted also in Figure 3.1-4.
The initial equivalent TNT weight for the fragmentation effect is much
less than half the value for the full-load spill because of the lower
initial pressure of the contained gas within the service module. The
fragmentation hazard becomes negligible after about I0 seconds ignition
delay time.
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The equivalent TNT weights for the blast and fragmentation effects
associated with a full-load spill in air at one atmosphere are plotted
as a function of the ignition delay time in Figures 3.1-5 and 3oi-6_
respectively. The resulting service module gas pressure due to a cryo-
genic spill drops to the chamber air pressure in a relatively short
period of time. Nevertheless_ a significant amount of explosive gas
mixture remains in the service module after venting because of the
ambient air pressure in the space chamber. In addition_ the equivalent
TNT weight for the blast effect is much greater than the amount calcu-
lated for the evacuated chamber_ because the blast wave from an explo-
sion can be transmitted only through a medium. The equivalent TNT
weight for the fragmentation effect has a very high initial value be-
cause of the high initial pressure of the spilled cryogenic gas mixture
within the service module. The fragmentation hazard drops very rapidly
with ignition delay time because both the quantity of explosive gas and
its pressure within the service module falls very rapidly; but after
venting it remains at the same level as the blast hazard because the
residual gas in the service module is at ambient gas pressure.
Associated with a spill in the ambient chamber is an attendant
hazard from a possible explosion in the hydrogen plume escaping from
the service module. The escaping cryogenic gases will not be completely
mixed with the ambient air immediately on venting from the service mod-
ule_ so that the explosion hazard will be much greater than that calcu-
lated for Case II_ (see Section 3.1.2.3) where complete mixing and
dilution is assumed.
The equivalent TNTweights for blast and fragmentation effects
associated with a half-load spill in air at one atmosphere are plotted
in Figures 3.1-5 and 3.1-6_ respectively, Again the reduction in the
equivalent TNTweight for the initial fragmentation effect is less than
one-half of the full-load value because of the lower confined gas
pressure within the service module. The time required to reach pressure
equilibrium is less than 5 seconds. The final equivalent TNT weight is
lower than for a full-load spill because of the lower ratio of hydrogen
to air resulting from the half-load spill.
!
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The confined explosion potential is summarized in Table 3.1,5.
TABLE 3,1-5
SUMMARY OF CONFINED EXPLOSION POTENTIAL
Blast Effect
Full Load
Half Load
Fra$mentation Effect
Effective TNT Equivalent Weight - Pounds TNT
In Vacuum In Ambient Air
Before After Before After
Venting Venting Venting Venting
Negligible Negligible 650 215
.
Negligible Negligible 325 175
Full Load 2250 Negligible 2900 215
Half Load 560 Negligible 900 175
The full-load blast effect peaks at 2 pounds TNT about 3 seconds after
a spill. The half-load blast effect peaks below I pound TNT after a
spill.
e. Pressure Pulse Versus TNT Explosion
Both theoretical and experimental methods have been used (see
References 3.1-4, 3.1-5 and 3.1-6) to determine blast wave characteris-
tics from point source or finite source explosions. A typical blast
wave, after a shock front is developed, is shown in Figure 3.1-7. The
front has an instantaneous rise and decays very rapidly in an exponent-
ial manner.
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Pi + Po---k Pi = Peak incident pressure
I\ p = Initial pressure ahead of the
o shock front. In free air this
k would be iA.7 psi.
_ T = Positive phase duration.
_o
T _ t__ iime.... _-
TYPICAL PRESSURE - TIME CURVE
FIGURE 3.1-7
The incident pressure, Pi' and time duration, T, as a function of
distance are the important parameters for the dynamic analysis. Based
on the work in the references cited, Figures 3.1-8, and 3.1-9 plot
overpressure, Pi' as a function of equivalent TNT and distance (range);
and duration, T, as a function of equivalent TNT and overpressure_ res-
pectively. (These curves are based on Po = 14.7 psi_ and an unconfined
space.) The range and time durations vary in proportion to the cube
root of the equivalent TNT yield.
For example, from Figure 3.1-8:
at W 1 =
Pi --
and at W 2 =
Pi = 27 psi;
or by cube root scaling_
R I
I0 Ibs and at R 1 = I0 ft,
27 psi;
I0,000 ibs and at R2 = I00 ft,
for constant pressure.
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Similarly, from Figure 3.1-9:
at W 1 =
_i = 1.9 ms;
and at W 2
_2 = 8.8 ms,
•r'l" _ -- (100)
v2 8.8
or .... 4.65.
TI 1.9
f. Fragmentation Potential
I0 Ibs and at Pi = 27 psi,
= I000 Ibs and at Pi = 27 psi,
= 4.65,
It is assumed that a detonation within the service module will
break up the service module and subsystem components into small parts,
and the moving pressure front will impart an impulse to the fragments.
The internal pressure at the walls of the service module at the instant
of rupture may be estimated from an equivalent point source detonation
at the center of the service module. The peak incident pressure, at
R equal to 6.4 feet_ is taken as the initial driving force of the frag-
ments.
The maximum impulse occurs when the chamber is at ambient condi-
tions. This condition is treated numerically, and the vacuum condi-
tion is considered relative to the ambient condition. The maximum
impulse is shown in Figure 3.1-i0 for an effective W equal to 2900
pounds, previously derived as the maximum hazard potential for fragment-
.
ation. The effective impulse 9 I, is 2.4 psi-sec, and it establishes the
forcing function in calculating projectile velocities from the basic
impu Ise-momentum equation:
where v = projectile velocity,
A = projectile area,
m = projectile mass.
*See Figure 3.1-10
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ARRIVAL TIMES
(taken from reference 3.1-6)
t _
R (ft) p (psig) s (ms) At = ts-O.08
6.4 9,500 O. 08 o
8.0 5,000 I. 4 O. 08
i0.0 2,400 O. 22 O. 14
12.5 1,3oo 0.38 o.3o
15. o 7oo o. 6o o.52
20.0 380 I. 25 i. 17
30.0 115 3.40 3.32
t = Arrival time
S
I0,000 psi
6,000 psi
f-Effective Impulse on Fragment
I_\ (Ambient Condition)
I_ ,,_--Effective Impulse on Fragment
[ (Vacuum Condition)0OO
= O.57 psi-see
0.5 1.0 ms
Time
FRA_ENTATION IMPULSE
FIGURE 3.1-10
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The impulse,l,at vacuum conditions is significantly reduced since
the pressure drops almost instantaneously with travel of the shock
front into the evacuated chamber. An upper bound to the impulse is cal-
culated by assuming that the decay curve is tangent to the initial slope
of the curve in Figure 3.1-10 for the ambient condition. Therefore, I
is less than 0.57 psi-seco (See Section 3.1.3.3 for effect on fragments.)
3.1.2.3 Case If: Unconfined Chemical Explosion
a. Introduction
The possible hazards to the space chamber due to the unconfined
explosion of spilled cryogenic fluids are analyzed in this section.
This study is divided into two parts. The first considers the possible
explosion phenomena occurring after a spill of the stored cryogenic
oxygen and hydrogen into the evacuated space chamber. The second part
considers the possible explosion events occurring after a spill of the
stored oxygen and hydrogen into the space chamber filled with air at
one atmosphere. In each case, it is assumed that the initial gas mix-
ture is homogenous with respect to composition and temperature. A con-
sideration of explosions of non-uniform mixtures between hydrogen and
air is treated qualitatively.
In order to calculate the effect of pressure loads on the space
chamber components resulting from combustion of the unconfined cryogenic
fluids, it is first necessary to determine the characteristics of the
pressure waves and combustion products created during the burning or
detonation of the combustible mixtures.
When a combustible mixture is ignited, the reactants combine with
a release of energy in a very narrow reaction zone which travels very
rapidly from the source of ignition to the limits of the combustible
material. The energy release causes the reaction product temperature
and pressure to increase in the reaction zone. When the reaction zone
propagates relative to the unburned mixture at subsonic speed by heat
transfer and diffusion processes the phenomenon is referred to as a de-
flagration wave. When a reaction zone travels at supersonic speed rela-
tive to the unburned mixture the phenomenon is referred to as a
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detonation wave. The latter wave is sustained by the rapid release of
chemical energy under the conditions of increased pressure due to a
shock wave preceding the reaction zone.
b. Method of Analysis
The development of the analytical procedure for prediction of
the combustion characteristics for a flammable mixture involves the
application of conventional mass and energy balances to the events
occurring in the reaction zone. The basic relationships are presented
here as a review of well known combustion theories to establish the
basis for the numerical calculations. (See Reference 3.1-7 for a more
detailed discussion.)
In the following presentation the state of the unburned gas is de-
noted by subscript I and the state of the burned gas by subscript 2.
If one considers a plane normal reaction front, advancing with speed U
into a stationary unburned mixture, the following equations in the coor-
dinate system moving with the reaction zone will apply.
The continuity equation is:
I°I U : /02 (U - u2) (3.1-15)
The momentum equation is:
P1 + t°l U2 = P2 + /02 (U - u2 )2
The energy equation is:
PI U2 P2 (U - u2)
- + +
+ el + 2 '_2 e2 2
(3.1-16)
(3.1-17)
where P is the gas pressure, lOis the gas density, e is the internal
energy, and u 2 is the velocity of the burned gas.
Elimination of u 2 and U from Equations 3.1-15, 3.1-16, and 3.1-17
yields the Hugoniot equation:
I (pl + p2) ( 1 1 ) (3.1-18)e2 - el = 2" _:_1 /02
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Equation 3.1-18 may be modified by substitution of the perfect gas law
relating pressure and density of the reactants (State I):
I e2- el--½ (m_-'_'l)R T1 (1 + _)(1- _)
I
I
I
I
I
(3e 1--19)
where n I is the number of moles of reactants, m is the mass of reactants
or products, R is the gas constant, and T I is the temperature of the
reactants. The value of nI and m must be determined from the reaction
equation which represents the gas mixture under consideration. For
example, the following equation represents the possible reaction between
hydrogen and oxygen in the same proportions as are present in the ser-
vice module storage tanks:
1.4 H 2 + 02 = 1.4 H20 + 0.3 02
the value of n I is 2.4, n 2 is 1.7 and m is 34.8.
Using the perfect gas law, the pressures and densities of the
reactants and products are related as follows:
I
I
I
I
P2 n2/°2 T2
-- = (3.1-20)
P1 nlF'l T1
By use of Equations 3.1-19 and 3.1-20 along with the internal energy
values for the reaction_ it is possible to obtain values of the ratios
P2/PI and _i/_02 for various assumed temperatures of reactants and prod-
ucts. A plot of the locus of the above ratios determined for a given
reaction mixture and state, and various state-2 temperatures is called
a Hugoniot curve. A typical Hugoniot curve is shown in Figure 3.1-11.
I
I
I
I
I
The curve has two branches. One is in the region of P2/PI values
greater than unity with /°i/l° 2 values less than unity, which is typical
for shock waves. This branch is designated as the detonation branch.
The other branch of the curve has P2/PI values less than unity with
l°i/P 2 values greater than unity and is referred to as the deflagration
branch. The region of the curve between points A and B corresponds to
imaginary values of u 2 and U and has no physical meaning.
In a detonation wave_ 2 is greater than lOl, which leads to posi-
tive values of u 2 when the densities are substituted in the continuity
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equation. In a deflagration wave,/O 2 is less than/O l, and leads to neg-
ative values of U2o Therefore_ it can be concluded that a detonation
wave accelerates the gas in the direction in which it propagates_ where-
as a deflagration wave accelerates the gas in the direction opposite to
that in which it propagates.
The point of tangency with a line drawn between the point repre-
senting State I and the detonation branch of the Hugoniot curve repre-
sents the state occurring in a Chapman-Jouguet detonation_ and is
designated by the letter D on the Hugoniot curve in Figure 3o1-11o It
can be shown that the Chapman-Jouguet detonation produces the minimum
detonation wave speed for a mixture° Experiments performed with ex-
plosive mixtures in tubes indicate that the speed of propagation of the
detonation waves corresponds to the Chapman-Jouguet condition. Where
only one chemical reaction is possible_ only strong detonations have
physical meaning; i.eo_ a weak detonation_ represented by region A-D on
the Hugoniot curve_ is thermodynamically impossible.
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Similarly_ the point of tangency with a line drawn betwen the
point representing State I and the deflagration branch of the Hugoniot
curve represents the state occurring in a Chapman-Jouguet deflagration,
and is designated by the letter C on the Hugoniot curve in Figure 3.1-11.
It can be shown that the Chapman-Jouguet deflagration produces the max-
imum deflagration wave speed for a mixture. Only weak deflagrations are
possible since entropy increases across such waves, and fully developed
deflagrations correspond to the Chapman-Jouguet condition.
It can also be shown that for the Chapman-Jouguet points:
U = u2 + a2
where a 2 is the speed of sound in the burned gas. Since u 2 is positive
for detonation waves and a2 is greater than al, the velocity of a deton-
ation wave is supersonic relative to the unburned mixture. On the other
handy since u 2 is negative for deflagration waves, the velocity of a
deflagration wave must be subsonic.
The information obtained from determining the Chapman-Jouguet
states for a combustible mixture can be used as follows:
Io The P2/PI ratio for the detonation wave can be used to
predict the peak pressure due to a detonation.
2. The detonation wave velocity can be used to predict the dura-
tion of and travel time for the detonation pressure pulse.
3. The deflagration wave velocity can be used to predict the
pressure rise rate for a deflagration event.
It should be noted that the information obtained for the wave states_
particularly the P2/PI ratio, does not predict the equilibrium pressure
for the burned gas. To obtain the latter value, it is necessary to cal-
culate the equilibrium temperature using the internal energy contents
of the reactants and products together with the applicable reaction
equilibrium constants. The pressure is then calculated for the specific
gas composition determined by the above equilibrium condition and temp-
erature by using the perfect gas law.
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The above method of analysis can be used for any combustible mix-
ture, and is based entirely on reaction equilibria. However, it is
possible that a reaction will not take place even though it is indicat-
ed by the reaction equilibria, because the temperature developed by the
reaction is not high enough to give the reaction rate needed to sustain
the reaction.
c. Calculation of Hugoniot Curve for the Evacuated Space Chamber
The combustion, in this case s involves a mixture of oxygen and
hydrogen at a sub-atmospheric pressure. The initial condition of the
mixture is determined by assuming that the full content of hydrogen and
oxygen in the storage tanks is spilled in the evacuated chamber and the
gas temperature is 540°R. The pressure attained by release of 56 pounds
of hydrogen and 640 pounds of oxygen into a volume of 3 x 105 cubic
feet is 0.9 psia. This pressure is well below atmospheric pressure where
most experimental work has been carried out. It is expected that the
major effect of a low State-i pressure is a greater dissociation of re-
action products for a given temperature than occurs for reactions start-
ing at ambient pressure.
The dissociation relationships used for this study are:
1
H20 = H 2 + _ 02
1
H20 = OH + _ H 2
Equilibrium constants for each reaction have been determined at various
temperatures. The equilibrium constant relates the partial pressures of
the products to the partial pressures of the reactants. Use of the per-
fect gas law allows the conversion of partial pressures to mole concen-
trations.
The equation for the reaction in this study may be written as:
1.4 H 2 + 02 = nH2 H 2 + n H20 H20 + n02 02 + nOH OH
The values of the product mole concentrations vary with State-2 tempera-
tures.
AJA 3-38 NSL 65-136-1
!
!
!
I
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
I
The Hugoniot curve for the combustion of the H 2 and 0 2 mixture in
the evacuated chamber is shown in Figures 3.1-12 and 3.1-13. The de-
tonation and deflagration branches are plotted separately, because it
is difficult to illustrate both branches clearly on one diagram.
The Chapman-Jouguet detonation state is found at the point of tan-
gency on the detonation branch with a line drawn from the point repre-
senting the state of the mixture ahead of the detonation wave. The
values of _ t_ and ,_2 / _2''I _2 -- the Chapman-Jouguet detonation point are
18 and 0.54, respectively. The detonation wave speed calculated from
the above values is 5800 ft/sec, which is the minimum detonation wave
speed for the mixture. The peak pressure in the detonation wave is 17
psia.
The Chapman-Jouguet deflagration state is found at the point of
tangency on the deflagration branch of the Hugoniot curve with a line
drawn from the point representing the initial state of the mixture.
The values of P2/PI and /_i//°2 at the Chapman-Jouguet deflagration point
are 0.46 and 17, respectively. The deflagration wave speed calculated
from the above values is 175 ft/sec, which is the maximum deflagration
wave speed.
The equilibrium temperature of the reaction products is calculated
by assuming that the reaction products absorb the energy released during
combustion. The value obtained for the equilibrium temperature is
5860°R. The corresponding chamber pressure, taking dissociation into
account, is 8 psia.
Figure 3.1-14 shows the chamber pressure fluctuation during com-
bustion of the oxygen and hydrogen mixture. Deflagration occurs at the
maximum wave speed, which travels the i00 feet between chamber top and
bottom in about 0.6 second. A detonation can occur anytime after the
start of combustion and is indicated in the figure by the pressure spike
to 17 psia. The maximum pressure decay period for the detonation wave
is estimated by assuming a 5 foot relaxation distance for the detona-
tion wave, which gives 1 millisecond for pressure decay from 17 psia to
the 8 psia expected in the equilibrium state.
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Figure 3.1-15 shows the curve representing chamber pressure versus
time for the period after the explosion event. The method used to cal-
culate points on the above curve is as follows. Assuming a perfect gas,
the pressure of the reaction product gas is proportional to the gas temp-
erature. A conservative rate of cooling is obtained by assuming that
the heat in the gas is lost only by natural convection cooling to the
chamber walls. The heat capacity of the chamber walls is such that the
wall temperature remains essentially constant during the cooling of the
gas in the chamber_ i.e. the wall temperature rise is only 2°F.
I0
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FIGURE 3.1-15 CHAMBER PRESSURE CHANGE DUE TO COOLING
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The natural convection heat transfer relationship for cooling the
gas at the chamber wall (see Reference 3.1-3) is combined with the gas
temperature and heat capacity relationship, and integrated for the
change in temperature with time to obtain the following equation:
e- A " _-_oJ (3.1-21)
where 8 = time after complete combustion,
A = chamber wall area,
C = reaction product gas heat capacity,
P
W = weight of reaction products,
AT = initial temperature difference between gas and wall,
o
AT = temperature difference between gas and wall at time = e.
The initial gas temperature is assumed to be 5860°R, and the chamber
wall temperature is assumed to be 540°Ro The vertical wall surface area
is assumed to be 20,000 square feet.
An explosion of a half-load spill of the cryogenic oxygen and hy-
drogen is probably unlikely because of the resulting low initial chamber
pressure, 0.45 psia. However, if combustion did take place the pressure
pulses would be no more than one-half of the pressure pulse obtained for
the full-load spill, i.e. 8 psia for the detonation and 4 psia for the
chamber pressure after combustion.
d. Calculation of Hu$oniot Curve for the Space Chamber under
Ambient Pressure
The combustion in this case involves a very dilute mixture of
hydrogen in air with some oxygen enrichment due to the cryogenic spill.
The composition of the chamber gases after a spill of the full load of
cryogenics would be 3.5 percent H2, 22 percent 02 and 74.5 percent N2.
A temperature of 540°R is assumed for the State-i condition. One would
expect that combustion in this mixture is unlikely since the hydrogen
concentration is at the lower limit of flarmmability for hydrogen-air
mixtures.
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The Hugoniot curve has been determined for this mixture in order
to obtain reaction product temperature and pressure values in the event
combustion does occur. The presence of nitrogen greatly lowers product
temperatures to levels where the dissociation of reaction products can
be ignored. This greatly simplifies the solution of the Hugoniot
equation. The reaction can be represented by the following equation:
H 2 + 6.4 02 + 21.5 N2 = H20 + 5.9 02 + 21.5 N2
The Hugoniot curve for the combustion of the cryogenic-air mixture
is shown in Figures 3.1-16 and 3.1-17. A Chapman-Jouguet detonation
state can be determined in the usual manner. The ratios P2/PI and
/°I//Q2 for the Chapman-Jouguet detonation wave are 4.0 and 0.64, res-
pectively. A detonation wave velocity of 2140 ft/sec is obtained from
the above values. The peak pressure in the detonation wave is 59 psia.
It should be pointed out that no detonations have been observed in
hydrogen-air mixtures below a hydrogen concentration of 15 percent.
Reaction rates are highly dependent on temperature, and the indicated
product temperature of 1400°R is too low to allow a detonation wave to
propagate by chemical energy alone. Therefore_ a detonation wave cannot
develop in a combustion of the mixture obtained with air at one atmos-
phere pressure.
The ratios of P2/PI and/Ol/P 2 for the Chapman-Jouguet deflagration
wave are 0.5 and 3.2, respectively. The indicated deflagration wave
speed is 350 ft/second. However, the reaction product temperature is
only 880°R, which indicates that the reaction rate is probably too slow
to propagate a deflagration wave. The literature indicates that 4 per-
cent hydrogen concentration in air is the lower limit of flanTnability.
Therefore, development of a deflagration wave also appears to be unlikely
for the mixture obtained with air at one atmosphere pressure.
The transient conditions, occurring before a cryogenic spill com-
pletely mixes with the ambient air, provide a more flarmmable mixture and
could present a more likely explosion hazard. (See next section on
Non-uniformMixing.)
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The equilibrium temperature of the reaction products, including
the diluents, can be calculated by equating the reaction energy to the
total change in internal energy of all components. The equilibrium
temperature is 1230°Ro The corresponding equilibrium pressure is 35
pSiao The latter pressure rise also occurs during combustion of non-
uniform mixtures of a full load of cryogenic fluids with the ambient
air.
Figure 3.1-18 presents the chamber pressure change with time dur-
ing combustion of the mixture_ assuming that all the hydrogen is burn-
ed. The deflagration wave travels the I00 feet between chamber top and
bottom in about 0.3 second. The magnitude of the calculated detona-
tion pressure spike is 59 psia. Since a detonation is not considered
possible for the uniform mixture of the cryogenics and the ambient air,
the detonation pressure spike has not been included in the figure.
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FIGURE 3.1-18 CHAMBER PRESSURE VS. TIME AFTER IGNITION
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Figure 3o1-19 shows the curve representing chamber _ressure versus
time for the period after the explosion event. The above curve is based
on the calculated change in reaction product temperature due to heat
transfer to the chamber walls. The heat capacity of the walls is such
that the chamber wall temperature remains essentially constant during
the cooling of the gas in the chamber.
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FIGURE 3o1-19 CHAMBER PRESSURE CHANGE DUE TO COOLING
eo Non-uniformMixin_
The effects of a confined explosion within the service module
have been discussed in Section 3.1o2o2o The effects of explosions of
uniform mixtures of the cryogenic fluids with air have been discussed
in this section. It should be noted that the cryogenic fluid mixture_
vented into the space chamber after a spill in the service module_ has
a hydrogen concentration over 55 mol percent_ which is very likely to
detonate upon ignition. The time period required to attain the rela-
tively hazardless uniform mixture with the ambient chamber air is un-
doubtedly very long compared to the period required for venting the ser-
vice module after a spill of the cryogenic fluids.
The cryogenic fluids mix with some air during venting from the ser-
vice module. However_ before much dilution has occurred the hydrogen
density provides a buyoyancy force which carries hydrogen to the chamber
roof. If the hydrogen mixes with less than one-fourth of the air in the
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chamber during the period required to rise to the chamber roof, the con-
centration of the hydrogen is over 14 mol percent, within the detona-
tion range. It is unlikely that the hydrogen will continue to mix with
the air to any significant extent after it reaches the chamber roof be-
cause of the large density differences. Detonations produce incident
pressure pulses of about 20 times the initial pressure or about 300 psi
for hydrogen-air mixtures at ambient pressure. The gas pressure in the
ch_ber after complete burning of all the hydrogen is approximately 35
psia.
It is unlikely that a half-load spill of the cryogenic fluids can
burn when uniformly mixed with the chamber air. However, the non-uniform
mixtures present immediately after a spill can explode with a resulting
pressure pulse as high as 300 psi in the detonation wave and a chamber
pressure as high as 25 psia following the combustion.
3.1.2.4 Case III: Mechanical Explosion
a. Introduction
This section of the study is concerned with the possible haz-
ards arising from the sudden rupture of the cryogenic storage tanks
without any ignition of the fla_able mixtures. The purpose of this
study is to estimate the forces due to the impact of the high velocity
cryogenic fluid on the chamber structure. Tank ruptures occurring when
the chamber is at ambient air pressure are not considered hazardous,
where there is no ignition source, because the kinetic energy of the ex-
panding gas is rapidly dissipated in the stagnant air surrounding the
service module. On the other hand, tank ruptures occurring when the
space chamber is evacuated are accompanied by a very rapid expansion of
the cryogenic fluid into the service module and space chamber. The
possible hazards arising from the pressures produced when these high
velocity gases impinge on the chamber surfaces are considered under this
part of the program.
Two extreme conditions are considered. The first condition assumes
that the service module remains intact, but the spilled cryogenics are
vented through an annular opening around the main thrust engine nozzle,
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so that the discharged gases all impinge on the lunar plane. This mode
of venting is the same as that considered for the confined explosion
hazards analysis under Case I (see Section 3.1.2.2). The second condi-
tion assumes that the aluminum skin of the service module provides no
restriction to the rapid expansion of the spilled cryogenic fluids upon
tank rupture. Each condition is considered separately.
bo Characteristics of Fluid Spills
A sudden release of a supercritical fluid into a vacuum will
cause the fluid to expand at high velocity and cool rapidly. Part of
the fluid will first condense to a liquid and later solidify. However,
the rapid expansion will tend to limit the growth of liquid and solid
particles to a very fine mist or dust, because the process starts with
a fluid density less than that of the condensing liquid and the sudden
expansion during a spill further lowers the fluid density.
The above process is different from a spill of cryogenic liquid
into vacuum, where the reverse process of evaporation from a liquid
phase causes a break-up of the liquid into smaller droplets controlled
by surface forces. Therefore, the range of droplet size and the upper
size limits will be much smaller for the supercritical fluid spill than
for the cryogenic liquid spill. The latter case was investigated by
the Atlantic Research Corporation. (See Reference 3.1-8.)
Impingement of the expanding supercritical fluids will tend to
coalesce fine drops into larger drops. However, because of the fine
droplet size accompanying expansion of a supercritical fluid, impinge-
ment will be much less extensive than the impingement of a spray accom-
panying the sudden expansion of a liquid cryogenic into vacuum. Also,
the very small droplet size in the supercritical fluid expansion causes
the droplet flow path to conform more closely to the gas flow path dur-
ing changes in flow direction than is the case for the larger droplets
accompanying a cryogenic liquid expansion.
A sudden release of the supercritical fluids into the ambient at-
mosphere will result in slightly lower flow velocities near the tank
than for the vacuum release. However, the expansion will not proceed
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to the same extent and, thus, the fluid temperature will not drop as
much as during the expansion in a vacuum. The expanding vapor will tend
to condense into a fine mist, and no solidification will occur. How-
ever, a larger fraction of the fluid will condense than in the case of
the supercritical fluid expansion into a vacuum. The denser fluid med-
ium will tend to cause formation of somewhat larger droplets than in the
case of the vacuum discharge. Maximum fluid velocities at various dis-
tances from the storage tank will be less also. Mixing between the ex-
panding fluid and air will result in cooling the air as well as vapor-
izing the liquid in the droplets.
c. Cryogenic Gas Impinsement on Lunar Plane_ Vented as in Case I
The cryogenic gases vent from the bottom of the service module
at sonic velocities in the manner previously described under Case I.
Thus, the confined gas pressure within the service module as a function
of elapsed time after a spill, calculated for the above case, is also
used in this study. The discharge velocity of the venting gases is
assumed to remain constant, because of the isothermal process condition
used previously. The kinetic energy of all the vented gas is assumed to
be totally converted to a dynamic pressure load on the lunar plane.
Therefore, the total gas pressure on the lunar plane does not depend on
the distance between the vent and lunar plane. This is a conservative
estimate because some of the vented gas does not impinge on the lunar
plane in the actual case, and the gas jet is not entirely normal to the
lunar plane surface. The lunar plane surface area is approximately 1600
square feet.
The load depends on the pressure and density of the confined gas in
the service module which decreases with time. The load is directly pro-
portional to the vent area which is assumed to be I00 square inches as
in Case I. The total pressures calculated for a full-load spill of cry-
ogenics as a function of time elapsed after a spill are tabulated below.
In the actual case, the load decreases more rapidly than indicated by
these values because of the presence of the expelled gases.
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LUNAR PLANE LOADS FROM DOWNWARD VENTING CRYOGENICS
Time after Spill Total Gas Pressure
Load on Lunar Plane
seconds pounds
0 2500
1 1850
2 1400
3 1050
4 800
6 400
8 250
i0 150
A half-load spill results in an initial pressure load on the lunar plane
of one-half the initial load for the full-load spill.
d. Unrestricted Expansion of Cryogenic Fluids
When a perfect diatomic gas is allowed to expand into a vacuum
the molecules at the gas outer boundary move at a velocity of five times
the speed of sound in the fluid. However, the gas density at this
boundary is negligible, so that any surface, at which the kinetic energy
is transformed, receives an insignificant pressure pulse. The main body
of gas expands uniformly with a maximum speed equal to the sonic velo-
city of the compressed fluid. In order to obtain a conservative estiu.-
ate of the pressure load received by any surface in the path of an
expanding body of gas, it is assumed that the kinetic energy of the gas
traveling at sonic velocity is completely converted to a dynamic press-
ure pulse, the duration of which is obtained by assuming a wave length
equal to the distance between the storage tank and the chamber roof.
The supercritical cryogenic fluids are not perfect gases, as evi-
denced by the P-V-T data for both fluids at their storage conditions.
However, for purposes of this study it is assumed that the supercritical
fluids behave as perfect gases and expand upon a spill in vacuum at
speeds up to the sonic velocities based on their storage temperatures
as determined by the following equation:
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where u = sonic velocity,
g = gravitational constant,
y = specific heat ratio,
R = gas constant,
T = absolute temperature,
M = molecular weight.
(3.1-22)
The sonic velocities determined by Equation 3.1-22 for the supercritical
fluids are 700 ft/sec for oxygen and 1500 ft/sec for hydrogen at their
storage temperatures of 228°R and 63°R, respectively.
The dynamic pressure of the fluids at various distances from the
storage tanks is dependent on the fluid density and velocity. Assuming
a spherical divergence for the expanding fluid, the density is inversely
proportional to the cube of the distance between the storage tank and
impacted surface. This assumption is conservative because it assumes
all the fluid behaves as a gas. In the actual case, condensation
effectively lowers the density of fluid in the sonic wave. The latter
effect is even larger for spills of cryogenic liquids, because less
vapor is formed per pound of fluid spilled. Therefore, the dynamic
pressure is related to the fluid sonic velocity and storage conditions
by the following equation:
PD = /°I u2 (rl13 (3.1-23)
2 g k_27
where PD = dynamic pressure,
O1 = fluid storage density,
r I = storage tank radius,
r2 = distance from storage tank center to point of fluid impact.
The values of the dynamic pressures at various distances from the
storage tanks are summarized in Table 3.1-6.
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TABLE 3.1-6
DYNAMIC PRESSURES FROM CRYOGENIC SPILLS IN A VACUUM
(Pressure from 2 Tanks of Each Fluid)
Hydrogen
Distance from Storage Tank
20 feet 0.4
30 feet 0. I
Oxygen
Pressure - Psia
Pressure Pulse Duration
3.1o2.5
a.
0.04 seconds 0°I0 seconds
Evaluation of Experimental Results
Introduction
Results from the series of tests performed under Task C (Section
4) have been evaluated with respect to how they would aupport or confirm
the analysis of Task A. In order to make the evaluation as comprehen-
sive as possible in the limited time available, advantage has been taken
of pertinent experimental work reported on by others in the literature.
b. Series I Tests (Shock Tube Driver Section)
Examination of the oscillograph traces 1-33 through 1-41, in-
dicates that detonation of the various mixtures did not occur. The
pressures and velocities recorded suggest that conflagration, only, took
place. The mixtures were ignited with a hot wire source, which prob-
ably is insufficiently intense to create an immediate detonation. The
gradual decay of the reflected shock velocities from the tube end walls
lends credence to a no detonation condition, i.e. there is no evidence
of a jump phenomenon where a deflagration wave suddenly accelerates
through the shock front to form a stable detonation or vice versa. Also,
the dynamic pressure to initial pressure ratios are considerably below
the detonation condition ratios. (Reference 3.1-9, Figure 9.32 a,
p. 353.)
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Reference 3.1-9 (p. 335-336) contains a summary of some past work
by Bennett and Wedaa and by Morrison; it states that changes of pressure
and temperature of the fresh (initial) gas will influence the detona-
tion velocity only slightly as in Table 3.1-7 and Figure 3.1-20.
TABLE 3.1-7
DETONATION VELOCITIES of 2H 2 + 02 MIXTURES
D_VPENDING ON PRESSURE AND TI_4PERATURE
T= 10°D
p-psia 3.9 5.8 9.7 14.7 21.3 29.0
D-ft/sec 8640 8900 9100 9280 9400 9300
T=I00°C
p-psia 7.55 9.7 14.7 19.4 28.0
D-ft/sec 8850 9000 9180 9300 9340
29
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DETONATION VELOCITY OF 2 H2 + 02 VS. PRESSURE
FIGURE 3.1-20
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C. Series 2 Tests (18" Die. Chamber)_ Series 3 Tests (24" Die.
Chamber)_ and Series 4 Tests (8" Die. Chamber)
The pertinent oscillograph traces for Series 2, 3, and 4 tests
have been traced for comparison and appear as Figures 3.1-21 through
3.1-29. A discussion of these figures follows.
Figure 3.1-21 shows a series of pressure time histories as a result
of spark ignition in the 8 inch diameter chamber for an 02/H 2 ratio of
11.3/1, approximately the calculated mixture ratio for a total spill of
the cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen in Chamber A. Four histograms are
shown for different initial mixture pressures; with peak pressures and
total impulses increasing almost proportionally with initial pressures.
Similarly Figures 3.1-22 and 3.1-23 show pressure time histories for
the same initial conditions in the 18" and 24" diameter chambers, res-
pectively, and the same proportionality may be observed.
Comparing Figures 3.1-21, 3.1-22, and 3.1-23, increasing the cham-
ber volume results in a decrease of the total impulse and peak pressures.
This can be explained by the proximity of the measuring transducer to
the ignition source, and the reinforcing effect of the walls, i.e. the
8" diameter chamber approaches shock tube dimensions where mixtures are
more easily ignitable than in larger chambers. There is a distinct de-
pendence on an energetic ignition source to create a spherical detona-
tion in a given gas mixture compared to creating a plane detonation w ve
in a shock tube, (Reference 3.1-10, p. 1123 and 1126).
Also evident in Figures 3.1-21 through 3.1-23 are the induction
times necessary from the source to produce a combustion in the gas. The
longer induction periods are associated with the larger gas volumes,
suggesting a relatively slow local heating effect from the source, until
a gas flame front occurs followed by the deflagration pressure wave as
shown. Again, this strongly suggests that deflagration waves, only,
were produced in the series of uncontained tests with spark initiation.
It is possible that if a local detonation of the mixture occurred adja-
cent to the spark, this would have decayed in_nediately thereafter into
a deflagration wave.
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Similar comments can be made for Figure 3.1-24, where tests were
made in the 18" diameter chamber with hot wire ignition. Comparing
Figures 3.1-22 and 3.1-24, it is evident that the spark is the more en-
ergetic ignition source; the peak pressures and total impulses obtained
for a given mixture with the hot wire source are lower than those ob-
tained when using a spark. The induction periods and pulse rise rates
are almost identical, however_ which supports the previous suggestion
that a slow local gas heating effect takes place before deflagration
co_nences.
Figures 3.1-25 and 3.1-26 show the hydrogen rich, (02/H 2 = 5/1 by
weight) and oxygen rich_ (30/1), pressures and total impulses for var-
ious initial mixtures in the 18" diameter chamber with spark ignition.
Induction periods are somewhat longer for the oxygen rich mixture and
the pulse rise rates are noticeably slower than those for the hydrogen
rich mixture. Comparison of the 5/1 mixture data with the data from
the 11.4/1 mixture (Figure 3.1-22) shows that slightly higher peak
pressures were obtained with the 5/1 ratio. Total dynamic impulses
were the same, however, as were the pulse rise rates, suggesting that a
stoichiometric mixture (8/1) would produce a similar rise rate for a
deflagration condition. In all cases considered_ where a hot wire or
spark ignition source was used, the deflagration wave exhibited rise
times as rapid as 0.4 milliseconds for the highest responses and as slow
as I millisecond for the lesser responses.
From the analytical viewpoint, this rise time range appears to
bound the cylindrical shell frequencies that would be most affected by
such rise times; namely 250 to greater than 600 cps.
Figures 3.1-27 and 3.1-28 show the effects of diluting an initial
0.746 psia 11.4/1 02H 2 mixture with varying amounts of air prior to
ignition by spark. These tests were conducted in the 18" and 24" cham-
bers.
For the 18" chamber, a comparison of run 2-15 of Figure 3.1-22 and
the traces of Figure 3.1-27 should be made, where the effects of no di-
lution, I/I dilution and 2.3/1 dilution (air/mlxture by pressure) res-
pectively, are shown. The quenching effect of the added air is distinct.
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Similarly, for the 24" chamber, run 3-6 Figure 3.1-23, and the traces
of Figure 3.1-28 show the same effect. When the air/mixture pressure
ratio is raised to 5/1 (run 3-15 Figure 3.1-28) a slow periodic burning
pressure is observed which continues for a few seconds before fading.
When the dilution ratio is raised to 8/1, no reaction takes place and
it is concluded that this mixture is not ignitable with a spark of the
intensity used in the tests.
Later tests run with dilution pressure ratios of 9.2/1 and 19.6/1,
(test runs 8-6 and 8-9 in the 24" and 18" chambers respectively) when
initiated with a stronger source ignition (detonator cap), resulted in
pressure reactions which appear to be due to aperiodic burning. Press-
ure fluctuations of between i to 2 psi last as long as 200 to 300 mill-
iseconds but with no discernable increase in static pressure.
Figure 3.1-29 shows three pressure traces of the effects of an ec-
centric ignition source. For a given initial mixture, it will be seen
that a higher dynamic pressure is achieved for increasing distances of
the ignitor from the pressure transducer. It is probable that the re-
flected deflagratlon shock wave from the nearby chamber wall is rein-
forcing the propagation of the initial shock wave, resulting in a some-
what higher dynamic pressure at the transducer location. In turn, this
emphasizes that the reflected shocks from nearby surfaces and project-
ions play an important part in the formation of pressure waves and that
the shock mechanism in a chamber such as Chamber A would be quite com-
plex. Fast motion pictures taken during the uncontained tests confirms
the complexity of the reflections. It is important to note thai the
pressure wavefronts of Figure 3.1-29 are steepening, and that other in-
teracting surfaces may, indeed, have eventually produced a detonation
front. Note also, however_ that the total impulses appear to be about
equal.
In an effort to deliberately produce a detonation wave r a series
of tests were conducted in the 18" and 24" chambers with stoichiometric
mixture ratios, with a detonator cap used as an ignition source. Mix-
ture pressures of 0.649, 1.0 and 2.0 psia were used_ (tests 8-4, 8-7 and
808). Instrumentation difficulties were encountered; however it is
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believed that detonations were produced but not recorded. A slow,
quasi-static pressure rise takes place within the chamber as shown in
Figure 3.1-30, corresponding roughly to the predicted rise from the
analysis, and decays to the initial pressure level after about 300 mill-
iseconds. Thereafter, further decreases in pressure gradually take
place due to condensation of the combustion products on to the relative-
ly cold chamber walls.
A further series of tests was performed where plastic frangible
canisters within the evacuated chambers were filled with gaseous hydro-
gen-oxygen mixtures and ignited by the hot wire method. The tests were
representative of a sudden spill and immediate ignition within the con-
fines of the service module with resultant shrapnel and high speed pro-
jectiles. Pressures were recorded at the chamber wall and fast motion
pictures taken of the motions of the broken canister. Shrapnel veloci-
ties as high as 440 ft/sec were recorded via fast motion pictures.
Pressures were not reliable due to parts of the canister striking the
transducer's sensitive diaphragm. It was possible to photograph the in-
terior of the canisters during the detonation sequence through the cham-
ber port and the transparent plexiglass top of the canister. The film
shows the ignition from the hot wire as it melted, the rapid growth of
a shock front as it expanded to the cylindrical wall of the canister,
the reflected syr_netrically annular shock wave from the canister walls
and finally the immediate brilliant change in color (intense white fro_
a blue) as the reflected shock converged to form a detonation. The can-
ister then proceeded to disintegrate under the influence of the appar-
ently high internal pressures from which the projectile velocities were
obtained.
d. Discussion
It is apparent that no sustained detonations have been produced
within the shock tube or the three chambers used when ignited by the hot
wire or spark method. The pressure signatures observed and as presented
in Figures 3ol-21 through 3.1-29 are considered typical of the dynamic
pressure-time histories due to deflagration of oxygen-hydrogen gaseous
mixtures. Subsequently s pressures are characterized by a gradual
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increase over a period of 20-50 milliseconds to about 1/4 peak pressure
due to heating effects followed by a gradual decrease to below the ini-
tial gas pressure in about 400 to 500 milliseconds, due to chamber wall
cooling and condensing effects. The heating and cooling effects are
more protracted as one graduates to larger chamber sizes due to the
larger volumes of gas to cooling surface available. It is probable that
detonations were produced with the detonator caps in some instances dur-
ing the series 8 tests. Figure 3.1-30 shows impulses which are quite
different from those due to deflagration, although instrumentation diff-
iculties prevented detection of the detonation pressure spike. A sugg-
estion has been made by the manufacturer that the crystal pressure trans-
ducer exhibits an apparent negative pressure as shown in the first por-
tion of Figure 3.1-30, when subjected to a very high temperature tran-
sient. If this is true r then the high temperature transients must have
been accompanied by high pressure transients, or detonations. The slow
negative traces shown in Figure 3.1-30 probably describe the recovery
time constant of the transducers from the high temperature effects,
which Of course, masks the detonation spikes. In any case, detonations
with onset times faster than 25,_sec. would be beyond the capability of
the recording system, which was limited to a I0 Kc upper response.
The limits of detonability for oxygen-hydrogen gaseous mixtures
are shown in Figure 3.1-31 (from Reference 3.1-11) down to 0.5 atmos-
phere. Detonations have been obtained with initial mixture pressures as
low as I0 mm Hg as shown in Figure 3.1-20 and as reported by Gilkerson
and Davidson (Reference 3.1-12) for initial hydrogen-oxygen pressures of
I
I
I
I
27 mmHg.
The analysis shows that for complete combustion at a flame speed of
about 200 ft/sec, a slow pressure rise as shown in Figure 3.1-30 will
result. This is further supported by Figure 3.1-32 (from Reference
3.1-2) which shows the same slow rise to a maximum static pressure for
gaseous explosions of hydrogen-air mixtures. The pressures in this case
are considerably above ambient but the same characteristic features will
be noted. The peak static pressures obtained from run 8-4 (0.649 psia
stoichiometric oxygen-hydrogen mixture equivalent to a Chamber A spill)
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agree with the pressures predicted in the analysis. This strongly
suggests that complete or near complete combustion took place in each
of the detonator cap tests (Series 8), and that probably an initial gas-
eous detonation assisted materially in this process.
Combining the information of Reference 3.1-9, (Figure 9.32 a),
where peak reflected pressure to initial pressure ratios are shown for
detonations and the results of Figures 3.1-30 and 3.1-32, Figure 3.1-33
has been constructed, wn1_,_ shows the ^ i + deto-o_o_ o_a p_,,_e' "-' _omp_e_e .................
sequence for an uncontained condition. The total reaction time for the
detonation spike is taken from Reference 3.1-9 (p. 374), and for con-
servatism_ is considered to be as long as I0 .,sec. Actual calculations
for a .75 psia mixture from Reference 3.1-12 gives a detonation reaction
time of 3.8 _sec. In view of the predominant breathing frequencies
calculated for Chamber A, it is concluded that such detonation transients
would have little effect on the chambers structural integrity.
A detonation process in low-concentration mixtures will however,
produce eventual higher static pressures than a deflagration process,
assuming, as before, that the detonation leads to a more complete com-
bustion of the products. The higher static pressure then, becomes the
major point of concern for chamber integrity, and has been treated as
such in the analysis.
The quenching effect of dilution of the mixture with air as prev-
iously described, is supported by Reference 3.1-10 (p. 1126), where it
is shown that the limits for significant yield, (detonation) are between
18 and 59 mol percent H 2. The limit for burning or deflagration is
approximately 4 mol percent H 2 in air. The 6 psi air and 14.7 psi air
dilution used in Tests 8-6 and 8-9 respectively, represent 6.5 mol per-
cent H 2 and 3 mol percent H 2. In both cases, mild (I to 2 psi) react-
ions were evident for periods of 0.2 to 0.3 seconds, but with no notice-
able increase in static pressure. This probably is due to the extended
reaction time keeping pace with the heat absorption rate of the chamber
walls.
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The eccentric ignition source appears to be quite important, based
on the results shown in Figure 3.1-29. If the reinforcing and amplify-
ing effects of reflected shocks are noticeable in a deflagration pro-
cess, then they should be at least as important in a detonation condition.
Little is known to exist in the literature regarding the effect of nearby
reflecting surfaces on the propagation and intensification of spherical
detonations.
==-_.a_ly,1.. _,.e contained +_=_....results for shrapnel velocities are of
the same order of magnitude arrived at in the fragmentation analysis.
Although, as discussed _arlier, pressure readings in the chamber were
not indicative of the actual detonations, photographic evidence showed
a distinct occurence of severe explosions within the canisters.
3.1o2o6 Comparison of Experiments and Theoretical Results
a. Uncontained Explosion
The theoretical analysis indicates that a detonation and de-
flagration explosion is possible for the specified cryogenic spill into
the evacuated chamber. The magnitude of this explosion depends on the
quasi-steady gaseous pressures resulting from the spill. With the cham-
ber at ambient conditions and assuming uniform mixing, the cryogenic
fluid percentage is too low to expect a detonation. Moreover, the mix-
ture is at the lower limit of initiating a deflagration wave. Non-
uniform mixing is possible in the chamber resulting in cryogenic per-
centages which can sustain a deflagration wave and activate a detonation
spike.
The test results verify the theoretical analysis for a cryogenic
spill into the evacuated chamber provided a strong ignition source is
available. However, with the chamber diluted with air even a strong
ignition source could not start a deflagration wave.
b. Contained Explosion
The theoretical analysis indicates that a significant pressure
pulse is developed inside the chamber due to ignition of the cryogenic
fluids prior to venting from the service module.
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The contained tests could not distinguish the pressure pulse from
the fragment impact on the pressure gage mounted on the chamber wall.
Therefore, the tests did not provide pressure data to compare with the
pressure pulses derived by analysis.
c. Basis for Structural Analysis
The chamber integrity analysis is based on the loading condi-
tions previously defined as Case I, Case II, and Case III. The tests
in this study were able to confi_ a f_-) conditions i_ Case II (uncon-
fined) and showed qualitatively the possibility of obtaining severe ex-
plosions inside the service module (Case I). The data were inadequate
for determining the critical load magnitudes of Case I_ as well as of Case
II. Case III (mechanical explosions) was not simulated by tests. The
load conditions determined by analysis (which is partly based on empiri-
cal data from published experimental research) may be considered as
upper bounds in the assessment of the potential hazards to the chamber
area, and they will be used in the structural dynamic investigations
discussed in subsequent sections.
3.1.3 Critical Loadin_ Conditions
3.1.3.1 Assumption _
Idealized dynamic and static loads are defined for the critical re-
gions in the chamber. The dynamic load is assumed to be a triangular
pulse with an instantaneous rise 9 and a static load is assumed when the
pressure has a long rise-time and a long total duration.
3.1.3.2 Pressure-Time Histories at Critical Resions
a. Case I: Critical Pressure Pulses
The effective equivalent TNT value versus time is shown in
Figures 3.1-4, 3.1-5 and 3.1-6. The maximum value with the chamber at
ambient conditions is W = 650 pounds (initially) for full load and
W = 325 pounds (initially) for half load. Pressure pulses are based on
these two values which define the worst hazard for any time after rup-
ture of the tanks. The pressure pulse at vacuum condition is negligible.
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The shock front is assumed to impact on three critical surfaces:
i. The lunar plane at a distance of 22 feet_
2. The vertical cryopanels or manlock doors at a distance of 30
to 35 feet_
3. The upper chamber head at a distance of 62 feet.
The pressure pulses are reflected as they impact these surfaces
giving a peak pressure fr__m...2 to 8 times the peak incident pressure.
l Reflected pressure versus incident pressure is shown in Figure 3.1-34.
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The clearing time of the reflected wave in free air is less than the pos-
itive phase duration of the _nc_dent pulse but for this confined condi-
tion it is indeterminate. Therefore the reflected pressure pulse is
assumed to have a linear decay to the positive phase duration of the in-
cident pulse. The pulses for areas (I), (2)_ (3) are shown in Figure
3.1-35.
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PULSES FOR CASE I: AMBIENT
FrCtr 3.1-3 
b. Case II: Critical Pressure Pulses - Chamber at Vacuum
The pressure rise due to deflagration and detonation at vacuum
conditions is shown in Figure 3o1-14o This pulse may be significant for
the lunar plane structure s manlockss and cryopanelso The chamber wall
is under an external pressure of 14.7 psi and the increase in internal
chamber pressure only tends to relieve the stresses in the chamber
shell. The net pulses to be considered for full load are shown in
Figure 3.1-36.
The half-load pulses are only different in peak pressure magni-
tudes. For the detonation pulse the stagnation pressure_ 8.4 psi_ is
reduced to 4.1 psi and for the deflagration pulse the peak pressure,
3 psi, is reduced to 1.5 psi.
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NET PRESSURE PULSES: VACUUM
FIGURE 3.1.36
The pulse (a) of Figure 3.1-36 shows the net pressure and
corresponding impulse for a detonation wave moving at 6000 ft/sec
a_d pulse (b)shows the net pressure and corresponding impulse for
the deflagration wave moving at 175 ft/sec. The net pulses are calcu-
lated assuming a travel distance of 22 feet for the pulses to travel
around and underneath the lunar plane.
c. Case II: Critical Pressure Pulses - Chamber at Ambient
Pressure
The pressure-time history due to deflagration and detonation
based on uniform mixing is shown in Figure 3.1-18. The detonation pulse
is very unlikely and therefore is neglected. The pressure rise due to
burning is 35 psia which gives a net differential pressure at the cham-
ber walls equal to 20 psig. Also net pressure pulses exist at the cryo-
panels and lunar plane due to the differential time between deflagration
wave travel to the front face and the back face. The pulses used in the
response analysis are shown in Figure 3.1-37.
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FIGURE 3.1-37 NET PRESSURE PULSES FOR AMBIENT PRESSURE
The half-load pulses have reduced peak pressure magnitudes of
(a) I0 psi, (b) 1.5 psi and (c) 9 psi.
A detonation pulse is possible if non-uniforn_mixing takes place
in the chamber. In general the impulse will be of a very short dura-
tion (less than I msec) and the impulse energy is less than that due to
a confined explosion. If a high concentration of hydrogen rises to the
top of the chamber the hydrogen-oxygen mixture may induce a detonation
in a local region (see Section 3.1.2.3 e) which may be critical for the
structural integrity of the chamber upper head. The peak incident detonation
pressure on the upper head is 28_ psi but with a duration of less than i
msec (see Figure 3.1-38). A reflection factor is not considered appli-
cable since the chamber head is assumed to be very close to the detona-
tion source.
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FIGURE 3.1-38 NET PRESSURE PULSE FOR AMBIENT PRESSURE
(NON-UNIFORM MIXTURE)
The half-load pulse has a reduced stagnation pressure equal to
I0 psi.
d. Case III: Critical Pressure Pulses - Chamber at Vacuum
The pressure pulses at the cryopanels and chamber walls are
negligible (see Section 3.1.2.4).
3.1.3.3 Fragment Impact Conditions
The fragment hazard is determined for a maximum impulse of 2.4
psi-sec (see Section 3.1.2.2 f)o The fragment size (geometrical shape
and mass) is an important factor in establishing both velocities and
penetration depths. Therefore the critical velocities and penetration
analysis are considered jointly in this section.
The maximum fragment velocity is calculated from the impulse-
momentum equation:
I
V --
m
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and for the worst condition postulated:
2.4 A
v = w/g
where A = exposed area, sq. in.
w/g = mass
Three geometrical shape factors are considered as possible (most criti-
cal shape) fragments:
d2
__,_ .... d A = .785
_--_-- '- d A = d2
'--_ .f'_ r'/"" _ L A = dL
w-
The dimension, d, (in inches) is assumed to be the projectile diameter.
The penetration distance, x, (in inches) through an equivalent
thickness of steel plate is given by (see Reference 3.1-13):
2
W V_
(10 -6 )
x = d2
where w = weight of fragment projectile, Ibs,
v. = velocity required to penetrate a thickness equal to x, with
final velocity equal to zero, ft/sec°
The w/d 2 and A/w ratios can be expressed in terms of the density
for the three geometrical shapes considered:
(I) Spherical:
(2) Cubic:
+
(3) Rectangular :
w/d 2 = 0°5 d y ; A/w = l°5/d y
w/d 2 = 1.0 d y ; A/w = I/d y
w/d 2 = 3°0 d y ; A/w = i/d y
+
for an aspect ratio, L/d = 3
where y = weight density
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The major components and structural properties of the service module
have weight to area ratios comparable to aluminum or less. Using the
density for aluminum we have for the three shapes, respectively:
(I) w/d 2 = .05 d, (2) w/d 2 = 0. I d, (3) w/d 2 = 0.3 d
(I) A/w = 15/d , (2) A/w = 10/d , (3) A/w = 10/d
The chamber wall in series with the cryopanels has a minimum thick-
ness at the 40 feet diameter access door of 0.25 inches steel and 0.18
inches aluminum. The effective thickness of aluminum in terms of steel
is assumed to be proportional to the densities, Ya /Yst = 1/3. There-
fore the net thickness of equivalent steel is 0.25 + 0.06 = 0.31 inches.
The velocity required to penetrate this depth is calculated in terms of
diameter and geometrical shape by equating the above thickness to the
penetration depth, x:
v_¢ s
d2
-- (0.31)(106 )
w
For the three geometrical shapes considered:
(I) v. = 2500/(d) I/2
(2) v. = 1760/(d) I/2
(3) v. = 1020/(d) I/2
1/2
The maximum, aluminum projectile diameters which will pierce the equiva-
lent thickness of steel is thus obtained by equating the required velocity,
v., to the velocity due to the impulse.
For the spherical projectile:
(I) 2500/(dmax )I/2 = 2.4 (15)(32.2)/dma x = ll60/dma x
(I) d = 0.22 inches
max
Similarly, for the cube and rectangular projectiles we have:
(2) d = 0.20 inches
max
(3) d = 0.57 inches
max
The maximum steel projectile diameters will be 1/7 of those of aluminum.
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It tanbe concluded from these results that only small objects
with large w/d 2 ratios will penetrate the chamber at the minimum sec-
-tlon (Access Door). It should be noted that the equation for penetra-
_tion is conservative because it is based on non-yielding projectiles.
Most fragments from the service module will have large w/d 2 ratios and
the fragments will be yielding type elements. Therefore the chamber is
considered to provide adequate safety for fragmentation containment for
the worst postulated explosion condition,
3.1.4 Structural Analysis and Response
3.1.4.1 Method of Investigation
First, the chamber shell and its structural and mechanical systems
are represented by simplified structural systems whose analysis and be-
havior are relatively well defined. Next, a failure mode, a response
frequency, a static yield resistance and a failure condition are deter-
mined for each structural item. And finally, the response to a trans-
ient hazard load is evaluated based on the response of a single-degree-
of freedom system possessing the above characteristics.
The structural characteristics are discussed in general terms be-
low. A more detailed consideration for each critical item is given in
Section 3.1.4.2.
Failure Mode - The failure mode (mode of collapse) for a transient
hazard load is taken to have the same shape as that corresponding to the
static application of the transient load. In most cases, the failure
mode is easily envisioned.
Response Frequency - The response frequency is determined by using
the static deflection method, and the failure mode shape is assumed to
correspond with the frequency mode shape.
Static Yield Resistance - This characteristic is defined as the
static pressure, which when applied to the structure (item) as a uniform
load will cause general yielding. If loss of structural stability occurs
before this load level is reached, stability rather than yielding would
be the governing factor.
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The force-deformatlon relationship of the material is idealized to
a purely elastic-plastic material whose yield point coincides with the
actual yield point of the material, Two structural steels have been
used throughout the system; ASTM Type 304 stainless and ASTMA7 carbon
steel. The idealized and actual behavior of A7 steel for a tensile
loading is shown in Figure 3.1-39. Similar properties are known to
exist for Type 304 SS at room temperatures as well as at cryogenic temper-
atures. Compressive loading Is assumed to result in properties identi-
cal to the tensile behavior. Material behavior for a shear loading is
similar but with a reduced yield region and a yield and ultimate strength
equal to 0,6 of the tensile values.
Ultimate
Yield
-Actual Material
4
Idealized Material
Elastic Region IPlastic Region
T
DUCTILE MATERIAL STRESS-STRAIN CURVE
FIGURE 3.i- 39
Strain
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The aluminum alloy and bolting material used in the chamber is
assumed to behave in a manner similar to steel and is based on an
effective yield point that corresponds to the 0.2 percentstrain offset
on the stress-strain diagram (see Figure 3.!-_O).
Ultimate
m
Yield iiiiiill
!
!
!
Strain
SEMI-DUCTILEMATERIAL STRESS-STRAIN CURVE
FIGURE 3.1-40
The relationship between the resistance and the resulting deflection
Of the structural item is assumed to be similar to the adopted ideally
elastic-plastic behavior of the material as shown in the two Figures
3.1-39 and 3,1-40.
Failure Conditions_ Quasl-static Loads -
I. No structural damage will occur when the hazard
load is less than the yield resistance of the item,
2, Minor structural damage will occur when the hazard load is
greater than the yield resistance but less than the ultimate
resistance distortion.
3, Major structural damage will occur when the hazard load is
greater than the ultimate resistance distortion.
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Failure Condltion_ Transient Hazard Loads - Structural damage will
depend on the amount of yielding that the item can tolerate prior to
failure (collapse) and engineering judgment has been used to distin-
guish between minor and major structural damage. In general_ the allow-
able _ values for a tensile or bending failure mode are set as follows:
No Significant Structural Damage
_ I0
Minor Structural Damage
I0=_ _20
Major Structural Damage
_=_ 20
This estimate of failure_is defined in terms of ductility factor (_)
which is defined as the ratio of the allowable elastic-plastic displace-
ment to the yield displacement (see Figure 3.1,41). For a predomin-
antly shear or compressive failure mode these _ limits are set at 5 and
I0.
yield
o max
= _yield
_yield Deflection Z_max
TYPICAL LOAD-DEFLECTION CURVE: ELASTIC-PLASTIC BEHAVIOR
FIGURE 3. I-A 1
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The establishment of a failure condition due to loss of structural
stability is based on engineering judgment and is discussed for each
pertinent critical item in the next section.
I The assessment of how these failures affect the safety of the sys-
tem is discussed in Sections 3.1.4.3 and 3.1.5.
I 3.1.4.2 Structural Characteristics (Failure Mode_ Response Frequency,
and Static Yield Resistance)
I
I
ao Introduction
The failure mode, response frequency and static yield resist-
ance for the critical items of the system are sur_narized in Table 3.1-8.
The items can be grouped into the following structural systems.
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I. Lunar Plane and Support: Items 1-8
See Figure 3ol-42
Chamber Shell: Items 9-13.
See Figure 3ol-43
3. Main Access Door: Items 14-16
See Figure 3.1-44
4° Miscellaneous Subsystems: Items 17-24
See Figures 3.1-45 through 3.1-48
(The locations of these subsystems are shown in the overall schematic
shown in Figure 3.1-i.)
The table notes the failure mode for each item and gives the ap-
plicable minimum yield stress value which was used to calculate the
static yield resistance. The ultimate static resistances are taken as
twice the static yield resistances except for the items which are sub-
ject to buckling. The post buckling condition was investigated and ul-
timate capabilities are discussed in the following subsections for items
having a buckling mode failure.
b. Lunar Plane and Support: Items 1-8
Items 1-8 represent the critical points on the load path conn-
ecting the lunar plane surface with the bottom head of the chamber shell.
This load path transmits the transient hazard loads, which impinge the
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TABU 3 l-S(a)
STATIC YIELD RESISTANCES
ITEM
f
i. Floor plate of
lunar plane
2. Circumferertial
floor beams of
lunar plane
3. Radial Cantilever
beams of lunar
plane
4. 45 in. die x 1 1/2
in. thick portion of
lunar plane drive
shaft
5. Lunar plane drive
support assembly
collar
6. Bolted connection
connecting support
assembly collar to
housing
7. Cylindrical portion
of lunar plane
FAILURE MODE
Bending .
(_=' 33 ksi)
Bhear in bolted conn.
---(_y= 20 ks i)*
Bending
(_y = 33 ksi)
Axial compression
Axial compression
and bending
(_ = 33 ksi)
Shear
Shear
( Ty = 20 ksi)
Tension and shear
Tension and shear
(_y= 77 ksi)
Elastic axial cempr.
skin buckling
RESPONSE
FREQUENCY
(cps)
20_f_80
20_f_80
20
20
20
15
15
STATIC
YIELD
RESISTANCE
20 psi
_---8psi
i0 psi
• e **
30 psl(_=O)
• e
I0 ps_(_l)
• e
16 psl(_=O)
• e
6 psl(_=l)
• e
7 PSl(_ =0)
• e
ps1(_=l)
9+
9+9+
32 psi
and _. are allowable yield stresses in tension and shear
Y Y
respectively.
e is the eccentricity of the total load applied to the lunar plane
and R is the radius of the drive shaft.
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TABLE3.1-8(b)
STATIC YIELD RESISTANCES
ITEM
8. Bottom head of
chamber shell
(lunar plane
loading)
9- Top head of chamber
shell
[O. Top head and
cylinder junction
[I. Cylinder portion of
FAILURE MODE
tensile yielding neaz
bottom ring
(_y= 93 ksi)
Tens ion
(OT_ = 33 ksi)
Compress ion
(0__ = 33 ksi)
T ens ion
chamber shell
between elev.
+ 40' and +70'
(_y-- 33 ksi)
[2. Cylinder portion of
chamber shell
between elev.
-4' and + 40'
13. Bottom head of
chamber shell
L_. Unclamping of main
access door
LS, 1/4 in. spherical
cap of main access
door
Tensile yielding in
vicinity of 40' door
(F_T_ = 33 ksi)
Tens ion
(0-7 = 33 ksi)
Yielding of clamp
bolts
(_y= _3 ksi)
Initial elastic
buckling
_ssuming door is held
from opening and cap
LS able to reverse
itself without tearin
(_yy = _3 ksi)
AJA 3-88
RESPONSE
FREQUENCY
to
_ps j
15
120
120
120
120
120
STATIC
YIELD
_,ESISTAhC_
5 psi
95 psi
_0 psi
45 psi
Static load
57 psi
Fransient Load
35 psi
45 psi
3 psi
3 psi
35 psi
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TABLE 3.1-8(c)
STATIC YIELD RESISTANCES
ITEM
16. Main access door
ring beam
17. Diffusion pumps
L8. Typical cryopanel
L9. Unlocking of
manlock door
20. Manlock door itself
(assuming door is
held in place)
21. Hoist ports
annular plate
Glass port
22. Recessed view ports
annular plate
Glass port
FAILURE MODE
Compression and
bending
(assuming door is
held from opening
and cap has
reversed itself)
(O-#y= 33 ksi)
Bending of cap
flanges
(_)___= 33 ks i)
Bending
(O T_ = 16 k_i)
Bending of locking
rods
(O_y = 33 ksi)
Bending of channel
frame
(_y = 33 ksi)
Bending
( O_y = 33 ksi)
Bending
((__ = i0 ksi)
Bending
(O_y = 33 ksi)
Bending
((_-= I0 ksi)
RESPONSE
FREQUENCY
(cps)
i000
I0
25
120
120
120
120
120
STATIC
YIELD
RES ISTANCE
13 to 18 psi
I00 psi
4.5 psi
I. 3 psi
i00 psi
i00 psi
90 psi
200 psi
P
70 psi
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ITEM
23. Lunar plane drive
housing truncated
spherical cap
22. Lunar plane drive
housing cylindrical
portion
TABLE 3. l-8(d)
STATIC YIELD RESISTANCES
FAILURE MODE
Elastic buckling of
cap under normal
pressure
Elastic skin
buckling under
lateral static
pressure
Yielding of skin
under lateral static
pressure
RESPONSE
FREQUENCY
(cp_)
STATIC
YIELD
RES ISTANCE
16 psi
20 psi
90 psi
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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Radial Cantilever
Beams (Item 3)
Spherical Cap
!
Itousing (Item 7)
..._ _ , d" • to Q , D" • • O
ELEVATION
!
Support Assembl'/ Collar
(Item 5)
Conne tion_
ly to
(Item
_tt_ Head(Item
i
FIGURE _. I-_2 LUNAR PLANE SUPPORT
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Top Head
(Item 9)
/_I'R
t"--
65' Dia.
' Junc tion
tem I0)
Portion
Item 11)
,Ib
__
I
Cyl. PortiOn
_--_cess Door
(Item I_) 47'R/ I_'R _;
Lunar Pla 1 _ Bottom Head
(Item 13)
SECTION VIEW
Skin Material 304 S. S.
(Stiffeners Not Shown)
FIGURE 3.1-$3 CHAMBER SHELL
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L 4x4xl/4
| ,, ,,4_i
1 1/2 Plate ._ j._-:
"x. _ °, Ul
_..-_- ,_ r
U to _ __-.... 'IT,1/4 Cap J - '
SECTION
!
Ring Beam (Item 16)
/
1/4 In. Spherical Cap
(Item 15)
I
I
I
I
I
I
Hinge
Llne
\
48 Total
I
I
I
Clamps (12 Total)
(Item 14)
OUTSIDE ELEVATION
FIGURE 5.1-_4MAIN ACCESS DOOR
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I Cap Flange
(It_ 17)
'!
Material: 304 S
!
!
I
I
Interior of
Chamber
FIGURE 3.1 - _9 TYPICAL DIFFUSION PUMP
Chamber Wall
Cryopanel (Item 18) l"_ Cryo-pipe
l
L_ ! d35" -- '
I _ z Stiffener 3/16" Plate
,-4
I
I
I
==
i
h
SIDE ELEVATION
SECTION
Material: A1 6061T4
I FIGURE 3. l-h6 TYPICAL VERTICAL CRYOPANEL
m
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Locking Rod 
( I t e m  19) 
Door Structure iscking Rods S p .  
(Item 20) About Centerline 
Rinse Line 
Channel Frame Cover P l a t e  
FIGURE 3.1-47 MAALOCK DOOR 
Interior Face of 
Chamber Shell 
- Annular P l a t e  
Glass Port 
--- 
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FIGURE 3.1-48 RECESSED VIEW PORT (ITEM 22) 
(HOIST PORT SIMILAR; I T l B  21) 
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lunar plane surface, to the bottom head. The static yield resistances
are based on a uniform syn_netric load application to the entire lunar
plane surface (excluding Items 4-6, see discussion below). The response
frequencies are predominately a function of the deflection of the eight
radial cantilever beams, since they are the most significant structural
elements in the load path.
Items I and 2: Floor Plate of Lunar Plane - Ambient floor
plate properties h_-ve been assumed (this is the most critical state).
The individual plates are supported on two sides only and are continu-
ous over one support. The static yield resistance is therefore taken
as the load which causes the plate to fail as a mechanism (i.e. plastic
hinges are allowed to develop until a mechanism forms).
The response frequencles of both plate and beams are dependentupon
the radiaI distance from the center of the lunar plane, the higher
values being for the shorter spans and the lower values for the longer
spans.
Item3: Radial Cantilevered Beaum of Lunar Plane - The static
yield resistance is taken as the load (uniform load over wedge-shaped
contributing area) which causes a plastic hinge to form at the base of
the canti lever.
Items 4-6: Drive Shaft and Support Assembly Collar - The yieId
resistance analysis considers an eccentrical load application at the
lunar plane surface. The ratio, e/R = 0, represents no eccentricity of
load and e/R = I represents a load eccentricity of 22.5 inches, the rad-
ius of the drive shaft (R). Load eccentricity for Items 1-3 is not ap-
plicable and it is not important for Items 7 and 8.
Item 7: Cylindrical Portion of Lunar Plane Drive Housing
(Lunar Plane Loading) - The static yield resistance
in this case is a pseudo-axial buckling resistance of the cylinder for
a dynamic load (the portion in question is the unstiffened area just
below the support pIane of the drive shaft). This resistance is an
upper bound and is equal to the classical buckling load. Any strength
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capability beyond this value cannot be verified with any degree of con-
fidence. Therefore the ultimate strength capability and yield strength
capability are assumed to be the same.
Item 8: Bottom Head of Chamber (Lunar Plane Loading) - The
reaction of the lunar plane drive housing axial loads by the bottom head
results in high tensile meridional and compressive hoop stresses in the
head in the junction vicinity. The static yield resistance is deter-
mined by assuming that only membrane forces are developed and that these
forces are resisted by the skin of the head. This is not an unduly con-
servative assumption.
The compressive hoop stresses which occur throughout the head are
not large enough to cause buckling.
c. Chamber Shell
Items 9-13 represent the four main areas of the chamber struct-
ure which have significant differences and consequently have varying
strength capabilities. The response frequency of the cylindrical por-
tion was calculated to be 80 CpSo It was determined that the end heads
do not significantly affect this response frequency, except in the
vicinity of the heads. The effect of openings and discontinuities have not
been evaluated. It was concluded that a conservative estimate of the
response frequency of the entire chamber shell could be made by using
the response frequency of the heads, 120 CpSo
Item 9: Top Head of Chamber Shell - The static yield resist-
ance is taken as the load which causes yielding of the plate skin.
Only membrane stresses are considered.
The response frequency is taken as the breathing frequency of a
complete monocoque sphere of the same radius.
Item I0: Top Head and Cylinder Junction - High meridional and
longitudinal bending stresses are developed in the head and cylinder_
respectively, as a result of the horizontal component of the head re-
action to the cylinder. The static yield resistance is based on report-
ed calculations for the vacuum condition. (See Reference 3.1-14.)
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These calculations have considered the bending and extensional rigidi-
ties of the head and cylinder stiffeners. A plastic section modulus
was used.
Buckling of the junction ring (compressive hoop stresses are de-
veloped in this region) was considered but was found not to be critical.
Item II: Cylinder Portion of Chamber Shell Between
Elev. + 40' and + 70' - The static yield resistance
for this portion of the shell is taken as the load which causes a ten-
sile hoop stress to develop under a transient load, and as the load
which produces a principal yield stress under a static load. Longitu-
dinal tensile stresses are developed during the static loading but it
is considered too conservative to consider the longitudinal forces for
the transient loading since the pressure pulse must travel to the heads
before a reaction occurs. Bending which results from the stiffening
effect of the hoop stiffeners is accounted for.
Item 12: Cylinder Portion of Chamber Shell Between
Elev. - 4' and + 40' - This portion of the shell
contains the stiffened 40 foot door opening. Due to the complexity of
the shell in this region, the static yield resistance is calculated
using the results of the structural integrity test of the chamber (in-
strumented proof test (see Reference 3.1-15). A stress of 14 ksi is
believed to be representative of the state of stress in this vicinity
for the test loading of 15 psi. Ratioing this stress up to 33 ksi gives
a static yield resistance of 35 psi for the hazard loading. It is
assumed that the door is held in place and transmits its load to the
shell as a distributed load. This assumption validates the use of the
experimental data.
Item 13: Bottom Head of Chamber Shell - Item 8 considers the
bottom head under the effects of the lunar plane loading. Here, we are
concerned with the resistance of the head to an internal pressure load-
ing only. (The two types of loads will not occur simultaneously.)
The maximum combined membrane stress occurs at the junction of the
torus and spherical cap. The static yield resistance is based on this
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stress. Only the plate skin is accounted for. The meridional stiffen-
ers are more than adequate to resist the bending which results from the
discontinuity in hoop stresses at the junction.
d. Main Access Door
Items 14-16 cover the three critical parts of the door, the
locks, hemispherical skin, and the ring beam.
Item 14: Unclamping of Main Access Door - The door is seated
for sealing purposes by _e!ve clatters. Under chamber vacuum the clamps
are not stressed. However, for an internal hazard load this nominal
calmpingmust secure the door from opening. The clamping resistance is
calculated using the yield resistance of the bolts securing the clamps
(4 3/4" dia. bolts per clamp). The clamping device itself is assumed
to be at least as good as the bolts.
Item 15: 1/4" Spherical Cap of Main Access Door - The mono-
coque door cap is subject to buckling. The geometric parameter, _ ,
is determined by the following relationship:
(Rh) 1/2
where R = spherical radius,
h = shell thickness,
b = base radius of cap_
= Poisson's ratio_
_ indicates gross stability of shallow caps; it is equal to 36 for
this cap. For this relatively large value of the parameter and because
of the size of the cap, it is apparent that loss of stability will
occur as a snap-type buckling due to the presence of geometrical imper-
fections, and furthermore s it will occur near the lower bound values
presented in the literature. This lower bound is taken as one quarter of
the classical buckling pressure of a complete spherical shell of the
same radius and thickness.
The cryopanel support trusses do not materially stiffen the cap
and on the contrary they may cause initial buckling to occur below the
3 psi lower bound due to the localized reactions on the cap.
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The post-buckled resistance of the cap is taken as the membrane
resistance of the cap in a fully reversed position. It is believed that
the edge stiffening detail of the ring beam will allow reversal without
tearing. Furthermore_ the cap will act essentially as a membrane since
the radius to thickness ratio is quite larger 1900. If the cryopanel
trusses do not collapse the cap will tear away from the support points
of the trusses as the cap reverses.
The response frequency of the cap (door) is lower than the elastic
frequency because buckling takes place at a very low hazard loading.
The reversal process implies a soft system (low response frequency).
Item 16: Main Access Door Rin_ Beam - It is here assumed that
the door is held from opening.
The ring reacts the cap load. Both radial in-plane and out-of-
plane loads are reacted_ depending upon the deflected shape of the cap.
The most critical condition of complete cap reversal is assumed. The
static yield resistance of the ring is calculated from the allowable
bending moment (in the presence of axial compressive forces) of the
ring section. Two values are given for the resistance; 13 psi corres-
ponds to full restraint against twisting of the outer l-section_ and
18 psi corresponds to no restraint.
Compressive buckling of the ring is not critical.
c. Miscellaneous Subsystems - Items 17-24 are appendages attached
to the chamber which respond to the loads specified. The critical
stress area for each item is described below.
Item 17: Diffusion Pumps - Failure modes were checked for an
internal pressure loading. Bending of the cap flange is critical.
Item 18: Typical Cryopanels - The static yield resistance is
taken as the load which causes a mechanism to form. The response fre-
quency is calculated using the flexibility of the supports as well as
the flexibility of the panel itself.
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Item 19: Unlocking of Manlock Door - The door is seated for
sealing purposes by four locking rods (bolts). Under vacuum conditions
the rods are not stressed. However, for an internal hazard load this
nominal lockingmust secure the door from opening. The locking resist-
ance is calculated using the static yield resistance of the locking
rods in bending. _ne static yield resistance is taken as the load which
when applied to the door causes a plastic hinge to form in each rod.
The response frequency is calculated using the flexibility of the lock-
ing rods.
Item 20: Manlock Door - The channel frame is the weakest com-
ponent of the door. Bending is critical. Strength is based on plastic
hinges being allowed to form until a mechanism develops. The corres-
ponding load is taken as the static yield resistance. The response fre-
quency is taken as the response frequency of the chamber shell, 120 cps.
Item 21: Hoist Ports - The annular steel plate and the en-
closed view port are found to be critical. The annular plate is assum-
ed to be built-in at the inner edge and simply-supported at the outer
edge. The static yield resistance is taken as the load which induces
a plastic hinge at the inner boundary. The view port is assumed to be
glass with O-ul t = 14 ksi and the static yield resistance is taken as
the load which causes the external plate fiber to reach yield
(O_y = I0 ksi). The glass plate is assumed to be simply-supported.
The response frequency of the port is higher than that of the
chamber shell. The response frequency is therefore taken equal to the
chamber shell frequency.
Item 23: Lunar Plane Drive Housing Truncated Spherical Cap -
The cap is subject to buckling. An estimate of the pressure at which
the cap will first buckle is made by assuming the truncated cap will
behave In much the same manner as a complete sphere of the same radius
and thickness. The buckling pressure is reduced to one quarter the
classical value to account for geometrical imperfections.
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No estimate of the post-buckled cap can be made. However, it is
believed that the post-buckled strength will be several times greater
than the initial buckling load.
Item 24: Cylindrical Portion of Lunar Plane Drive Housing
(Lateral Pressure Loading) - The housing is ade-
quately stiffened and braced so that general loss of stability of the
entire housing is not critical, however localized skin buckling will
occur. Flat plate theory is used to estimate the buckling pressure.
3.1.4.3 Response
a. Introduction
The response of the critical items is given in this section
for the critical loading conditions defined in Section 3.1.3 and for
the two conditions specified in the Work Statement. These two condi-
tions are defined (and amplified) to have the following meaning for
this analysis:
Condition 1 Criteria: Necessary minor modifications may be
accomplished to insure minimum safe operation. Minimum safe
operation is further defined to mean that a minimum safety
factor is only necessary to insure safe operation. Chamber
venting is tolerable at the Main Access Door (partial opening)
and Manlocks.
Condition 2 Criteria: Modifications to the chamber are to be
considered which would result from a requirement for maximum
safety precautions under worst case conditions. Maximum
safety precaution is further defined to mean that only minor
yielding of primary elements is tolerable so that there is a
sufficient safety factor (greater than 1.5) to insure safe
operation. Venting at main access door and manlocks is not
tolerated.
The response of the various structural elements has been obtained
for the three situations that result in significant dynamic loads: (i)
Case I, contained explosion with chamber at ambient pressure (2) Case II,
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uncontained explosion with chamber at initial vacuum and (3) Case II,
uncontained explosion with chamber at ambient pressure. The response
for Case I, contained explosion, creates the maximum damage level and
is summarized in Table 3.1-9. The response for Case II, chamber at
vacuum, produces only minor damage to internal parts of the chamber.
The response for Case II, chamber at ambient, produces significant
damage to critical areas in the chamber primarily due to a rise in
pressure in the chamber caused by deflagration (burning). Table 3._-I0
indicates the critical areas and the conditions for which fixes are
required.
The following subsections discuss the critical areas in more de-
tail.
b. Case I: Chamber at Ambient (see Section 3.1.3.2 a)
Table 3.1-9 summarizes the response of the critical items to
pulses corresponding to 650 and 325 pounds of TNT which correspond to
full load and half load respectively. Acceptable responses for minimum
and maximum safe operation are given in terms of TNT poundage and duct-
ility ratio. (The two are equivalent statements of acceptable response.)
Four areas of the system have unacceptable response; the load path conn-
ecting the lunar plane surface with the bottom head (Items I-8), the
main access door (Item 14), the manlock doors (Item 19), and the cryo-
panels (Item 18). Internal piping and the solar simulators are inde
terminate items and they do not represent a safety hazard but they may be-
come projectiles causing additional internal damage.
The response of the chamber shell (Items 9-12) is based on inci-
dent pressures only. The flexible cryopanels_ and to a lesser extent
the wall insulation, preclude significant build-up of reflected press-
ure. The solar simulators offer adequate shielding of the shell where
cryopanels are absent.
(I) Lunar Plane
Allowable response of Items 1-8 is governed by the shear
failure of the circumferential floor beam connections to the radial
cantilever beams. Considerable damage will be inflicted upon Items 4-8
i!!ii|
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befor_ the circumferential beams fail. (These beams are the weakest
element of the load receiving lunar plane.) Furthermore, if the re-
sultant hazard load is eccentrically applied, the damage may be catas-
trophic: the entire lunar plane and drive may collapse and possibly
punch through the bottom head of the chamber shell. Load eccentrici-
ties of 22.5 inches are considered in Table 3.1-9. These are rela-
tively small and larger eccentricities may be expected.
The radial cantilever beams will not bear on the repressurization
plenum until a response of _ = I0 to 20 has taken place. By this time
failure will have occurred. Allowing larger _ values for Items 4-8
will not significantly increase the load carrying capacity.
(2) Main Access Door
The door will open with a violent swinging motion about its
hinges for the equivalent TNT poundage expected. (The door will open
for nominal TNT poundage.) The structural integrity of the door itself
is adequate. Buckling of the door cap will occur simultaneously with
opening.
A maximum safe operation requires the door to be held tight so
that no venting takes place. For this condition_ the cap will buckle
and assume a reversed position due to the short duration pressure pulse.
The time required for the cap to reverse itself is greater than the
duration of the pressure pulse. A lower bound on this time duration
can be calculated by equating the impulse of the pressure pulse to the
momentum induced to the door cap. A velocity of less than 200 ft/sec
is calculated and for an average travel distance of 4 feet the travel
time is 20 mseco
Since the duration of the pulse is only 6 msec, the pulse will
have decayed to an insignificant load by the time the cap has reached
the full reversal position. Therefore the reaction load applied to
the ring is negligible in the final distorted position allowing re-
versal of the cap without failure of the support ring.
For minimum safe operation venting is permissible and therefore
the door response is less critical than the response if no venting is
allowed.
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(3) Manlock Doors
Both doors of the single and double manlocks will violently
swing open. (The door will open for nominal TNT poundage.) This is
considered acceptable response for the minimum safe operation since
gross venting is allowed_ and the door is not large enough to cause
significant damage while opening. The door leading to the main chamber
must remain closed for maximum safe operation.
The structural integrity of the door is adequate and it is believ-
ed that it will remain on its hinges.
(4) Cryopanels
Structural integrity of the cryopanels will be lost for a
pressure pulse corresponding to 650 lb. equivalent TNT. Severe dis-
tortion of the panels will occur for a pulse due to 325 Ibo equivalent
TNT_ but structural integrity will be retained. The panels are assumed
to be expendable since they can be replaced during the repair period
following the assumed explosions.
(5) Internal Piping
The internal piping is given an indeterminate (but safe)
status because of the difficulty in defining a loading pulse on the
piping. However_ it is believed that the stronger pulses will result
in severe distortion but structural integrity will be retained. Short
stiff elements may break and become projectiles but will not pierce
the chamber wall. (See fragment analysis in Section 3.1.3.3.) The
piping is assumed to be expendable.
(6) Solar Simulators
The solar simulators are given an indeterminate (but safe)
status since the response characteristics of the flexible bellows
which connect the exterior apparatus to the internal reflectors is un-
known. It is expected that the internal portions will sustain severe
damage while the external equipment will sustain only minor damage.
The simulators are assumed to be expendable.
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c. Case II: Chamber at Vacuum (see Section 3.1.3.2 b)
The detonation and deflagration pulses are not critical for
the cryopanels (_ _ I).
The lunar plane and support structure does not become critical un-
til load eccentricities are much greater than 22 inches for full load.
Therefore it is considered safe for both load conditions.
The detonation pulse will cause the manlock door leading to the
main chamber to open. The door leading to the exterior will not open
since the calculated 40 psi reflected pressure will be reduced to some-
thing less than 15 psi due to the filling effect of the manlock.
Very minor damage may occur inside the chamber but the overall
chamber integrity is safe for this critical load condition.
d. Case II: Chamber at Ambient (see Section 3.1.3.2 c)
The calculated 20 psi static pressure due to burning is crit-
ical for the main access door, manlock doors, and lunar plane drive
housing. The pressure causes an unsafe condition at the doors but
only local yielding at the housing. The spherical truncated cap (Item
23) and cylindrical portion of the housing (Item 24) buckle locally.
This buckling is not detrimental since the post-buckled strength is
several times the initial buckling load. These items will not buckle
for 75 percent fuel load or less.
The differential pressure pulse due to burning is critical on the
lunar plane and cryopanels but it is only detrimental for the lunar
plane support structure.
The detonation pulse due to non-uniform mixing at the top of the
chamber is critical only for items in that region.
(i) Main Access Door
The door will start to open as the static pressure builds-up
to 3 psi. (Buckling of the door cap may occur simultaneously, however,
it is not expected to reverse itself.) The door will open less violent-
ly than under the contained explosion hazard. (See discussion of Case
I_ Ambient Condition.)
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A 20 psi build-up of static pressure is possible for I00 percent
fuel load (I0 psi for 50 percent fuel load) for a maximum safe opera-
tion. The cap will probably completely reverse itself for these loads.
The static yield resistance of the cap in this position is 35 psi, and
13-18 psi for the ring beams (ultimate resistance for the ring is 26-36
psi). Thus_ major yielding and distortion without failure is antici-
pated for IO0 percent fuel load and only minor damage is expected for
50 percent fuel load.
Partial opening for a minimum safe operation is not as critical
since venting will limit the pressure build-up to a lesser degree.
(2) Manlock Doors
The doors will slowly open as the I to 2 psi static pressure
level is reached. See discussion of Case I, Ambient Condition.
(3) Lunar Plane
The net pressure pulse of 18 psi,0.11 rise time and 0.22 sec
duration will cause the lunar plane and drive to collapse. The pulse
acts essentially as a static load since the rise time is about twice
the response period. The static collapse resistance (ultimate strength)
is taken as twice the static yield resistances given in Table 3.1-9,
(Items 1-8). Items 2, 6, and 8 are inadequate for concentric load ap-
plication and Items 2, 4, 5, 6, and 8 are inadequate for eccentric
load application. See discussion of Case I, Ambient Condition. The
collapse strength Is marginal for a 50 percent fuel load and is con-
sidered safe for minimum safe operation.
(4) Top Head of Chamber Shell (Detonation Pulse Due to Non-
uniform Mixing)
The 300 psi_ 1 msec pulse will cause severe damage to the
cryopanels and solar simulators located on the top head. Only minor
yielding is expected in the head itself ( _ _ I).
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3ol.5 Recommended Fixes
Three specific areas require reinforcement for both conditions as
specified by criteria (Conditions 1 and 2, see Section 3.1.4.3). These
areas are the main access door, the manlock doors leading to the main
chamber, and the supports of the lunar plane. Table 3.1-10 summarizes
the conditions for which fixes are required.
3.1.5.1 Condition I
As explained in Section 3.1.4.3, for this condition fixes are re-
quired to insure only a minimum safe operation.
Lunar Plane Support
To prevent total collapse of the lunar plane table and drive shaft
the present load path (Items 4-8 of Table 3.1-8) must be circumvented.
This is the most realistic and economical fix. A simple support frame
consisting of a ring of eight box girders supported by eight columns
and a new foundation load distribution slab is proposed for this pur-
pose. This fix is shown in Figures 3.1-499 50 and 51. The columns of
this structure must be located outside of the drive housing to clear
the drive assembly and pick up the reactions of the lunar plane radial
girders at desirable locations. The load transfer from the girders of
the lunar plane to the support frame girders will require the addition
of a horizontal "shoe" to the sloping lower flange of each of the tap, r-
ed, radial, lunar plane girders. The tapered girder lower flanges and
webs should be stiffened to improve buckling resistance in the areas
where the load transfer to the support structure takes place. For nor-
mal operation a small clearance will be provided between the tops of
the support frame girders and the soffits of the load shoes on the
lunar plane girders. Excessive deflection of the lunar plane girders
will close this gap and transfer the major part of any further load in-
crease to the support frame.
The support frame girders should be continuous over the supports
to equalize maximum positive and negative moments and should be of
'_ox" construction to provide resistance to lateral buckling and to the
torsion induced by the end conditions. The relatively short spans and
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heavy loading result in girder design controlled by shear rather than
moment for fully continuous girders. Consequently the vertical webs
will be heavier than the flanges in contrast to typical girder propor-
tions.
A preliminary check on the combined vertical load and bending (in-
troduced by the angled girder connections) indicates that double 18"
wide flange sections welded flange to flange will be suitable column
sections. The columns are shown centered on an 18 foot diameter circle
which facilitates the mutual stiffening of the columns and the lunar
plane drive housing against buckling, and leaves a maximum of clear
area in the surrounding annulus in the vessel for other uses. As in-
dicated in the sketch, the columns are welded to the inner surface of
the vessel shell in line with every third external '_" stiffener on the
bottom of the shell. Continuity of the internal column with the exter-
nal column stubs below the bottom chamber shell is obtained by close
fitting and full penetration welding of the external stubs to the exter-
nal T stiffeners and vessel shell.
Since the bottom head of the vessel normally deflects upward a
fraction of an inch when the vessel is evacuated, the column bases will
be secured to the foundations for alignment only, and, after the base
plates are dry packed to the foundation mat, the anchor bolt nuts will
be backed off and welded to the bolts to permit the column stubs to b&
lifted off the foundation under normal operating conditions.
Blast loading will be transferred from the column bases to the
existing foundation pile grid by the existing foundation slab and a new,
octagonal, reinforced concrete mat. As the central area of the existing
slab is reinforced primarily for hydrostatic uplift it will be used in
shear, only, to help transfer blast loading to the piles. The new,
superimposed, mat will extend to cover all but the outer ring of piles
required to take the new column reactions.
This auxiliary support system is designed to withstand an equiva-
lent static load of 15 psi applied to the entire lunar plane surface.
Under this load the bolted connections connecting the circumferential
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beams of the lunar plane to the radial girders are assumed to fail.
(_'ult = 66 psi for bolts.) Designing for this load insures that the
lunar plane surface can not transfer transient hazards loads greater
than the auxiliary support system capacity. Failure of these bolted
connections and excessive yielding of the radial girders is tolerable
as long as the main shell structure maintains its integrity.
The 15 psi resistance is required for both I00 percent and 50 per-
cent fuel load. Tne required resistance starts dropping-off for fuel
loads less than 50 percent.
Main Access Door
In its present condition the door will swing open when the internal
pressures are still well below the estimated magnitudes for the defined
hazards. The_gross venting, as well as the hazard of the moving door, is
not considered acceptable for-a_minimum safe operation. Partial opening
(controlled venting) is tolerable.
Partial opening may be achieved by installing (spring loaded)
snubbers at the periphery of the door. See Figure 3.1.52. Such re-
straints reduce the total pressure loading on the door by permitting
both venting and movement of the door resulting from the transient or
static hazard loading. This proposed scheme can limit the maximum dis-
placement of the door with controlled deceleration and can close the
door automatically when the internal pressure of the vessel decays to
a pre-determined level. If the door is permitted to open several feet
the pressure loading becomes very nominal but the anchorages become
very large and cumbersome. At the other extreme, with very little move-
ment of the door, the pressure loading approaches that for the fully
clamped edge condition. The compromise solution permits an average out-
ward movement of approximately six inches. Using this magnitude as an
average opening_ the total load which must be resisted by the snubbers
is 450 tons (equivalent to 5 psi static pressure loading on the door)
for I00 percent fuel load and 90 tons (I psi) for 50 percent fuel load.
* The most obvious solution to the problem would involve a complete re-
design of both the door and the latching system and modification of the
hinges and hinge supports as well. This is not proposed from the
standpoints of both cost and schedule.
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It is feasible to design for the larger force by using 24 snubbers to
distribute the reactions to the door and frame. For half load twelve
snubbers are adequate.
The 6 inch peripheral opening is considered adequate to prevent a
static pressure build-up of greater than 5 psi and I psi, respectively,
for the full and half-load conditions. Severe distortions of the door
cap are expected9 but structural integrity will be maintained.
The fact that the door must swing about the hinge rather than move
outward uniformly will complicate the final design and necessitate the
use of several different spring (and possibly housing) diameters and
lengths. The design illustrated in the sketches should be regarded as
typical rather than definitive. The snubbers are located inside the
outer ring girder of the door since external positioning is rendered
virtually impossible by the door neck structure, hinges, latches, etc.
which surround the door. However, the proposed design permits install-
ation of the snubber anchor bars and brackets from the inside after the
door is closed so that 40 foot clear inside diameter opening may be
maintained. During tests when the cryogenic hazard is not present, the
entire snubber system may remain disconnected at the articulated anchor
bar.
Manlock Doors
In their present condition the manlock doors will open for nominal
pressure differentials (1-2 psi static). The opening of the doors, and
subsequent venting (3'-9" x 6'-6" orifice) is considered tolerable for
a minimum safe operation, although a hazardous condition will remain in
the proximity of the door.
No fix is recommended.
3.1.5.2 Condition 2
As explained in Section 3.1.4.3 this condition implies that a max-
imum safe operation condition be achieved.
AJA 3-117 NSL 65-136-1
Lunar Plane Support
To insure a maximum safe operation the auxiliary framing system
proposed for a minimum safe operation is adequate but larger member
sizes are required to resist a static load of 30 psi applied to the
lunar plane surface.
Main Access Door
The partial door opening which was allowed for a minimum safe oper-
ation is not allowed for Condition 2. The door must be held tight so
that venting does not take place (some loss of seal is unavoidable).
This may be accomplished by placing closely spaced clamps around the
periphery of the door. (The detail of the clamps is similar to the de-
tail shown in Figure 3.1.52 with the spring cans deleted.) The total
load which must be resisted by the clamps is 2700 tons (equivalent to
1.5 x 20 psi = 30 psi static loading on the door) for I00 percent fuel
load and 1350 tons (1.5 x I0 psi = 15 psi) for 50 percent fuel load. The
20 psi and I0 psi loads are the static hazards loads for Case II -
Ambient. (The Case I transient loads result in less critical required
reactions as explained in Section 3.1.4.3.)
This fix is several times more expensive than the fix for minimum
safe operationp and any consideration for allowing some venting will
relax the requirements for clamping the door.
Manlock Doors
I
I
!
i
The door leading to the main chamber must not open for a maximum
safe operation. The door itself is adequate_ but additional latching
is needed. The simplest treatment appears to be the addition of two
pairs of bars edge-welded to the outside faces of the doors just above
the bottom, and below the top_ hinges. These bars would be space about
2 1/2 inches apart (in each pair) and extend about four inches beyond
each edge of the door. Four 2 1/4" diameter swing bolts with plate
washers and nuts, secured to the door frame structure, and oriented to
swing between the external ends of the bars after the doors are closed,
will provide the required anchorage for all conditions of loading. The
required resistance is I00 and 50 psi (for Case I Transient Load) for
the I00 and 50 percent fuel load conditions_ respectively.
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SCHEMATIC:
1 ._)II
l ._1!
_ -0
FIGURE 3.1-49
LUNAR SUPPORT STRUCTURE (FIX)
(For Typical Framing
Section See
Figure 3.1-50)
PLAN
Top of Girders; Elevation (-) 4'-_"
l
Col's. Stayed
To Top of Drive
Housing
Col's. Stayed to
New Drive Housing
Stiffener
Col's. Stayed
at Bottom Head
Vessel
Top of Foundation
at Elev.(-) e9'-3"
ELEVATION
k
(For Foundation Slab
See Figure 3.1-51)
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TYPICAL SECTION: LUNAR PLANE SUPPORT FRAMING (FIX)
FIGURE 3.1-50
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3olo6 Modification Cost Estimate and Schedule
A cost estimate (_ 20 percent) of the fixes recommended in Section
3,1,5 is shown in Table 3,1-11, Construction (material_ labor_ contin-
gencies) and engineering costs are included, It can be seen that if
half load is used_ and Condition.igmlnlmum safe operation is accepted9
the modification costs could be as low as $63_000, If use of full load
is stipulated_ and Condition 2_ maximum safety precaution 9 is desired_
_~_ $!72_000, FiRure 3,1-53 shows the modi-the costs could be as L_L as
fication costs as a function of cryogenic percentage used for Conditions
I and 2_ assuming a linear relationship. The actual relationship is
+
non-linear_ but the variations are within the - 20 percent range of the
cost estimate,
The Engineering and Construction Schedule is given in Table 3,1-12.
It can be seen that the recommended modification effort can be accom-
plished in a 4 to 5 month time period, This includes time for engi-
neering deslgn_ design reviews_ contractor selection period_ and an
uninterrupted sequence of construction events, The schedule also
assumes around-the-clock effort on the construction site,
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TABLE 3. i-ii
MODIFICATION COST ESTIMATE (_+ 20 °/0)
ITEM
Construction Costs
Main Access Door
Manlock Doors
Lunar Plane Support
Subtotal
Contingency
Subtotal
Engineering
Total (Dollars)
CONDITION I
(MINIMUM SAFE OPERATION)i
FULL LOAD
23,000
32,000
55,000
ii,000
66,000
18,000
84,000
IHALF LOAD
8jO00
o
32,000
40,000
8,000
48,000
15,000
63,000
CONDITION 2
'MAXIMUM SAFE OPERATION
FULL LOAD
71,000
3,000
49,000
123,000
24,000
148,000
24,000
172,000
HALF LOAD
44,000
2,000
49,000
95,000
19,000
114,000
22,000
136,000
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3.2 Analysis of Chamber A for Cryogen Spills
3.2,1 Criteria
This part of the study is concerned with the structural problems
arising from spills of cryogenic nitrogen, oxygen and hydrogen within
chamber A at ambient and at vacuum conditionso Worst spill conditions
are postulated:
I, Total spillage of liquid nitrogen equal to 1800 gallons may
occur. The liquid nitrogen piping system is zoned so that a
maximum possible spill in any one zone will be 300 gallons.
I
I
1
I
2. A maximum cryogenic oxygen spill equal to the total storage
capacity (640 pounds) may occur.
3. A maximum cryogenic hydrogen spill equal to the total storage
capacity (56 pounds) may occur.
3.2.2 Definition of Hazard
3.2.2.1 Cryogenic Nitrogen Spill
a. Introduction
l
I
I
I
I
I
In this part of the study, the effects of cryogenic nitrogen
spills on the temperature distribution in the structural members of the
space chamber are considered. Inspection of the chamber drawings in-
dicates that there are two regions within the bottom of the space chaT-
ber where a liquid spill can form a pool. (See Figure 3.2-1.) A
spill of the liquid nitrogen used for cooling the lunar plane is most
likely to collect in the annular section surrounding the lunar drive
housing. On the other hand, a spill of the liquid nitrogen from the
cryopanels is most likely to collect in the annular repressurization
plenum. Calculations involving the heat transfer between the cooled
steel members and the atmosphere as a function of the amount of liquid
nitrogen spilled have indicated the thermal profiles to be expected
in the steel structure in the region of the spill.
I
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il_f_ Possible
II LN 2 Spill
g22_
BOTTOM HEAD AREA
FIGURE 3.2-1
It should be noted that this study will consider only spills in
the ambient atmosphere, because the latter are expected to produce
steeper temperature profiles in more critical areas of the structure
than can occur for spills in the evacuated chamber. When the liquid
nitrogen spills in a vacuum, approximately 30 percent of the liquid will
vaporize while the remaining 70 percent turns solid. The rapid expan-
sion of the gaseous nitrogen formed will disperse the finely divided
solid nitrogen particles in the direction of gas flow. The wide dis-
persal of the solid nitrogen is further enhanced by the continued vapor
formation when the solid particles contact a warm surface. Therefore,
the extent of cooling of structural members expected in the case of a
spill in vacuum is much less concentrated than in the case of a spill
in the ambient atmosphere.
b. Effective Cooled Area Versus Spill Volume
The two chamber sections mentioned above, where liquid nitro-
gen is most likely to collect, are formed by the intersection of 0.25
inch thick cylindrical vertical steel plates with the 0.82 inch thick
steel bottom of the space chamber. Before any liquid nitrogen can
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remain as a liquid in these sections, the surfaces in contact with the
liquid nitrogen must be at or near the boiling point temperature, 140°R_
and the corresponding temperature gradients must be established in the
unwetted steel perimeter. The temperature through the steel plates in
contact with the liquid nitrogen is assumed to be uniform at the nitro-
gen boiling point, because the heat transfer coefficient between the
steel plate and the fluid is approximately 1000 times greater than the
heat transfer coefficient between the steel plate and the ambient air.
The first part of a spill is completely vaporized in the process
of chilling the joints and in establishing thermal gradients in the
steel (see next section on Thermal Gradients in Steel Plates 9 3.2.2.1 c).
Additional liquid is then vaporized to chill the wetted steel surfaces
as the liquid level rises. For definite amount of spill, therefore,
the liquid level will be lower than the level corresponding to the
initial spill volume.
The procedure used to estimate the amount of liquid nitrogen re-
quired to chill the steel joints is as follows. Using the thermal pro-
files determined in the next section of the report_ (3.2.2.1 c) the
average temperature and weight of steel for each steel member forming
the joint was estimated. The amount of heat removed from each joint
when the joint temperature was lowered from the ambient temperature
(540°R) to the liquid nitrogen boiling point (140°R) was found to be
2450 Btu/foot of joint length for the chamber bottom joint and 1830
Btu/foot of joint length for the plenum bottom joint. Using the total
joint perimeters and the value of 580 Btu/gallon for the latent heat
of vaporization of liquid nitrogen, the total liquid nitrogen required
to chill each joint to the liquid nitrogen boiling point is 200 gallons
for the chamber bottom joint and 400 gallons for the plenum bottom
joint.
The amount of liquid nitrogen which must be vaporized to lower each
joint temperature to intermediate temperatures between the ambient cham-
ber temperature and the liquid nitrogen boiling point_ is shown in
Figure 3.2-2. The variation in the steel heat capacity with tempera-
ture was used in this analysis.
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Chamber Bottom Joint Spill Volume_ Gallons
5oo
o
g
_ 3oo
[--4
°r',l
Q
o 5o !0o 15o 2o0
i 1 _ i ! _ I , ! .
_Ambient Chamber Temperature, 5_O°R:
!,......... ......,
! "_'---_'- i--_---_.._NitrogerL Boiling Point, I_O_R_
I00 _....
0 i00 200 300 _00
Plenum Bottom Joint Spill Volume, Gallons
FIGURE 3.2.2 NITROGEN SPILL VOLUME VERSUS'TEMPERATURE
FOR PLENUM AND CHAMBER BOTTOM JOINTS
The relationship between the net volume of liquid, contained by the
steel joints, and the height and width of the steel plates, wetted by
that volume of liquid, was determined from the dimensions of the space
chamber. By adding the amount of liquid nitrogen required to chill
each joint to the liquid nitrogen boiling point to the net volumes fouad
by the above relationship, the gross spill volume as a function of the
amount of steel surface wetted by the liquid nitrogen pools were ob-
tained for each joint.
The width of steel surfaces contacting the liquid nitrogen as a
function of the gross spill size for the chamber bottom and plenum
bottom are shown in Figures 3.2- 3 and 3.2-4, respectively. The spill
sizes shown in these figures are conservative from the standpoint that
some additional liquid nitrogen will vaporize before it reaches the
joints under consideration.
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a
c. Thermal Gradients in Steel Plates
The thermal profiles in the steel plates forming the above men-
tioned joints have been estimated for the steady state condition as
follows. In the case of the 0.82 inch thick stainless steel p/ate form-
ing the chamber bottom, it is assumed that the ambient air outside the
chamber transfers heat to the chamber bottom by natural convection, and
heat is conducted radlally to the cryogenically cooled zone. It is
assumed that a m,e-_.,=_,slv.a_ analysis tu obtain the radial tempera-
ture profile in the 0.82 inch thick stainless steel plate at the cham-
ber bottom will introduce a negligible error, since the radial area
normal to heat transfer increases only about I0 percent per foot of
radial distance. Heat transfer between the plate and the air within
the chamber is assumed to be negligible because of stratification of
the cooled air.
Integration of the thermal conduction and convection relationships
to obtain the steel temperature as a function of the radial distance
from the cryogenic pool gave the following relationship:
= distance from cryogenic pool surface, ft.,
= thermal conductivity of steel plate, Btu/hr-ft-°F,
= thickness of steel plate, ft,
= ambient air temperature, OR
T steel temperature at distance, x, OR
s
T = cryogenic boiling point, °R.
c
Using a value of 540°R for the ambient air temperature a value of 140°R
for the liquid nitrogen boiling point, and a value of 5 Btu/hr-ft-°F
for the steel conductivity, Equation 3.2-1 may be simplified to the
following relation for the 0.82" steel plate:
x°8(540-_) _/_. _._ (_.___)
The calculated temperature profile expected in the 0.82 inch plate is
shown in Figure 3.2-5.
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The thermal gradients in the 0.25 inch vertical plates, forming
the joints mentioned above, are estimated to be less than 100°F per foot
of vertical distance above the cryogenic pool level, because heat is
transferred only by conduction through the plate, as the cooled chamber
air is stratified.
The thermal profile in the exterior stiffner plates is also shown
in Figure 3.2-5. Heat is transferred to both sides of this plate from
the ambient air by natural convection.
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FIGURE [5.2-.5 TEMPERATURE PROFILES IN STEEL PLATES
3,2.2.2 Cryogenic Oxygen and Hydrogen Spills
Spills of cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen in the evacuated chamber
are not considered for the reasons mentioned in the previous section
(Section 3.2o2.1) relative to cryogenic nitrogen spills in vacuum.
When the cryogenic hydrogen spills in air at one atmosphere, a
maximum quantity of only 25 pounds of liquid hydrogen is formed by the
adiabatic expansion of the 56 pounds of the supercritical fluid. The
cooling capacity obtained from vaporizing 25 pounds of liquid hydrogen
is equivalent to vaporizing 8.5 gallons of liquid nitrogen. Figure 3.2-2
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in the previous section indicates that vaporizing 8.5 gallons of liquid
nitrogen will cool the chamber bottom joint less than 15°F. However_
it is doubtful that the liquid hydrogen can even reach the chamber
bottom before it has completely vaporized through contacts with the
service module and lunar plane.
A spill of the entire 640 pounds of supercritical oxygen will
yield 282 pounds of liquid oxygen upon adiabatic expansion to one at-
mosphere. The cooling capacity of the above amount of liquid oxygen
obtained upon its vaporization is equivalent to the vaporization of 45
gallons of liquid nitrogen. Figure 3.2-2 indicates that vaporizing 45
gallons of liquid nitrogen will cool the chamber bottom joint less than
75°F. Again_ it is unlikely that the above amount of liquid oxygen can
reach the bottom joint because of vaporization upon contact with the
service module and lunar plane.
3.2.3 Thermal Stress Analysis
The liquid nitrogen spill (for the chamber at ambient pressure)
causes temperature gradients in the lunar drive housing, the bottom
head and the plenum wall. See Figure 3.2-6. (The spill at vacuum con-
ditions is discussed in Section 3.2.2 and it is there concluded that the
temperature gradients will be negligible.)
Imnar Drive _
Housing Fib
(;/4 S.S. '1/
late) _ _|
r-
Vertical . _
Stiffeners
300 gallon
-/--e
Chamber II
Ill\L i k/I- Bottom Head
9" i 18" (0°82" S.S. Plate)
,, .-_A-_j ....Radial Stiffeners
. • "l" ° Q_'° "_" "-¢'
BOTTOM HEAD LN 2 SPILL AREA
FIGURE 3.2-6
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Maximum spill conditions are postulated:
I. 300 gallons at the junction of the Lunar Drive Housing and the
bottom head due to rupture of the liquid nitrogen piping in the
Lunar Plane
2. 1500 gallons at the junction of the Plenum wall with the bottom
head due to rupture of the liquid nitrogen piping in the diff-
users above the plenum and in the vertical cryopanels.
The plate temperature in the spill area is assumed to reach a uni-
form temperature equal to the liquid nitrogen temperature of 140°R.
The temperature gradient at the boundary of the spill in the axial dir-
ection is shown in Figure 3.2-5. The gradient in the radial direction,
(shell plate to stiffener web to stiffener flange) is assumed to be lin-
ear going from the low temperature of 140°F at the shell to ambient
temperature conditions at the outer flange. See Figure 3.2-7.
ASSUMED THERMAL GRADIENT IN STIFFENER
FIGURE 3.2-7
The gradients assumed result in distorting the structure in these local
regions, and if there were no restraints at the boundary there would be
no increase in stress. The structure is continuous in the spill regions,
and the deflections and rotations due to the thermal gradient are re-
strained to a degree dependent upon the stiffness of the structure at
the spill boundaries.
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The lunar drive housing and plenum wall are connected to the
bottom head with moment and shear capability. The rotation stiffness
of the bottom head is much greater than the rotation stiffness of the
housing or plenum wall that provides nearly full fixity at the base.
The upper boundary has a gradient which induces a gradual slope back to
the original position in a distance equal to or greater than 6 inches.
The idealized condition for analysis is shown in Figure 3.2-8.
Fixity assumed where gradient
___ no longer exists.
, !
t
Stiffeners on .f--Greater
than 6"
Full fixity at bottom head
FIXITY CONDITION: LUNAR PLANE HOUSING AND PLENUM
FIGURE 3.2-8
The maximum stress condition occurs at the points of fixity shown in
Figure 3.2-8.
The bottom head has 12 inch deep radial stiffeners on approximately
24 inch centers. The radial stiffness overshadows the circumferential
stiffness_ and therefore the maximum stress condition will occur in the
radial direction. Fixity is assumed to exist at 14 inches or greater
beyond the spill boundary_ see Figure 3.2-9. Maximum stress conditions
exist at the points of fixity.
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"-_. Length _...
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I FIXITY CONDITION: BOTTOM HEAD
FIGURE 3.2-9
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3.2.4 Critical Stresses
As stated in the above Section 3.2.3 the maximum stresses occur
at points of fixity or restraint. The results of the analysis are
given in Table 3.2-1.
i TABLE 3.2-1
CRITICAL STRESSES
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
Critical Area Stress or Amount of Yieldin
I. Lunar Drive Housing and Plenum
Wall above Spill Level
2. Connection-Lunar Drive Housing
and Plenum Wall to Bottom Head
3. Bottom Head at 14 Inches from
Spill Boundary
i
_f 20,000 psi (remains elastic)
_f 33,000 psi (yields to a _ 12)
_f 33,000 psi (yields to a _ _3)
Stresses or rotations exceed the yield capability at two locations, at
the lunar drive junction with the bottom head and in the bottom head at
the spill boundaries in the radial direction. The amount of yielding
is about 2 to 3 times the yield deflection, and permanent deformations
at these locations are expected to occur.
3.2.5 Assessment of Hazard
The plates and welds exposed to the cold temperature are of stain-
less steel and exhibit ductile properties at low temperatures as well as
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at ambient temperatures. The stiffeners are carbon steel 9 and since
the flanges remain at ambient temperatures_ the material is ductile for
the temperature gradient conditions postulated. Therefore the yielding
predicted will not cause rupture or failure. Table 3.2-2 gives a
qualitative description of the maximum possible hazard.
TABLE 3.2-2
HAZARD ASSESSMENT
Critical Area Hazard Assessment
l.
.
Lunar Drive Housing and
Plenum Wall above Spill
Level
Connection - Lunar Drive
Housing and Plenum Wall
to Bottom Head
3. Bottom Head
No Permanent Deformations - no
Damage
Small Permanent Deformation - No
failure - Some weld cracks may
develop at the plate intersect-
ions. Repair may be necessary
to retain integrity for vacuum
operating condition
Small Permanent Deformation - No
failure - The continuity of the
shell is retained for vacuum
operating conditions
I
The high stress region at the weld connections (item 2 in Tables 3.2-1
and 3.2-2) can be eliminated by installing a metal shield spanning
across the joint. See Figure 3.2-10.
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Lunar Drive Housing_
(or Plenum)
.-----Stai_alessSteel Metal
eld (Typ)
_- Bottom
8" ..... _ Head
RECOMMENDED FIX AT BOTTOM HEAD
FIGURE 3.2-i0
A shield 8 inches on each side would provide adequate length to limit
the rotation at the joints to the elastic region.
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3.3 ANALYSIS OF CHAMBER A FOR HAZARD DETECTION/SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS
This portion of the study deals with the operating requirements of
Chamber A and appraisal of the hazards which will be introduced by the
Apollo system installed for testing. Information concerning internal
details of the Apollo vehicle, and its operation during the test is very
limited (and also subject to change). At present, the chamber has no
fire detection or suppression systems installed, nor gas-detectlon
systems - except for one mass spectrometer unit which is included in the
instrumentation of the vacuum monitoring and control equipment. The
requirement of this program is to assess the overall hazard potential of
the chamber, during all phases of setup, operation, and stand-by condi-
tions, and to recommend safety equipment and operating procedures to
suppress these hazards.
3.3.1 Description of Problems
Essentially, the entire problem is resolved into two environmental
situations: Stand-by Conditions - at ambient atmosphere, and Operating
Conditions - at hard vacuum and depressed temperature. A llst of con-
siderations which must be made under these divisions is presented in
Table 3.3-i. These considerations are discussed under each of their
headings.
3.3.1.1 Stand-by Conditions - The term "stand-by conditions" encompasses
all of the time period during which the chamber is not actually providing
the specified environments. During any given year, this is, of course,
the most prevalent condition and thus deserves much consideration. At
such times, the chamber may be out-of-servlce because of need for
routine maintenance or repair, or perhaps for installation of new
accessories or test appurtenances. In this event, relatively few
personnel are likely to be inside the chamber, compared to the times
when the test specimen is being readied, and the hazards presented will
be due to the nature of the operations they are performing and to the
tools, materials and equipment which they are using. It might be
reasonable to assume that such operations could include drilling,
soldering, welding, grinding, and electrical checkout. The hazards
3-140
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TABLE 3.3-I SAFETY SYSTEM CONSIDERATIONS
STAND-BY CONDITIONS OPERATING CONDITIONS
STANDARD T_MPERATURE & PRESSURE -5VACUUM: 1 x i0 torr TEMP: -300°F
GAS DETECTION
COMBUSTIBLE GAS ANALYZERS INFRA-RED ABSORPTION TECHNIQUES
MASS SPECTROMETRY
F IRE DETECTION
FUSIBLE LINK
THERMOCOUPLE (& OTHER TEMP.
SENSORS)
RATE-OF-TEMP. (or PRESSURE) RISE
ULTRA-VIOLET or INFRA-RED FLAME
DETECT.
RATE-OF-PRESSURE RISE
RATE-OF-TEMPERATURE RISE
ULTRA-VIOLET or INFRA-RED FLAME DET.
FIRE SUPPRESSICIq
WATER, HIGH-EXPANSION FOAM
N ITROGEN, CO 2 , ARGON
FREONS, A.B.C. POWDER
NOZZLE CONFIGURATIONS
NITROGEN
EXPLOSIVE-ACTIVATED SUPPRESSANTS
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introduced are those related to construction materials, solvents and
fluxes, welding gases, mechanical and electrical sparks, etc.
The chamber may be in process of lengthy and detailed preparation
for a test upon the Apollo vehicles. This will involve many persons in
the chamber, a considerable amount of transport and hoisting machinery,
engagement and hookup of a great number of mechanical and electrical
connectors, performance of many electrical checkout operations. At this
time the Apollo vehicles themselves are involved, as well as risks to
the operating personnel and to Chamber A. Although little "repair" work
would be anticipated, it is again possible to conceive of the same
hazardous materials, operations, tools, and equipment being introduced
into the chamber as above. Again the hazard source would be concerned
with mechanical and electrical sparks, or hot filaments (due, for
instance, to a broken lamp bulb). Combustibles might be solvents or
cleaners, lubricating oils, wipe-up rags, parts of the handling
machinery, or even the skins and portions of the Apollo vehicles. This
phase of the hazard exists during all periods of time that the test
specimen is within the chamber, or is in the process of being moved in
or out. It is likely to include the greatest number of personnel, the
most "expensive" risks, and introduce many unpredictables.
Upon completion of a test, and after the Apollo has been removed
from the chamber, a certain amount of cleanup will be required. This
may include solvents or cleaning solutions of various kinds, rags, and
other combustibles. Cleaning machines, such as vacuum cleaners, wire
brush, buffers, or polishers may be employed. Again, these machines
present sources for mechanical or electrical sparks. The cleanup
ritual may be very minor; however, in the event of some sort of opera-
tional failure, or breakdown, or unusual "incident", a considerable
effort may be involved.
The probability for the occurrence of the cited hazards is not
evaluated. The intention here is merely to consider each hazard and
discuss it.
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3.3.1.2 Operatin 8 Conditions - The term "Operating Conditions" defines
only the time during which the chamber is sealed and functioning in the
vacuum regime. However, it also includes the time during which the
chamber is being evacuated or repressurized and the thermal shrouds are
being chilled or rewarmed.
The situation during Operating Conditions is well defined. The
Apollo vehicle will have been installed in the chamber, with all con-
nectors and attachments firmly mated; no other equipment is inside.
With the chamber (and Apollo) having been thoroughly cleaned and sealed,
no unknown combustible materials are present. The risks are to the
three men inside Apollo, and to the vehicle itself (plus the chamber,
of course). The only combustibles readily available are the cryogenic
loads of Oxygen (640#) and Hydrogen (56#) during the time that they are
in transit, or on board the Apollo. The 5 potential ignition sources to
be considered are: electrical leaks, abrasion sparks, static electrical
sparks, heated surfaces, catalytic reactions. (These will be discussed
in the next section.)
3.3.2 Implications of Experimental Data
The entire test program has been aimed specifically toward furnish-
ing data as required for the structural analysis task. However, much
information of value to the hazard detection and suppression analysis
has been gleaned. Data directly applicable to assessing of Ignition
Source hazards is presented in Figure 4.5-3; effects of Mixture Ratios
is presented in Figure 4.5-5; effects of Initial Pressure is presented
in Figure 4.5-2; effects of Air Dilution is presented in Figure
4.5-9. Analysis of this data is of distinct importance in assessment
of hazard "likllhood" and aids in forming conclusions as to which
condition is the greater hazard and, therefore, in the selection of
detection and suppression systems most appropriate for installation in
Chamber A.
To simplify the following discussion, the term "sensitivity" will
be employed - meaning, the ease with which a given gas mixture can be
caused to react. In general, the following observations have been
noted:
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Sensitivity is directly related to Initial Pressure. As the test
chamber pressure Is reduced below ambient, the sensitivity of mixtures
is also reduced and becomes quite marginal in the vicinity of 0.72 psla
(the pressure attained in Chamber A in the event of a total spill of
cryogens at 10-5 torr). In fact, at such low pressures, only the more
"ideal" ratios can be ignited, and then only by the more energetic
sources.
Sensitivity is closely related to Mixture Ratio. Most of our
experiments were performed with a mixture ratio, by weight, of 11.5/1
Oxygen-to-Hydrogen (the ratio attained in Chamber A in the event of a
total spill of cryogens, after evacuation). This ratio is rather close
to stolchlometric (8/1), and thus might well be regarded as a highly
sensitive mixture. To explore, briefly, the effects of mixture ratio
upon sensitivity, other ratios were also tried, such as 30/I (Oxygen-
rich) and 5/1 (Hydrogen-rlch). As could be expected, the other ratios
demonstrated different sensitivities. In general, the greater the
oxygen content of the mixture, the higher the sensitivity.
Sensitivity is closely related to Ignition Source characteristics.
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
Our experiments were conducted with the following types of ignition
source s:
Detonator (Blasting Cap)
Burn-out Wire
Spark Gap
Corona Discharge
Radiant Energy
Comparing the experimental ignition sources employed - to the specified
(Task B) potential sources to be considered in Chamber A - observations
may be made as follows:
DETONATOR - No comparison in Chamber A. Detonator caps were used in
the experimental series, to explore the characteristics of a
true detonation, and to determine limits of mixture and
pressure conditions capable of achieving detonation via
this extremely energetic source. Although no direct (source)
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comparison is made, it is of great value to note that true
detonations of reactive mixtures were never obtained - in
the low pressure regions - by any other than this source.
All other reactions were "rapid combustion" pulses.
BURN-OUT WIRE - Compares to heated surface (also to abrasion spark, to
some degree). This proves to be an extremely energetic
source because of the very high temperature (approxi-
mately 4800°F) attained at time of burn-out. Data from
tests employing this source tend to indicate that it is
the greatest hazard potential likely to be encountered
in Chamber A. It might represent (in the chamber) a
hot-filament vacuum gage or a broken lamp bulb. To some
degree, it might also represent an abrasion spark -
specifically, to the degree that the spark temperature
may be termed the governing factor. (Other influences,
such as spark-partlcle velocity, particle-slze, tlme-of-
flight, etc., are quite random in nature and thus not
equateable by the hot wire.) This source was capable of
igniting gas mixtures over a broad range of ratios and
pressures, down to at least 0.5 psla - but always re-
sulted in flame waves, not detonation waves.
SPARK GAP - Compares to possible electrical sparking sources in Chamber
A. This spark, of very brief duration, was across a gap
of I/4", at a potential of 20 KV. It was effective
on various mixture ratios at pressures above 1.0 psia,
but at a pressure of 0.70 psla, or below, only mixtures
close to stolchiometrlc could be ignited. Thus, it
appears to be a lesser hazard source, effective only
in the event of a total spill of cryogens into the
evacuated chamber.
CORONA DISCHARGE - Relates to electrical leak sources in Chamber A.
During tests with the spark gap, it was observed
that if the high voltage lead wires were not extremely
well insulated throughout their length inside the
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vacuum chamber, an intense glow discharge occurred
around the wires. The dissipation effects of this
discharge were such that all input power of the
voltage source was lost in the corona so that no
spark occurred at the intended gap. In this situa-
tion, no ignition of mixtures was detected. This
type "source" may be equated to "electrical leaks",
among which may be included low-resistance ground
paths over the surface of insulators, glow discharges
in vacuum at bare terminals of high voltage circuits,
etc. (Such situations might conceivably occur inside
some portion of the Apollo Service Module.) It may
be concluded that this "potential source" is very
weak indeed and constitutes practically no hazard in
Chamber A.
RADIANT ENERGY - Relates to "catalytic reactions" to be considered. An
extensive search of applicable literature has led to
very little information pertaining to possible cata-
lytic-reactive potential sources within Chamber A. As
regards internal paint, chamber or spacecraft materials,
it is concluded that none are likely catalysts - at
least not in the realm of circumstances which will
occur in the chamber. The only remaining potential
source that might be considered is the solar simulator
system from which intense radiant energy is emitted.
Possible catalytic effects of such intense photon
emission, rich in the ultra-violet spectrum, were
considered worthy of investigation. To simulate this
energy, in a very rudimentary fashion, attempts were
made (at several pressures, with stoichlometrlc ratios)
to ignite gas mixtures by initiating photo flash bulbs
inside the test chamber. No reactions were noted.
This energy release was far greater than that obtained
in the solar simulation system. It is concluded that
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catalytic reaction as a potential hazard source in
Chamber A is of little consequence.
3.3.3 Detection/Suppression Techniques
Existing, commercially available gas detection, fire detection and
fire suppression techniques and devices were reviewed for their possible
application to conditions in Chamber A. The review was limited to
assessment of operating principles, manufacturers' literature, technical
discussions with manufacturers_ representatives and general literature
review. Testing of devices was not within the scope of the study.
At the outset it appeared that all techniques and devices should be
evaluated for applicability to both operating and stand-by conditions.
However, experimental data and analysis have verified that the flamma-
bility/explosivity hazard during operating conditions is minimal, even
with total spill of cryogens from the Service Module. Therefore, the
following techniques were reviewed for applicability:
a. Gas Detection
I. Stand-by conditions
2. Operating conditions
b. Fire Detection
i. Stand-by conditions
c. Fire Suppression
i. Stand-by conditions
Fire detection and suppression at operating conditions requires
considerable modification of existing devices or development of new
devices. Also, examination of available techniques indicates that only
the more "exotic" equipment has promise. As stated, much development is
required of such equipment in the areas of response time, installation,
materials, usage, setup, calibration, interpretation, etc. In addition,
experimental data indicates that the effects of vapor ignition at low
pressures are not those typical of explosion or detonation. The major
effects on the chamber due to ignition of 02/H 2 gas mixtures at low
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pressure will be those of heat from the rapid burning of the gases.
Also, time to reach peak pressure is in the order of one millisecond.
For these reasons, fire detection and fire suppression techniques for i
i
Operating Conditions are not considered to be feasible for inclusion in
Chamber A facility.
Functional, valid and reliable gas detection during operating and
stand-by conditions is the key to prevention of hazardous gas concentra-
tions in Chamber A. Therefore, a great deal of emphasis was placed upon
evaluation of gas detection techniques.
3.3.3.1 Gas Detection
There are no available gas detection devices that are suitable for
use in both conditions of Chamber A, as defined. Therefore, gas
detection for each operating mode was considered separately.
A. STAND-BY CONDITIONS
For stand-by conditions, as previously defined, there are many gas
detection systems readily available. Most of these operate as com-
bustible gas analyzers and use the principle of catalytic combustion
of flammable vapors. A hot-wlre platinum element is usually used as the
catalytic filament. A current is applied to the element which burns the
contaminant gas on the wire surface without a flame. The heat generated
changes the resistance value of the wire element which is part of a
bridge circuit. This resistance change produces an accurate meter
reading proportional to the quantity of explosive gas present. Calibra-
tion is relatively simple and the systems can be calibrated for any
combustible gas. Indication on all detectors is calibrated in percent
of the lower explosive limit (LEL). LEL is defined as the lowest con-
centration of any gas or vapor in air which may explode when exposed to
a spark, flame, or source of heat.
Combustible gas analyzers are of two types: those which require an
air flow to carry the gas/air sample to the catalytic wire portion of
the bridge circuit, and those which place the catalytic wire portion of
the bridge circuit in the detector "head". The air-flow instruments,
necessarily, have slower response times and, in multi-sensor installa-
tions, air flow is cycled for pre-set periods through each sensor.
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For example, consider an air flow gas analyzer system with four sensor
"heads". Such a system will have one vacuum pump and one indicating
meter. The air flow may be set to sample for 30 seconds through each
sensor, thereby creating a detection situation that leaves each sensor
"dead" 75 percent of the time. On the other hand, most of the sensor-
head located bridge circuit systems have an indicating meter for each
sensor and provide continuous monitoring. These considerations are
important in evaluating large, permanently installed systems. For
portable, hand carried units these considerations are not as important.
For the purposes of continuous monitoring and rapid response time, the
technique of choice is the combustible gas analyzer that places the
catalytic portion of the bridge circuit in the detector head. Such
instrumentation is manufactured by General Monitors, Inc., the Houston
Instrument Corp., and others. This equipment ranges in price from
$500.00 to $2,000.00 for units with 2 to 6 detector heads.
Combustible gas sensors should be located to adequately cover
Chamber A and the locations of cryogen loading and unloading activities.
During cryogen transfer operations the permanently installed gas de-
tection equipment should be augmented with portable combustlble-gas and
oxygen-detection instruments operated by qualified safety and/or
industrial hygiene personnel. Suitable, portable combustible gas de-
tectors are available from Davis Emergency Equipment Corp., Houston
Instrument Corp., General Monitors, Inc., Johnson-Williams, Inc.,
Mine Safety Appliances Co., and others at a cost of approximately
$150.00 to $200.00 each. Portable oxygen analyzers are available also.
However, these normally are used to test for Oxygen deficiency and have
a maximum indicating range of 25 percent Oxygen. Therefore, 02
detection can indicate only that 21 percent (normal) is being exceeded.
Manufacturers are Mine Safety Appliances Co., Davis Emergency Equipment
Corp., Beckman Instruments, Inc., Johnson-Willlams, Inc., Bacharach
Industrial Instrument Co., and Union Industrial Equipment Corp. Cost is
variable, depending upon operating principle. _verage cost is approxi-
mately $150.00 to $200.00.
3-149 NSL 65-136-I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
t
Ii
B. OPERATING CONDITIONS
Gas detection techniques that require air flow or standard tempera-
ture and pressure conditions for their proper function were quickly
eliminated from serious consideration, for obvious reasons. Only two
techniques remained to be evaluated: mass spectrometry and infrared
absorption. Our investigation indicates that infrared absorption
techniques are not yet developed to the extent that their Inclusion in
Chamber A is feasible. Also, the infrared contribution from the solar
simulators presents unsolved technical interferences. On the other
hand, Chamber A provides an ideal pressure environment for the mass
spectrometer. Also, it appears that many of the earlier operating
difficulties encountered in mass spectrometry have been and are being
eliminated. Therefore, the mass spectrometer stands out as first choice
for gas detection at operating conditions.
Consolidated Systems Corporation (CSC), under contract to
NASA/MSFC, has developed a quadrupole mass spectrometer to detect the
presence of both Hydrogen and Oxygen gases. The gases are alternately
detected in the analyzer at a preselectable rate of four to twenty
cycles per second. This instrument system includes a reference gas
assembly to provide a stable reference for extended periods of opera-
tion. Physically, the analyzer system is contained in an enclosure 9_
inches wide, 14_ inches high, and 19-3/4 inches long, and weighs 45
pounds. Electrical requirements are 20 watts of 28v DC powering the
analyzer, and 300 watts, l13v AC on an intermittent basis for the
thermostatically-controlled environmental protection heaters. The
system is designed to operate at -IO0°C and pressures down to 10-6 torr.
It is capable of detecting 02 and H 2 at i00 parts per million and pro-
vides three O-Sv DC output telemetry signals to indicate component gas
level, range, and identification. An analyzer similar to the ones now
being manufactured for NASA/MSFC can be furnished for approximately
$75,000.00 and delivered nine months after final engineering details
for Chamber A application have been defined.
Other mass spectrometers, manufactured by a number of companies
(CSC, Bendix, General-Electrlc and others) and called Residual Gas
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Analyzers (RGA), are readily available at a cost in the range of
$5,000.00. However, it appears that rather major modifications would
be required to adapt a laboratory RGA for use in Chamber A. The basic
changes required would be:
a. Place the RGA vacuum support system outside the chamber with the
analyzer flexibly connected through the chamber wall, or
possibly convert RGA to use a sputtering ion pump vacuum system.
b. Modify inlet system to provide remotely variable flow through
a molecular type leak.
c. Modify output electronics for automatic peak value operation.
d. Provide remote calibration system for extended operation.
e. Improve RGA electronics for faster sampling response.
f. Provide analyzer environmental control.
It appears that some additional study may be necessary to evaluate
the RGA modification, performance and cost factors. Such a study could
include feasibility of modifying the analyzer to operate over a wide
pressure range (760 mm to 10 -6 tort), thereby investigating the possi-
bility of single-devlce continuous gas monitoring through all modes of
Chamber A operation. Should time and/or funds for such study not be
available, the first system described ($75,000.00) is recommended for
gas detection in Chamber A, at operating conditions.
The use of mass spectrometry for gas detection requires trained
and qualified operators! Accurate interpretation of readings is of
great importance.
3.3.3.2 Fire Detection
Fire detection techniques and systems, in essence, are protective
signalling systems. In fire protection practice, protective signalling
systems can be used to:
a. Notify occupants so that they can evacuate the premises when
there is a fire.
b. Summon organized assistance to undertake or assist in fighting
the fire.
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c. Supervise extinguishing systems to assure their operability
when needed.
d. Supervise industrial processes to warn of abnormalities that
may contribute to the fire hazard.
e. Supervise personnel to assure performance of assigned duties.
f. Actuate fire control equipment.
Evacuation alarms range from simple hand operated bells to intri-
cate devices which frequently appear in electrical systems intended to
warn occupants of large hotels, institutions or multl-occupancy office
buildings. Certain basic principles common to all systems are recog-
nized as follows:
a. The alarm signal must be distinctive so that it cannot be
confused with other signals produced in the same area. Both
audible and visual signals should be effectively implemented.
b. The alarm must be heard or seen by all occupants for whom the
warning is intended.
c. The system must be constructed and arranged so that it can be
maintained periodical ly.
d. Equipment should be designed and installed so that malicious
or accidental operation is difficult.
e. Consideration must be given to the probable reaction of people
in protected premises when deciding whether a general alarm
shall be given, or whether the alarm produced will be recog-
nized only by selected personnel who can prompt and monitor
the evacuation.
Beyond the elementary classification of systems by method of opera-
tion (manual or automatic), systems are classified according to the
location where the signal registers. The classifications generally
recognized are:
a. Local systems in which the alarm or supervisory signal regis-
ters in the protected premises. They are primarily for the
notification of occupants.
b. Remote station systems in which the alarm or supervisory sig-
nal registers in the office of an agency located at a distance
from the protected premises.
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c. Auxiliary systems in which signals are recorded at a fire
department.
d. Proprietary systems in which signals are received at a central
station, where trained and experienced operators are on duty at
all times to take whatever action the signals call for.
e. Central station systems in which signals register in the office
of an independent agent located at a distance from the protected
plant.
At NASA/MSC/SESL fire alarm signals should register simultaneously
in the following locations:
a.
b.
c.
d.
Chamber A control console(s).
Chamber A interior.
Building which houses Chambers A and B.
On each floor of the adjoining SESL office building. An alarm
is recommended that will be recognized only by selected
personnel who, via predetermined and practiced procedures,
will initiate and monitor building evacuation.
e. MSC Fire Department.
The above recommendations result in a multl-classifled signalling
system: local, remote, auxiliary and proprietary.
Fire protective signalling has a history of at least I00 years in
the United States. During that time there have developed certain
principles which are the basis for, and find expression in, the estab-
lished standards for the industry. These standards are found easily in
publications of the National Fire Protection Association, and all
protective signalling systems should conform to these standards.
The various fire detection systems are discussed in paragraphs A
through D below.
A. MANUAL SYSTEMS
Manual systems, as employed at familiar fire alarm boxes, may be
simple electric switches or mechanically or electrically driven motors
turning a code wheel to open and/or close an electric circuit.
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B. AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS
Automatic systems employ detecting elements sensitive to heat,
smoke, and other manifestations of fire.
C. OPERATING PRINCIPLES OF FIRE DETECTORS
Heat detecting devices fall into two general categories; those
which respond when the detection element reaches a pre-determined
temperature (flxed-temperature types), and those which respond to an
increase in heat at a rate greater than some pre-determlned value (rate-
of-rise types). Some devices combine both a fixed temperature and
rate-of-rlse principle. The same principles apply whether the devices
are of the spot-pattern type, in which the thermally sensitive element
is a compact unit of small area, or the llne-pattern type, in which the
element is continuous along a line or a circuit.
Fixed-Temperature Detectors: Thermostats are the most widely used
flxed-temperature heat detectors in signalling systems and the common
form of thermostat is the bi-metalllc type which utilizes the different
coefficients of expansion of two metals under the influence of heat to
cause a movement resulting in closing of electrical contacts. Several
types are listed below.
BI-Metalllc Strip Thermostats
Snap-Actlon Disc Thermostats
Thermostatic Cable
Fusible Links and Quartzold Bulbs (fixed-temp., but not
thermostat)
Rate-of-Rise Detectors: Fire detectors that operate on the rate-of-
rise principle function when the rate of temperature increase at the
detector exceeds a stated number of degrees-per-mlnute. Detection of
this type invariably combines two functioning elements, one of which
initiates an alarm on a rapid rise of temperature, while the other acts
to delay or prevent an alarm on a slow rise in temperature. The
advantages of rate-of-rlse devices are several:
I. They can be set to operate more rapidly, under most conditions
of combustion propagation, than can flxed-polnt devices.
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2. They are effective across a wide range of ambient temperatures,
as, of course, fixed point devices are not, making them equally
useful in low temperature and high temperature areas.
3. They re-cycle rapidly and are usually more speedily available
for continued service than are fixed-point devices.
4. They tolerate slow increases in ambient temperature without
giving an alarm.
i"neir disadvantages are their _Jsceptlbility to false alarms where
there is a rapidly increasing ambient temperature that is not the
result of hostile combustion, and the possibility that they may fall to
respond to a fire which propagates very slowly. Two types are listed
below:
Pneumatic Tube Detectors
Thermoelectric Detectors
Combined Rate-of-Rise and Fixed Temperature Detectors: Although
the bimetallic fixed temperature thermostat finds considerable applica-
tion by itself, it has become increasingly common, in recent years, to
use it in combination with the rate-of-rise detection principle in the
so-called rate-of-rlse spot thermostat. Rate-of-rlse thermostats were
developed, presumably, to take advantage of the capability of the rate-
of-rise feature to sense and respond rapidly to a fast flre while the
fixed-temperature operating limit takes care of a situation where the
growth of a fire is slow - so slow that the rate-of-rise capability
might never come into play. The typical form which the rate-of-rlse
thermostat takes is a vented air chamber closed off by a flexible
diaphragm carrying electrical contacts. Heat on the outside of the
chamber causes air in the chamber to expand, and when that expansion
exceeds the capacity of the vent to relieve pressure, the diaphragm is
flexed to close the electrical contacts it controls. Slow changes in
ambient temperature near the chamber allow it to "breathe" through its
vent, and the diaphragm is not moved sufficiently to cause an alarm.
Devices of this type have two ratings: (i) the rate-of-temperature
rise, and (2) the fixed temperature at which the unit operates; the
latter becomes operative only when the former has not functioned.
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Figure 3.3-1 shows a typical spot-type combination rate-of-rise/fixed
temperature device.
Smoke Detectors: Smoke detectors may be employed where the type
of fire anticipated is expected to generate substantial amounts of
smoke before temperature changes are sufficient to actuate a heat
detection system. Several types are listed as follows:
Photoelectric Detectors
Spot type
Line type
Sampling type
Ionization Detectors
Other Types of Detectors: A number of other physical principles
have been used, with varying success, in the detection of fire. Several
types are listed as follows:
Melting of soft solder
Flicker-effect upon photo celis
Differential thermal expansion of tensioned wire pairs
Actuation of Fire Control Equipment: Operation of any of the types
of fire detection devices discussed previously may be used to actuate
fire control systems. In addition, the systems may be directly
actuated by any of several monitoring or detection devices operating _n
response to conditions other than fire, as, for example, vapor concen-
tration. The actuation of fire control equipment by the devices and
principles previously discussed may be electronic or mechanical.
Figure 3.3-2 illustrates one rate-of-rlse operating arrangement.
As indicated by the previous discussions, a large amount of fire
detection equipment is commercially available. Table 3.3-2 lists de-
tection devices, their operating principles, the manufacturers,
recommended distances between installations, the maximum distance from
walls or partitlons_ and normal temperatures of the environment com-
pared with temperature rating of the devices.
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Fig. 14-2SB. A spot-type combination rate-of-rise, fixed-femperatute device. 
The air in chamber A expands more rapidly than it can escape from vent '3. 
This causes pressure fo close electrical contact D between diaphragm C and in- 
suluted screw E. Fixed temperature operation occurs when fusible alloy I: melts 
releusing spring G which depresses the diaphrugm closing the contact points. 
FIWRE 3.3-1 
F I X E D  TE?4PERAE RE /RATE - OF - R I  SE DETECTOR 
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Fig. 14-39. "Automatic" Sprinkler Corp. of America rote-of-rise fire dcfecfion sysfem 
operating arrangemenf (unsupervised). The movement of the diaphragm, through a series 
of levers releases a weight. The dropping of fhe weight operates the fire protection 
device fo which the release i s  attached. 
FIGCRE 3 .3 -2  
RATE -OF -RI SE DETECTOR 
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TABLE 3.3-2
FIRE PROTECTION HANDBOOK TABLE 14-42
Based on data from Underwriters' Laborator/es, Inc., and Factory Mutual Engineering Division.
Factory Mutual listings do not give recommended q_acing. The devices referenced here are of
various kinds having different principles of operation and different fields of usefulness. Any selection
of devices for specific uses should be made on the basis of complete information.
Abbreviations and Designations Used in this Table
FT
RC=
RR -
C =
OPERATING PRINCIPLE
Fixed-Temperature operation.
Rate Compensation, Rate Anticil_a-
tion, and Rate Differential actuated.
Rate-of-Rise Type
Combined Rate-of-Rise and Fixed-
Temperature operation.
Intermediate Temperature ratings
available.
SPACING DISTANCES
Distance (as listed) for spot type and line
type indicated by letter d. The spacings
specified are for fiat, smooth ceiling con-
struction of ordinary height. Under other
forms of ceiling construction reduced
spacing of thermostats may be required.
Shaded area and letter A represent are,_ of
coverage, per unit for the spot type and
O = Open circuit.* per foot of line type.
CC = Closed circuit. _ /t///////_,a////H///l/l///
PT = Pneumatic Tubing systems. _/zd_ _-d-'t o _ .//////1_11////////_/7/
GO= Gas-Operated self-contained unit. _*_ !_t_
SO = Spring-Operated self-contained unit. -_ _' i A. _r ft
HL = For Hazardous Locations._ °
L = Line Type Spo_ Type Line Type
_Open-circuit systems are those in which the contact points of the devices are normally open
and, through the action of a bimetallic strip or other arrangement, close and complete the circuit
when exposed to predetermined temperatures.
_Closed-circuit systems are those in which the continuity of the electrical circuit is normally
maintained and actuation of the system results when the circuit is broken by exposure to heat.
_Hazardous locations refer to locations where flammable vapors, gases, combustible dusts
or other materials are present in explosive or combustible mixtures. The National Electrical Code
(Article 500) groups hazardous locations into three classes, depending upon the type of hazard
(see Sec. 9, Chap. III). Some thermostatic devices are listed by Underwriters' Laboratories and
Factory Mutual Laboratories for use in hazardous locations. Portions of other systems may also
be used in hazardous locations, provided these portions do not involve any electrical circuits
(i.e., the tubing of a pneumatic tubing system).
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Muulxturor or
I)h_btbldmmd
Modelm Type
Acme Corporation
Deted-A-Fire
Series 70, Type 7021-6
Hodzon._,lly moun._l
Series 71, Type 7121-7
Vert/cailXmou.ted..
Acme Fire Alarm Co.
Spot Fire Lowecator
Models 501, 502 .... C-O
Models 503, 504 .... FT-O
Alarm Device Mfg. Co.,
Inc.
Model 502 ........... FT-O
American Fire Alarm Co.
Models AF-5135C,
AF-5180C ........... C-O
Models AF-5135F,
AF-5180F ..... . .... FT-O
Models AFSL-1136C,
AFSL-2190C ........ C-O
Models AFSL-3136F,
AFSL-4190F : ....... !:1"-O
Type AF-TT* ......... PT-L
Model No. AF-SRRO... RR-O
Audiographic, Inc.
Models A-5, 202 ....... FT-O
Model A-6 ........... FT-O
Automatic Fire Alarm Co.
Types A, B, and C ..... FT-O
Type 41 ! 3, attachment
for pneumatic tubing. FT
Type B797, attachment
with Quartzoid sprin-
kler for pneumatic tub-
ing ............... FT
"Watkins". .......... FT-I
Aero Types 790, 790-M,
-MV, -V* .......... PT-L
Automatic Safety
Devices, inc.
Thermotech, Model 302.
Thermotech, Model
402X .............
TABT,E 3.3-2
Detection Devices
Max
Max Distance
Distance From
Apart WallorPar.
ft Utkm
!1
RC-O 25 12.5
RC-O-I 25 i 2.5
(Cont.)
Hernial_lili_ TemlWalurln "
100° F I
225° F i 3m°F
Temperature,Ratineof Devices
i.m-
ordi. 
135-165° F 175- 308° F
225° F 360° F
!40, 160 225 325
140, 160 225 325 'a;
50 25 136 190
15 7.5 136 190
20 10 ] 35 2O0
50 25 135 | 80
15 7.5 135 180
50 25 136 190
15 7.5 136 ! 90
30 15
20 10 135 200
20 10 135 200
12 6.25 165 212
15 7.5 136 203
12.5 6.25 135
15 7.5 142
290
30 15
FT-RC-O 40 20 140
FT-RC-O 40 20 140
175 250 325
360
* See note* on Page 14.50.
a. Also rated at 450, 600, and 725°F.
3-160 NSL 65-136-1
I FPH
TABLE 3.3-2
Table 14-42. Detection Devices (Cont.)
I
!
!
1
I
t
I
!
!
I
I
I
I
I
L
f|
MmMIdumr st
I)bblleW |ml
Model or Type
Max
Max Distance
Oporntinl Distance Frm
Wnll or
!I blbns
"Automatic" Sprinkler
Corp. of America
HAD, Model No. 87 ....
ft
RR 50 25
Normal CidlinlETmnporadums
100° F 100- 150- 225-
orLess 150°F 225°F 3OO°F
Tmporllum RatineM Devices
Ordinary
135-165° F
Inter.
mediate
175-
225° F
20 10 135 200
FT 15 7.5
FT-O-CC 20 10
20 10
20 10
25 12.5
15 7.5
150
135 . 200
125, 140 212
125, 140 212
140, 160 225
136 203
Carey Mfg. Co., The
Philip; Liberty Bell
Div.
Model I)-135 ......... FT-O
Central Station Signals,
inc.
Device for attachment
to pneumatic tubing..
Tempo-seh Model A...
Controlled Companies of
American Dislrict
Telegraph Co.
Types B666, C666 ..... Fr-O
Types 666-C, -CF, -CFW,
-CW .............. Fr-CC
Type 421 $ ............ Fr-O
Type 4113 attachment
for pneumatic tubing. FT
Type B797 attachment
with Quartzoid sprin-
kler for pneumatic tub-
lag ...............
Type 4215-X .........
A.D.T. Aero
Types 790, 790-M,
-MV, -V* ......... PT.L
Type C4103, V PT
Derby Devices, Inc.
Derby Fire Sentinal
Type8.T........... Fro
Dictograph Products, Inc.
Dictograph Model R...
Dictograph Model F...
Dictograph Models R-F.
Edwards Co., Inc.
Cat. Nos. 241,242 .... C-O
Cat. Nos. 245, 246 .... FT-O
Cat. Nos. 247, 248 .... FT-O
300°F
12.5 6.25 135 175
25 12.5 140, 160 225
Fr
RC-O-HL
30
3O
15
15
275
275
275
20
250
10 ! 35 212 286
H_
31m° F
\
FT-RC-O 25 12.5 140 185
Fr-O 20 10 135 185
C-O 50 25 135 180
50 25 136 190
20 10 135 190
15 7.5 136 190
* See note* on Page 14-50.
a. Also rated at 450, 600, and 725°F.
350
325(n)
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FPH Table 14-42.
i,, a i
Manufacturoror
Distributmand
ModelorT)Ise
,i i
Edwards of Canada Ltd.
Car. Nos. 245, 246 ....
Eiienco, inc.
Models 750, 751 .......
Ellis Fire Alarm Co.
Model B ..............
Evergard Fire Alarm Co.,
Inc.
Evergard
Model A- 10 .........
Model A- 15 ........
Model A-20 .........
Eyor-Defemsal, Inc.
Model A .............
Falcon Alarm Co., Inc.
Falcon
Models $36, $741 ...
Models $36X, $74X (e)
Federation for Home
Fire Safety, inc.
Thermosensor
Models 303, 304 ....
Fenwal, Inc.
. Detect-A-Fire
Types 27021-0, - 1, -2
horizontally mounted
Type 27121.0 verti-
call), mounted ......
Types 27020-0, . 1, -2
horizontally mounted
Type 27120-0 Verti-
cally mounted ......
Type 27120- T2 ......
Fire-Alarm Thermostat
Carp.
Life Saver
Model A ...........
Model F ...........
OpmltJnE
Principle
FT-O
C-O
FT-O
Detection Devices (Cont.)
Max
Max Distance
Distance From
Apart WailorPar.
It titiens
ft
20 10
NormalCIlflnllTmllatum
10O°F I ioo.i 15o- I _-or Less 150°F 225°F 300°F
TempeaibneRatineof Devices
Inter-
OrdinII7 In iatel
135-105°Fi 175-i
i 5°F I
135 190
50 25 136 190
20 10 135 200
GO 12.5 6 136 174
GO 15 7.5 136 174
GO 20 10 136 174
FT-CC 20 10 135 200
HIll!
Edra
H_
325-
360° F
GO 20 I 0 136 174
GO 20 10 136 174
C-O 50 25 136 190
i
RC-O-CC-i 25 12.5 140, 160 225 325
RC-O-CC-I 25 12.5 140, 160 225 325 ")
RC-CC 25 12.5 140, 160 225 325
RC-CC-I-HL 25 12.5 ! 40, 160 225 325 t_)
RC-CC-I-HL 25 12.5 140, 160 225 325 "z_
I*
FT-O-CC 20 10 135 200
FT.O 15 7.5 132 175
a. Also rated at 450, 600, and 725°F.
c. System units for use with 14-in. aluminum tubing not exceeding I;00 ft. in any one
system.
g. Available at 450_F up to 500°F.
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FPH
Manufacturer or
Distributorand
Model or Type
Table
Fire Detectors, Inc.
Model 55-60 [e) .......
Model M-60 _t' ........
Fire Devices, Inc.
Spot Fire Lowecator
Models 50 I, 502 ....
Models 503, 504 ....
Fire Devices Ltd.
Thermoflex
Models RF136, RF190
Models FT136, FT190
14-42. Detection Devices (Cont.)
Max
Max Distance
OperalJnE Dance FromPrinciple Wall or
Par-
ft titions
ft
GO 20 10
GO I 5 7.5
Normal CeilinETemperatures
llm°F I 100. I 150. I 225.orLess 15 °F 22 °F 300°F
Temperature Ratineof Devices
Fire-Lite Alarms, inc.
Fire-Lite Alarms
Models 51, 52 ......
Models 53, 54 ......
Models 43, 44 ......
Inter-
Ordinary radiate
135-165° F 175-
225° F
136 174
136 174
C-O 50 25 136 190
FT.O 15 7.5 136 190
C-O 136 190
FT-O 136 190
C-O 50 25 136 190
FT-O 15 7.5 136 190
FT-O 20 10 135 200
250-
300° F
20 10 135 200 250
Fire Lock Co.
Model C ............. FT-O
Firestat Co.
Firestat Model C ...... FT-O 20 10 135 200 250
PT-L 30 15
FT-O-CC 160 212 286 360
GameweU Co., The
Vigilarm
Types RM-09 193-A,
40351-B, 46765,
46766 ............
Sprink-La-stat, Type D
Grinnell Co., Inc.
Issue B, Bulb thermostat.
Inlerstote Engineering
Corp.
Vanguard
Mode_s V2, V210 ....
Kidde Ultrasonic &
Detection Alarms
Div., Walter Kidde
& Co., Inc.
Fyrindex
Models $- 15-C,
S. 15-C 1..........
Extra
360° F
FT-O-CC 12.5 6.25 135 175 250 325 *_''
SO 15 7.5 136 174
C-O 50 25 135 180
h. Also rated at 400 and 500'F.
(,. System units for use with 14-in. aluminum tubing not exceeding 1,500 ft. with one horn
and not more than 1,000 ft. with 2 horns on a balanced tubing system.
f. System units for use with 1,_-in. aluminum tubing not exceeding 1,000 ft. with one horn
or with 2 horns on a balanced tubing system.
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Manufactureror
Distributorand
ModelorType
Kidde Ultrasonic &
Detection Alarms
Div., Walter Kidde
& Co., Inc. (Cont.)
Models S- 17-F,
S-17-FI ...........
Atmo Type U.D.D.* ....
Fyrindex, 5-16-R ......
FT-O
PT-L
_R-O
Lightolarms Electronics
Corp.
Model F .............. FT-O
Matic-Mist
Manufacturing Co.
Models RH-9, WH-8...
Models RH-9-M,
WH-B-C(d_ .........
Minneapolis-Honeywell
Regulator Co.
Models T464A1002,
T464A1010 ........
Models T464B1001,
T464B1019 ........
Models T487A1003,
T487A! 011 ........
Models T487B1002,
T427B1010 .........
New Jersey Fire
Alarm Co.
Sidalarm-Duplex
Types C-10, C-20...
GO
GO
C-O
FT-O
C-O
FT-O
Notifier Corp.
Firespot
Models 135, 185 ....
Notifier
Models 50 !, 502 ....
Models 503, 504 ....
N-Co-Stat, Model FR...
Pacific Fire
Extinguisher Co.
Reichel
TypeB............
Type TIOOA 1 .......
PT-L
TABLE 3.3-2
Detection Devices
Max
fl
MIIx
{Cont.)
0f._
Wallor
fl
15 7.5
30 15
i
NormalCJlinl TenUres
100° F J 100- 150- 225-
orLess I lS0°F 225°F 300°F
Tmlmature Ratingsd Drdces
Inter- HFHE_
135-165=F
225° F
135 180
15 7.5 132 175
20 10 136 174
20 10 136 174
50 25 135 180
15 _5 135 180
50 25 136 190
15 _5 136 190
30 15 See Note
FT-O 15 7.5 135 185
C-O 50 25 136 190
FT-O 15 7.5 136 190
FT-O 20 10 135 190 250
RR-CC 25 12.5
RR-CC 30 15
* See note* on Page 14-50.
d. System units for use with
system.
_,_-in. aluminum tubing not exceeding 250 ft. in any o[.e
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Manufacturer or
Distributor and
Model or Type
Protedowire Co.
Protectowire t ........
Pyrotronics, Division of
Baker industries, inc.
Pyr-A-Larm
Type S-522-C .......
Type S-522-F .......
Save-A-Ufe Corp.
Tempo-Set
Model A ...........
Smith & Son, Harold S.
Firestat
Model C ...........
Models TI, T2 ......
Models F1, F2 ......
Sperti Faraday of
Canada Ud.
Model 5021 ..........
Spurling Fire Alarm &
Indicator Co., Inc.
Spurling Fire Watchman
Models 31, 32 ......
Models 33, 34 ......
Spurffng Fire Sentinel
Mode; C ...........
Standard Alarm &
Signal Co.
Messick
Model SS-60 _e) .....
Model M-60 _r_
Standard Fire Alarm &
Signal Inc.
Model SS-$9 ........
Model SY5-59 (e_ .....
Model Reddi-Eye H-60.
Star Sprinkler Corp.
Models WPB501,
WPBS02 ...........
Models WPB503,
WPBS04 ...........
Operating
Principle
Detection Devices (Cont.)
Mix
Max Distance
Distance From
Apart Wall orhr-
ft titions
ft
NormalCeilinETemperatures
1.°F I 100- I 150- I 225-or Less 15 °F 22 °F 300°F
TemperatureRatingof Devices
Ordinary
135-165° F
FT-O-L ,15 7.5 155
C-O 50 2.5 135
FT-O 15 7.5 1 35
IMar.
mediate
175-
225° F
190
180
180
FT-O 20 10 135 200
FT-O 20 10 135 200
C-O 50 25 135 180
FT-O 15 7.5 135 180
FT-O 15 7.5 132 175
C-O 50 25 136 190
FT-O 15 7.5 136 190
FT-O 20 10 135 200
GO 20 10 136 174
GO 15 7.5 136 174
GO 20 10 136 174
GO 20 10 136 174
GO 12.5 6.25 136 174
C-O-I 50 25 136 ; 190
FT-O 15 7.5 136 190
300 ° F
Extra
High
325-
360 ° F
250
* See note, _ on Page 14-50.
e. System units for use with :4-in. aluminum tubing not exceeding 1,500 ft. with on(" horn
and not more than 1,000 ft. with 2 horns on a balanced tubing system.
f. System units for use with z_-in, aluminum tubing not exceeding: 1,000 ft. with one horn
or with 2 horns on a balaneed tubing system.
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TABI_ 3.3-2
I Table 14-42. Detection Devices {Cont.)FPH
NormalCoili_ 'rontpendares
I O__paa_nceO_darm_unca100°F '1100" "150' il 225.
or Less 150°F 225°F 300°F
...... .
Mamfadurm"or Operati_ TemperatureRatinp of Devices
Oistributia'and Principle Waft or
Model er Type Par- '.... Inter. Extra
135-165° F -
I
I
I
i
I
l
l
I
l
I
StarSprinklerCorp. (Cont.)
Spot Fire Lowecator
Models EPB501,
EPB502 ............ C-O-!-HL
Models EPB503,
£PB504 ........... FT-O-HL
Stromberg Div., General
Time Corp.
Models M-07703-A,
M-0TT04-A ......... C-O
Models M-07503-A,
M-07504-A ........ FT-O
Territorial Fire Alarm
Co,, Ltd.
Model A ............ FT-O
Model F............. FT-O
Thermionic Corp. of
America
Thermionic, Model A... FT-@
Thermotech, Inc.
Thermotech, Model 302 FT-RC-O
White Electronics, Inc.
Model F............. FT-O
ft
ii
225OF 300°F 360OF
. i
50 25 136 190
15 7.5 136 190
i
50 25 13.5 160
15 7.5 135 180
20 I 0 135 200
15 7.5 132 175
20 10 135
40 20 140
15 7.5 132 175
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D. SUMMARY
In this study, more detailed evaluation of fire detection tech-
niques and devices, and their applicability to Chamber A was possible
than in the original Chemical Hazards Potential Study (Northrop Corp.,
NAS 9-2941). As a result, certain conclusions reached previously have
been over-ruled because of findings obtained during this study. Current
findings recommend the use of heat detectors, and de-emphaslze the
re_a!rement for fire detection in vacuum.
A thorough review of available fire detection systems indicates
that the most reliable, valid and economic devices suitable for Chamber
A employ the principle of combined rate-of-temperature-rise and fixed
temperature operation. Therefore, this is the recommended detection
technique.
The location and spacing of the recommended fire detection devices
are subjects that can be satisfactorily treated only with a detailed
fire prevention engineering study. However, preliminary investigation
leads to the following tentative recommendations:
i. For devices that function on the combined principles of rate-
of-rlse and fixed temperature, maximum spacing between sensor
units is recommended as 50 feet.
2. The height and diameter of the chamber dictate the need for
placement of sensors at various elevations and perimeter
locations. Recommended elevations for placement of sensors
are 15 feet, 31 feet, 62 feet and the interior top of the
chamber. One sensor should be placed in each ventilation
exhaust duct entrance at the top of the chamber. On the basis
of maximum spacing of sensors, a minimum of 18 detector heads
is suggested. Chamber A minimum coverage can be augmented
further if detectors are located on a basic 90 degree pattern
about the circumference, offset 45 degrees at each successive
elevation.
3. Where ready-made heat baffles, such as a platform, are not
available, then heat baffles should be installed. Sensors
should be installed just below the baffles.
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4. It is recommended that competitive bids for installation of
fire detectors include details of location, spacing, type of
signal, etc.
3.3.3.3 Fire Suppression
The complexity of Stand-by Conditions in Chamber A and various
ramifications regarding the use of suppressants in the chamber were
considered in evaluating suppressants and their method(s) of actuation
and application. The complexity of operations |eads to the conclusion
that the origin of a fire in the chamber is not readily predictable.
This unpredictability presents the major problem of choosing a design
for the suppression system. Should the system cover the whole chamber?
Should the suppressant delivery system be automatically actuated or
manually actuated? Should the system be permanently installed, portable,
or a combination? Should one or several suppressants be utilized?
Should the system be "zoned"?
In order to answer these questions a number of considerations in
the use of suppressants must be reviewed. These are:
I. The effectiveness, rapidity and permanence of extinguishment.
2. The possibility of causing additional safety or health hazards
by the use of certain suppressants.
A. Electrical hazards.
B. Toxicity hazards.
C. Asphyxiation hazards.
D. Reactivity hazards.
3. Facility rehabilitation following use of suppressant.
A. Ease of clean-up.
B. Length of time to rehabilitate.
C. Possibility of damage (particularly to solar units)
4. Cost of installation, number of chamber penetrations, system
complexity, etc.
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Analysis of the chamber environment during Stand-by Conditions and
of the potential types of fires that might occur has indicated a need
for two kinds of suppression capability. These are:
I. The capability to quickly extinguish small fires in localized
areas of the chamber.
2. The capability to extinguish a fire that is of catastrophic
magnitude, i.e. a fire that threatens the entire SESL facility.
Small fire control usually can be attained with the use of port-
able, hand-operated extinguishers that are readily available. To pro-
vide suppression capability for small, localized fires we recommend the
use of portable carbon dioxide (CO 2) extinguishers. The size, place-
ment and number of these should be determined by qualified safety and
fire prevention personnel who are familiar with Stand-by Conditions of
activity. CO 2 is selected because it can be used for almost all types of
industrially encountered fires(and is not likely to cause any secondary
damage).
Catastrophic fire control requires a permanently installed system
that covers the whole chamber. Consideration of the permanently in-
stalled, catastrophe fire control system involves serious evaluation of
the suppressant(s) to be used. Table 3.3-3 provides a summary of avail-
able extinguishing agents, their extinguishing properties and general
limitations. These agents were evaluated with due consideration to the
ramifications previously listed.
DRY CHEMICALS: Dry chemicals, such as ABC powder, would have to
be applied in great quantity. The problem of facility rehabilitation
is considered to be monumental. Chamber contamination would be wide-
spread and cleanup extremely difficult. Delivery system installation
requirements are not clear. Accidental activation of the system would
considerably delay all test operations. This is generally true of all
other suppressants (except for inert gases), but the problems of clean-
up are anticipated to be worst for this agent.
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TABLE 3.3-3 FIRE EXTINGUISHING AGENTS
AGENT
Water
Carbon
Dioxide
Foam
Chemical
Mechanical
Halogenated
Agents
Dry Chemicals
Inert Gases
EXTINGUISHING PROPERTIES
Cooling the surface of
burning material.
Liquid dilution.
Smothering
Cooling
Blanketing and cooling
Energy transfer blocking
by reaction with combus-
tion radicals (chemical
cooling).
Smo ther ing
Smothering
LIMITATIONS
Surface tension; reactivity;
electrical conductivity;
freezing temperature; vis-
cosity; low opacity & reflect-
ivlty; possible vacuum chamber
contamination.
Leaves hot surfaces, embers;
not effective on Oxygen-
contalnlngmaterials; certain
metals and hydrides decompose
carbon dioxide; toxic in high
concentrations.
Electrical conductivity; re-
activity; water content may
contaminate chamber.
Toxicity; corrosion factors
in presence of heat and
moisture; cost.
Leaves hot surfaces, embers;
contaminates relays and
delicate electrical contacts;
chamber contamination involv-
ing difficult clean-up
procedures.
Toxicity (asphyxiating
quantities); cost.
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INERT GASES, HALOGENATED AGENTS, CARBON DIOXIDE: -These agents
are grouped for thls discussion because the major objection to their
usage is the same. The quantity required, and volatility of these
materials indicate that their use in Chamber A would cause additional,
widespread hazard to personnel that of potential asphyxiation and/or
toxic poisoning. In our opinion, the use of these chemicals to suppress
a potentially catastrophic fire would seriously endanger the lives of
personnel in the chamber and possibly in adjacent areas. Other problems
with these agents are outlined in Table 3,3-3.
WATER: Water, even with its limitations, is the universal fire
suppressant! The major objections to the use of water in Chamber A
are potential electrical conductivity problems, chamber contamination,
damage to spacecraft, and installation difficulties. Electrical
hazards can be minimized by shutting off most or all electrlcal systems
prior to water flow. Chamber contamination, if it were the only draw-
back, could be tolerated if the use of water would save the facility
and minimize personnel hazard. The major problem appears to be in-
stallation difficulty. In order to reasonably "cover" the chamber wlth
water fog or spray, at least 2 "rings" of nozzles are necessary. Maxi-
mum spacing between "long throw" nozzles (required in this case) is
recommended to be ten feet. Therefore, minimum water coverage of
Chamber A would involve approximately 41 chamber penetrations (if zone-
control, with valves outside the chamber, is to be obtained). This
minimum coverage arrangement still leaves a significant amount of the
chamber perimeter "uncovered". Additional multidirectlonal nozzles are
required to correct this deficiency, necessitating additional penetra-
tions.
FOAM: Fire fighting foams are of two types: Chemical Foam,
formed by the reaction of an alkaline salt solution with an acid salt
solution in the presence of a foam stabilizing agent; and Mechanical or
Air Foam, formed by turbulent mixing of air with water containing small
proportions of a foam-formlng agent, usually synthetic detergent. Of
the two, mechanical or air foam presents the most promise. This type
of foam is produced in a form called hlgh-expanslon foam. Commercially
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available high expansion foam generators are capable of producing 1000
gallons of foam (or more) for each gallon of water used. Such foam
generators also are capable of producing high-expanslon foam at rates
of from 3000 to 7000 cubic feet per minute. The major advantage of
foam (over water) is that suppression can be attained with relatively
small amounts of water. Other advantages of high-expanslon mechanical
foam are: personnel completely enveloped by the foam can breathe
therein for indefinite periods of time; electrical conductivity is
reduced to a very minimal problem; the foam acts as an excellent heat
shield or insulator; if necessary, the entire chamber can be filled
rapidly and completely with foam; chamber clean-up problems are reduced
- foam can be "blown" out of the chamber, or scooped up by vacuum
cleaners, or, if left for a few hours, it slumps down to a very low
level, much the same as any detergent foam and leaves only a relatlvely
small residue to remove; installation poses fewer problems than water;
and cost estimates are quite reasonable.
Several variations may be considered for the foam system. Alter-
natives are suggested because of the problems of wall penetration,
equipment bulk, time for activation, etc. The major problem factor is
concerned with equipment bulkiness. Basically, the foam generating
units consist of a detergent supply tank, a water mixing and foaming
device, and a large fan enshrouded in a short, venturi-shaped duct.
(The overall size of the unit is approximately that of the duct itself.)
The larger the fan, the greater the capacity of the unit. In many
applications, this factor presents no problem, but in the space chamber
it presents a real dilemma.
The objective in use of foam is to establish a multi-celled "bar-
rier" between an existent fire and further sources of fuel, or oxygen.
This means to smother the fire site itself, or to smother the area to
be protected in a thick, insulating "blanket" of foam (or to establish a
barrier between the two). In the space chamber, the procedure would be
to pile up large mounds of foam upon the floor of the chamber at the
site of a fire, or around the base of the spacecraft to isolate it, or,
if need be - to smother the spacecraft entirely. These objectives
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must be accomplished in the shortest time practicable - thus, the need
for many generators of small capacity, or a few generators of great
capacity. The "small" units available have a duct of about 12" diam-
eter, while large units are 36" in diameter or even more (built to
order). These dimensions immediately reveal the magnitude of the prob-
lem of wall penetrations. If the generators were to be located outside
the chamber, a wall penetration of the selected diameter (plus an
external vacuum-seal valve) would have to be installed at each site.
if the generators were instal'_eu_ _n_u=_-_J- the chamber (cLv_^_instance,
suspended under the platform at 31, elevation), then only electrical
and water line penetrations (say i", with external vacuum-seal valve)
would be required at each location. The units would be built of stain-
less steel, contain explosion-proofed motors, and over all would be
designed to endure repeated exposures to the severe environments (while
in passive condition). Suggested units would be about 15" diameter and
30" long, and would be individually initiated by zone-con_nand switches
(to valves and motor) at the control console.
A second alternative would be as follows: During times of major
hazard, carry into the chamber a (to be specified) number of portable
foam generators, coupled to flexible electric and water lines from out-
side. These units would be mounted at specified locations about the
platform (31' elevation), and individually initiated by zone-command
switches at the control console. The advantage of this system would be
to avoid the wall penetrations and to maintain the "clean" configuration
of the chamber interior during testing. The disadvantage would be that
such temporary installations (and removal) would have to be repeated
many times and might have been "forgotten" at some critical moment.
A third alternative (possibly also a supplement to the first)
would be to install one (or several) extremely large generators out-
side the chamber on the floor level at 31' elevation. During times of
major hazard, one (or several) large, flexible, collapsible ducts would
be led from the unit(s) through the man-lock to the chamber interior
and positioned at selected locations about the platform (31' elevation).
This would be regarded as a'_ermanen_' installation, but would also have
3-173 NSL 65-136-1
II
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
to rely upon responsible personnel for proper emplacement of ducts to
assure readiness for hazard occasions.
Foam generators of various sizes have been discussed with many
vendors. Prices vary from $500.00 for small portable units, to
several-thousands of dollars for larger units (depending upon require-
ments and installation problems).
AC_k__0WLEDG_EM_ TS
We are indebted to a number of vendor companies for their assist-
ance in helping to prepare the previous outline on Gas Detection,
Fire Detection, Fire Suppression systems. They have assisted us in
analyzing the magnitude of the problem, suggesting devices which could
be applicable to Chamber A, and in furnishing cost information approp-
riate to overall system requirements. Following is a listing of
vendors offering services:
Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of America
Consolidated Systems Corp.
Fenwal, Inc.
General Monitors, Inc.
Halprin Supply Co.
Viking Automatic Sprinkler Co.
In addition, our listing has been made as comprehensive and
complete as possible by use of tables (permission granted) from the
"Fire Protection Handbook" (12th Edition), published by the National
Fire Protection Association. It should be noted that constant up-
dating of equipment data by manufacturers may enlarge and improve
upon these listings.
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3.3.4 System Recommendations for Chamber A
From the conclusions reached in Section 3.3.3 the following
gas-detection, fire-detection and fire-suppression systems are recom-
mended:
a. Gas Detection
Stand-by Conditions:
A combustible gas detection system utilizing the principle of
flashcube vapors, ___ L_..=__ the _=_=Ij_ _I _ocombustion of " ,I .+...+_
portion of the bridge circuit in the sensor heads. Minimum
number of sensor heads to be 23, located as follows:
15 ft elevation - 6 (space on 60 U axes)
31 ft elevation - 4 (space on 90 U axes)
62 ft elevation - 4 (space on 90 _ axes)
Interior top - 3 (space on 120 ° axes)
Exhaust ducts - 2 (one in each duct)
Cyrogen loading
area (outside
chamber) - 4 (two at each location)
Detection alarm circuitry should be designed to indicate the
location of the alarm. System sensitivity should be set to register
warning at a level of ten percent of the lower-explosive-limit of the
calibrated gas. The calibration gas should be chosen carefully so that
alarms will register conservatively. Portable combustible gas analy-
zers should be used during LH 2 loading and unloading operations and
portable oxygen analyzers during LOX loading and unloading operations.
Operating Conditions:
Mass spectrometer for 02 and H 2 detection. Locate centrally
in chamber near base of test specimen. Only unit "readily"
available is from Consolidated Systems Corp.
b. Fire Detection
Stand-by Conditions (only):
Combination rate-of-temperature-rise, fixed-temperature
detection devices. Minimum number of detector heads to be
18, zone-located as follows:
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15 ft elevation - 4 (space on 90 ° axes)
31 ft elevation - 4 (space on 90 = axes - staggered 45 °
from above)
62 ft elevation - 4 (space on 90 ° axes-staggered)
Interior top - 4 (space on 90 ° axes-staggered)
Exhaust ducts - 2 (one in each duct)
Alarm signals to register at Chamber A fire-control console,
Chamber A interior, on each floor of SESL building, and at the MSC
Fire Department. Alarm at Console (A) to indicate zone of activation.
Provide heat baffles, as necessary, above detectors.
c. Fire Suppression
Stand-by Conditions (only) :
For small, localized fires, it is recorm_ended that portable
CO 2 extinguishers be employed. The size, number, and location of
units to be determined by local fire-safety authorities.
For a massive suppression system, high-expanslon foam is
recommended. The size and number of units to be chosen should be
capable of approximately half-filling the chamber (completely smother-
ing the spacecraft) within 5 minutes. A permanently installed system
is recommended, with units suspended under the platform at 31' eleva-
tion. Zone-control to be attained by initiating individual units from
a single fire-control command console.
The recor0mended alternate is to carry into the chamber portable
foam generating units (of the same total capacity as above). Units
are to be carried onto the platform (31' elevation) through the man-
lock, connected from outside via flexible electric and water lines;
units to be mounted at pre-arranged locations on platform; remote-
operated zone control as above; rigid setup procedures (and inspection)
required, to assure "readiness" of system, as designed; prominent
"parking" racks to be provided outside of chamber, to display total
status count, indicating whether units are in or out of service
locations.
A thorough engineering study is required, for either
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alternative, in order to determine the details of installation,
specific types of equipment, location of foam generator units, etc. It
is suggested that qualified vendors be invited to inspect the SESL
facility in order to appreciate the scope of the requirements. Because
of the tremendous size of this installation and the special demands
involved in its operation (quite out of the realm of familiarity of
most fire-safety equipment companies), it would be of special value to
so acquaint them with the problem. Following such briefing the vendors
could better recommend equipment (and specifications) directly suited
to the requirements. (Such preparatory information will be essential
in composing a detailed statement of criteria upon which to seek bid
proposals. )
!
I
Estimated costs for completely comprehensive Detection/
Suppression systems would be at least $50,000.00, but would exceed
$125,000.00 if gas-detection in vacuum is also required. An estimated
schedule for installation is shown in Table 3.3-4.
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3.3.5 Test and Development Requirements
A thorough search for available techniques and devices and the
evaluation of same has resulted in the following conclusions:
a. No presently available equipment is suitable for fire detection
and suppression in the vacuum, cryogenic environments.
b. Data is not available concerning the ability of commercially
obtainable detection equipment to endure repeated and extended
exposure to the vacuum, cryogenic environment. It is not
known whether exposure to these environments might be destruct-
ive, result in limited life, or possibly distort established
sensitivities or calibration characteristics.
The equipment and principles recommended in Section 3.3.4 have not
been tested to determine the validity of reco_nendations. Before
installation, such tests should be conducted.
The possible effects of the recommended suppressants on the chamber
have only been estimated. A test study is recommended, to determine
cleanup time requirements, and possible deleterious effects upon the
ultimate vacuum capabilities of the chamber.
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3.3.6 Recommendations for Operational Procedures
3.3.6.1 Initial Precautions
Assure that the chamber is completely free of any residuals (oils,
solvents, cleaners, etc.) and is thoroughly clean and dry before the
Apollo spacecraft is transported inside for testing. During the trans-
port and hookup operations, a special fire-safety crew must be on con-
stant alert. Crew members must be stationed at their assigned positions
at installed fire-control systems. If conditions warrant, it may also
be adviseable to provide crew men with portable extinguishers at criti-
cal locations during installation and hookup.
The most critical source hazard on the spacecraft itself would be
explosive charges for separation of the modules, such as explosive
bolts, explosive disconnects or guillotines, shaped charges on skins
or structures, etc. As was indicated throughout the test program, the
only ignition source which could lead to detonations of gas mixtures -
within the explicit limitations of the space chamber conditions - was
a detonating source. Therefore, it is imperative to determine that the
spacecraft does no____tcontain explosive items of any of the types men-
tioned. If, for some reason it becomes mandatory to include such items,
then every provision must be made to assure that their electrical
initiating leads are shorted, grounded, shielded and protected in every
possible manner to preclude accidental firing.
3.3.6.2 Loadin_ of Cryogens
Much consideration has been given to the sequence priority for
loading Hydrogen and Oxygen on board. It appears that little, if any
preference is indicated; however, for other safety reasons (such as
minimizing the hazard in buildings surrounding the space chamber) it
is advised no____to present the two types of cryogenic delivery vehicles
to the chamber simultaneously. Ultimately, both cryogens must be on
board simultaneously and it is this fact which details the hazard. The
actual delivery process is expected to present little additional hazard.
Upon completion of delivery practically no change in hazard is realized
- particularly since delivery and vent umbilical lines must necessarily
remain engaged throughout the entire fuel cells test program.
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The basic requirement, of course, is to assure that all umbilical
lines are properly engaged and absolutely leak-tight. The highest
order of inspection is required on this point - posslbly dictating the
use of helium leak-detector techniques to assure integrity. If possi-
ble, this final leak-detectlon search should include the entire system
within the chamber, from the base of the wall penetrations, over all
joints and couplings of the umbilical systems, and over all available
portions of the Apollo spacecraft.
Little information has been available to this project as to the
monitoring instrumentation and control systems within the Apollo space-
craft, nor for the special external consoles which must be provided
outside Chamber A for certain parallel monitoring requirements. How-
ever, it is assumed that very elaborate measuring systems are provided
for monitoring all parameters of the Hydrogen and Oxygen systems of
Apollo. For this particular reason, all emphasis has been dropped on
attempting to provide exotic gas-detectlon devices within Chamber A, to
detect any leakage into the vacuum region. Full confidence is placed
upon the monitoring systems, to instantly indicate any leakage, identify
the gas and the quantity involved. The basic tankage requirements (for
each gas) will be known, the boil-off rates will have been established
(or input/output measurements can be made on supply and vent llnes),
and the energy-converslon rates will be measured. Thus, any gas quan-
tity unaccounted for would constitute leakage and should be readily
dlscernable. Quick appraisal of conditions at the time of such indica-
tion must then dictate the emergency action required.
I
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3.3.6.3 Abort Procedures
A great deal of consideration must be given to the reasons for,
and consequences ensuing from abort procedures. Furthermore, special
differentiation must be made between "emergency" and "normal" abort
procedures (the latter, essentially, being no different from a routine
shut-down procedure). A suspected leak may not necessarily require a
total abort of test and if remedial actions can be taken, short of
abort, it may be of great importance to proceed in such fashion. It is
especially desirable to avoid any call for emergency procedures if a
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careful assessment of conditions indicates that a faulty function Is
not automatically a hazard, and that it may be dealt with in a routine
fashion.
Typically, the chamber may require about 20 hours to pump down.
When cold wall operation is specified, many additional hours will be
required in the chilling and stabilizing operations. If cold wall
conditions have been in effect, many hours will be required for warm-up
before (normal) repressurization can be effected. If emergency re-
pressurization is triggered, before warm-up, then certain other problems
(such as fog, frost, etc.) will be created. These comments are intended
as reminders that not only a great deal of time be lost in event of an
abort, but also that the effects of unwarranted thermal shock environ-
ments upon all systems (in event of "emergency" abort actions) may
adversely affect the test program. Therefore, all considerations must
be carefully weighed before actually declaring an abort, and then as to
stipulating whether it is of an emergency or conventional nature. Note
that in the following recommended procedures, no emergency actions are
called for! (The only emergency action that might be anticipated is
concerned with llfe-saving requirements for men inside the chamber.)
In order to avoid a test abort, it might actually be possible for
men in space suits to enter the chamber and effect certain minimum
"repairs" or leak-stop procedures so that a test could be carried
through to completion. If such activity would be considered, then it
is necessary that the nature of hazard be precisely analyzed, so as to
minimize damgers to personnel involved and not further aggravate the
general hazard.
Let us assume that a leakage hazard may occur under two conditions:
(I) At start, when delivery of cryogens into the Apollo has just begun;
(2) After tankage has been completely filled and testing is in progress.
Table 3.3-5 presents a quick-look sunxnary of all possible actions,
explained in detail as follows: In Case 1 (while filling), leakage is
unlikely because of low system pressure during such time. Nevertheless,
during Case i, if either cryogen is being delivered when a leak is
noted, no real hazard exists. (Any declared hazard is only potential,
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TABLE 3.3-5 GAS LEAKAGE RECOMMENDED ACTION PROCEDURES
SII'UATION
MAN ENTRY
INTO CHAMBER
NO MAN ENTRY
ABORT PROCEDURES
Case I. While Filling
A. Oxygen Leak Stop cryogen delivery Stop cryogen delivery
Shut down vacuum pumps Shut down vacuum pumps
Find & fix leak, resume test
•-¢L" .......... ,C..1
zL u._uc_c=_Lu_, then abort
k---_Vent IN 2 from shrouds
Warm up shrouds
Normal-repressurize chamber
B. Hydrogen Leak Stop cryogen delivery Stop cryogen delivery
Continue vacuum pumping Continue vacuum pumping
Find & fix leak, resume test
If unsuccessful, then abort
k_-mVent LN 2 shrouds
Warm up shrouds
Shut down vacuum pumps
Norma l-repressurize chamber
Case 2. Tankage Full
A. Oxygen Leak Open Oxygen vent Open Oxygen vent
Dump Hydrogen Dump Hydrogen
Shut down vacuum pumps Shut down vacuum pumps
Find & fix leak, resume test
If unsuccessful, then abort
k__, Vent LN 2 from shrouds
Warm up shrouds
Norma l-repressurize chamber
B. Hydrogen Leak Open Hydrogen vent Open Hydrogen vent
Dump Oxygen Dump Oxygen
Continue vacuum pumps Continue vacuum pumps
Find & fix leak, resume test
If unsuccessful, then abort
k._m Vent LN 2 from shrouds
Warm up shrouds
Shut down vacuum pumps
Normal-repressurize chamber
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not actual, and decision time is not pressing.) The first action is to
stop delivery of the cryogen. Do not pressurize the system which was
leaking, in an attempt to effect emergency dump of the cryogen which
might already have been delivered. (Such pressurization would likely
lead to increased leakage.) Allow any dellvered cryogen to boil off
and vent itself normally. Assess the situation and consider what should
be the most appropriate action. Generally, all following actions will
hinge upon the decision whether or not men might be allowed to enter the
chamber in space suits to attempt corrective measures. If man entry is
planned and provided for, procedures may be described as follows: (refer
again to Table 3.3-5:
Case I.A (while filling). If the leaking gas is Oxygen, no hazard
is really presented. Stop delivery of the cryogen so that tankage is
held to a minimum during the "repair" period. Shut down the vacuum
pumps; the Oxygen presents no hazard and is of no importance to remove
at this time. Further, if an abort becomes essential, the presence of
this Oxygen would be of no concern. (It may be necessary to maintain
some pumping capacity on llne of this "hold" period continues for some
time, and I/q2 is to be maintained in the shrouds.) Introduce men into
the chamber to locate and repair the leak. Upon successful accomplish-
ment, the test may then be resumed by putting the entire vacuum pumping
system on line and resuming normal operations. If repair efforts were
unsuccessful, or if man-entry has not been a11owed, a routine abort
should be declared and the entire system shut down in conventional
mann er.
Case I.B. In the event of Hydrogen leak, only a moderate hazard
is presented. Stop delivery of cryogen, to minimize tankage quantities.
Continue operation of vacuum pumps; it is of importance to remove
spilled Hydrogen from the chamber, regardless whether the test will
later proceed or be aborted. Locate and repair leak, if possible, then
proceed with test merely by continuing operations which are already in
effect. If repair efforts were unsuccessful, or if it is otherwise
necessary to declare an abort, the conventional shut down procedure
should be adequate to deal with the situation. During the necessary
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delay time for venting all LN 2 and warming the thermal shrouds, the
vacuum pumping system will probably have accomplished sufficient re-
moval of Hydrogen so that it will not present any hazard in atmosphere.
Case 2.A. (Tankage full). In the event of Oxygen leak, no urgent
hazard is presented. As soon as leakage is detected, the Oxygen vent
should be opened, so as to completely relieve system pressure. Do not
attempt to dump Oxygen. Dump the Hydrogen tankage - thus entirely
eliminating any real hazard. Shut do;;_ the vacuum pumps; it is not
important to re_ove the spilled Oxygen. (It may be necessary to con-
tinue operating some vacuum pumping capacity, so as to maintain I_ 2 in
the shrouds.) Locate and repair leak, if possible. After repair, put
entire vacuum pumping system on llne. Re-fill Oxygen and Hydrogen
tankage and resume normal operations. If repair efforts were unsuccess-
ful, a routine abort should be declared and the entire system shut down
in conventional manner.
Case 2.B. In the event of Hydrogen leak, only a moderate hazard
is presented, l_edlately upon detection of leakage, open the Hydrogen
vent valve, so as to completely relieve system pressure. Do not attempt
to dump Hydrogen: Only if it has been determined that the system could
endure continued pressurization to accomplish dump, should this pro-
cedure be attempted. Dump the Oxygen tankage - thus, completely
averting any incipient hazard. Continue operation of vacuum pumps,
as it is of importance to remove spilled Hydrogen from the chamber.
Locate and repair the leak, if possible. After repair, re-fill Hydrogen
and Oxygen tankage and proceed with test. If repair efforts were unsuc-
cessful, the conventional shut down procedure should be adequate to deal
with the situation.
3.3.6.4 Fire Suppression Procedures
Before discussing procedures, it is essential to emphasize that
numerous problems are likely to be created by massive fire suppression
efforts. It is important to realize that a very small fire might occur,
which of itself would be of small consequence, even if allowed to burn
itself out without suppression. Portable CO 2 extinguishers could be
3-184 NSL 65-136-1
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
employed to deal with the situation quite locally and restrict the
damage potential to a very small area. In such instances, a small
amount of damage may be sustained, perhaps capable of quick repair or
possibly not requiring any immediate action (inside the chamber) which
would delay the test program. On the other hand, if any sort of
massive suppression (say water or foam) ha___dbeen effected, a delay in
the test program would certainly be required, as well as the possibil-
ity of damage incurred by the Apollo spacecraft, or portions of the
chamber. A considerable amount of cleanup effort wou1_u_ be required
before the chamber (and the spacecraft) were ready to proceed with
testing. It is quite possible that the nuisance and expense created
by massive fire suppression efforts (particularly from water systems)
could be worse than if no suppression had been attempted!
For the reasons outlined above, it is recommended that all fire
suppression systems be maintained under manual control. Portable CO 2
suppressors, of course, must be discharged by the person who is assign-
ed the responsibility. For the installed systems, fire signal infor-
mation may be received from several locations and dlfferent types of
sources. This information (conceivably it could be spurious) must be
carefully considered, and assessed for alternate penalties, before the
more massive suppression systems (water or foam) are triggered into
operation.
Essentially, the procedure in event of emergency would be as
fo Ilows:
I.
.
If a small, localized fire has occurred, it should be attacked
only by portable CO 2 suppressor units, by assigned, readily
available flre-safety crews.
If a large fire occurs, detected visually and/or by detector
systems, its zone location should be determined and suppress-
ant units in the appropriate zone (only) should be triggered.
(Foam is the recommended suppressant upon the spacecraft and
in the lower regions of the chamber; water is suggested for
direction only into the uppermost regions of the chamber.)
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NORTHROP SPACE LABORATORIES
SECTION 4.0
EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAM
The experimental program was directed toward providing data on
Oxygen/Hydrogen reactions under conditions simulating hazard condi-
tions in Chamber A. The program plan was conducted to furnish data
as required for the structural analysis of the chamber (Task A). In
addition, much of the data is of value for the hazard detection/sup-
pression analysis (Task B). However, it must be emphasized that the
test program was no.___ttplanned toward that purpose, and that the data
is not purpoted to be complete or comprehensive in that aspect.
4.1 TEST OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the experimental program consisted of simulating
several possible conditions of Chamber A operation to determine:
a. The limits of combustibility of Hydrogen and Oxygen vapors
generated by inadvertent spills.
b. The effect on the chamber structure due to the characteristics
of the propellant combustion.
Conditions of specific concern were:
a. The limiting pressure and pressure-ratios of the propellant
gases which could be ignited.
b. The pressure achieved by the reaction.
c. The velocity of the combustion pressure or detonation front.
d. The effect on the above characteristics due to air dilution.
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Data acquired during the experimental program was considered
essential to support analytical investigations of the chamber struc-
tural resistance (and also proved valuable in assessing requirements
for hazard detection/suppression systems).
4.2 TEST FACILITIES
The experimental portion of the Chemical Hazards Potential Study
was conducted in its entirety in the Turbodyne building, located within
the Northrop, Hawthorne complex. Five test chambers were _,_p!oyed, to
provide test data for a broad range of parametric variables. The main
building housed the test chambers and its associated vacuum pumping
equipment; a separate instrumentation room and gas storage area were
located external to the main test building. The test chambers were
isolated by concrete bunkers within the building, to provide protection
in the event of major structural damage to the chambers.
A single Kinney vacuum pump of 5 CFM capacity provided the chamber
evacuation mechanism which simulated the high altitude environment for
ignition of gaseous Oxygen and Hydrogen mixtures. The vacuum pump
suction line was adaptable for insertion at each of the vacuum chambers
to provide rapid turn around time for alternate test conditions. In
all cases, the pumping capacity provided an initial chamber pressure of
approximately 0.5 inches water gage which was achieved within I0 minutes
pumping time for the smallest chamber (0.40 cubic ft volume) to 30 min-
utes for the largest chamber (15 cubic ft volume). Prior to insertion
of the Oxygen and Hydrogen gases, each chamber was individually valved
closed from the vacuum source. All chambers were leak-tested to assure
the integrity of the test system prior to starting each test series.
Measurement of the vacuum condition was provided by two instruments
connected in parallel and located outside of the test building. A
mercury manometer, calibrated in 0.I inch increments, was used as a
backup instrument to support a Kolsman aneroid-type altitude gage which
was calibrated in increments of .I inches water gage. Local barometric
pressure was determined periodically each day to establish the reference
level for correcting instrument readings.
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The combustible gases (Oxygen and Hydrogen) were stored outside of
the building in standard 2200 psi bottles and plumbed through a port to
the test chamber. Each line was individually isolated at the chamber
by a valve, to prevent combustion back-streaming into the gas line.
Pressure reduction was provided hy two-stage regulation and metering
was closely controlled by using two 1/4 inch needle valves in series
downstream of the regulator.
Ignition sources mounted within each chamber were triggered by a
switch within the instrument room. Various types of ignition source
were employed: a burning wire, consisting of one strand of (36) gage
copper wire, was initiated with 120 volt, 60 cycle power; spark gap
ignition was excited by a coil producing 20,000 volts; and detonators
were initiated by application of 24 volts DC.
Dynamic pressures occurring during reaction were monitored with
piezoelectric transducers installed in the chamber wall and recorded
within the instrument room, Details of the recording technique are
described in Paragraph 4.4.
The various chambers employed during the test program provided a
range of volumes which permitted evaluation of the volumetric effect to
determine scaling factors for the Houston chamber. A shock tube was
employed to provide sufficient length of pressure wave travel for
establishing wave front velocity. Polystyrene canisters were installed
within the chambers during certain tests and pressurized with an Oxygen-
Hydrogen mixture to simulate combustion occurring within the Apollo
ServicQ Module and the effects upon the chamber structure of a blast
within the module. Various ignition sources were employed to evaluate
their effect on the characteristics of the gas reaction. Ignition
source location was also varied, to determine its effect on the
characteristics of the reaction.
Several views of the test area and the various facilities are
shown in Figures 4.2-1 through 4.2-10.
4-3 NSL 65-136-1
4-4 KSL 65-136-1 
4-5  N SL 
N 
I 
N 
65-136-1 
4-6 NSL 65-136-1 
m 
I 
N 
NSL 65-136-1 4 -7 

m 
1 
I 
8 
I 
1 
8 
c 
8 
I 
t 
8 
8 
I 
8 
I 
1 
I 
I 
FIGURE 4.2-6 24" CHAMBER WITH S P S - K  IGNITOR 
NSL 65-136-1 4-9 
FIGURE 4.2-7 BURK-OUT WIRE IGNITOR 
4- 10 
NSL 65-136-1 
:4: 
FIGURE 4.2-8 SMALL CANISTER 
4-11 
BEFORE TEST 
NSL 65-136-1 
NSL 65-136-1 FIGUST 4.2-5 S?.",iLL CLA!!ISTER AFTEE TEST 
I _,% 4-1L 
F I G U R E  4.2-10 LARGE CASISTER AFTER TEST - SHOWISG D.4MAGE TO FIXTURE 
4-13 NSL 65-136-1 
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
4.3 INSTRUMENTATION
It was required to accurately measure the shape and amplitude of
the incident and all reflected pressure pulses due to burning or deto-
nation of the mixtures in the chamber. Rise times of I0 to i00
microseconds are expected when detonation occurs. Thus, the pressure
instrumentation must respond accurately to frequencies as high as i00
kilocycles. High sensitivity is also required as pressure pulses as
small as 0.25 pounds per square inch are anticipated. These require-
ments precluded the use of transducers of the strain gage, variable
reluctance, piezo-resistive, or capacitance type of sensing element.
Several piezoelectric type transducers were chosen, to correspond with
the various pressure ranges expected. This type of transducer operates
on the principle of piezoelectricity, that is, when an asymetric
crystal is stressed, it will generate an electrical signal which is
proportional to the stress.
Kistler charge amplifiers were chosen in preference to cathode
follower amplifiers because of their greater sensitivity, versatility,
ease of calibration, and lack of sensitivity to cable capacitance
effects.
Oscilloscope readout was chosen to define rise times and pressure
peaks. An FM tape recorder system was used to obtain a long time
history of the pressure undulations.
The complete pressure instrumentation system is shown in block-
diagram form in Figure 4.3-i.
Pyroelectric output due to temperature effects in the transducer
was filtered out by controlling the low frequency cut-off point of the
charge amplifier. This proved effective for the Kistler and Sensonics
transducers (described below), but the response of the Endevco trans-
ducer to the pyroelectric effect was too rapid to be controlled by low
frequency cut-off.
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4.3.1 Pressure Transducers
Pressures in the range of 5 to 5000 pounds per square inch were
measured with a Kistler Model 601 transducer. The specifications of
this type of transducer are shown in Table 4.3-1.
TABLE 4.3-1 SPECIFICATIONS OF PRESSURE TRANSDUCERS
I
I
I
Kist ler i Sensonics Endevco
PROPERTIES 601 I V-25-I _Ju_-Juu.......
Range (psi)
Sensitivity (pcb/psi)
Frequency Response (cps)
Resonant Response (cps)
Rise Time (To 90%)
(Microseconds)
5,000
0.5
30,000
150,000
3
i00
21
i00,000
500,000
I
500
20
9,000
45,000
5
The transducer sensing element is quartz which has a small pyroelectric
coefficient.
Pressures between 0.25 and I00 pounds per square inch were sensed
by a Sensonics, inc., type V-25-I transducer. Table 4.3-1 includes the
specifications of this transducer. The sensing element is Barium
Zirconate Titanate which possesses a large pyroelectric coefficient.
Figure 4.3-2 shows the construction of the transducer, which is also
representative of the other types. The transducer was mounted as in
Figure 4.3-3. This method of mounting was used to isolate the transducer
from excitation in the radial mode.
Endevco type 2501-500 transducers were used to measure shock
propagation rates. The specifications of this type of transducer are
shown in Table 4.3-1. The sensing element is Barium Zirconate
Titanate.
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4.3.2 Charge Amplifiers
Kistler Model 568 charge amplifiers were used to amplify the
charge output of the transducers. The amplifier was modified according
to Kistler recon_nendations to provide a flat frequency response (_ i db)
from 25 cycles per second to 150 kilocycles per second. The modifi-
cation was necessary in order to remove the effects of pyroelectricity
when using Barium Zirconate Titanate transducers.
This amplifier has an input impedance of 108 ohms and one milli-
volt of noise referred to the output. It includes a four-step range
selector switch and a potentiometer feedback adjustment to control
amplifier sensitivity." A time constant selector switch extends the low
frequency response to 0.I cycles per second to allow quasi-static cali-
bration of the system with a step pressure input to the transducer.
4.3.3 Oscilloscope Readout
A Tektronix Type 502 dual-beam oscilloscope was used to record
the rapid transient portion of the pressure signature. The oscillo-
scope has a flat frequency response from D.C. to over 400 kilocycles.
A single sweep trace was triggered from the event displayed on the
screen. Triggering level is approximately 50 millivolts.
Data was recorded photographically on Polaroid Type 47 film.
4.3.4 FM Tape System Readout
A 14-channel Sanborn Type 3914 FM tape system was used to provide
a long-time history of the event. The pressure signals, a one-
kilocycle reference signal, and the oscilloscope triggering pulse were
recorded on the FM tape transported at 60 inches per second. At this
speed, the tape system has a flat frequency response to I0 kilocycles.
The data was then played back into an oscillograph, at a tape
speed of 3 3/4 inches per second. Consolidated Electrodynamics
Corporation Type 4-319 galvonometers are used in the oscillograph
playback.
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4.3.5 Calibration Technique
The Kistler 585 charge amplifier is equipped with a long time
constant operating mode which will "hold" the signal from a step
pressure for several tenths of a second. The system was calibrated by
rapidly applying a known amplitude step pressure to the transducer and
recording the signal on oscilloscope and tape. The calibrating
apparatus is shown in Figure 4.3-4. An oscilloscope triggering pulse
is generated as the fast-acting valve is opened, The transducer was
calibrated against a Wallace & Tiernan 300-inch mercury gage.
Figure 4.3-5 shows a typical oscilloscope picture of a calibration
signal.
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FIGURE 4.3-5 TYPICAL CALIBRATION SIGNAL
The following is a list of the commercial instruments referenced
in section 4.3.
i. Kistler Instrument Corp, Model 601 Pressure Pickup,
North Tonawanda, N.Y.
2. Sensonics, Inc., Variducer V25 Series Applications,
Kensington, Md.
3. Endevco Corp., Dynamic Pressure Pickup, Model 250i,
Pasadena, Calif, 1964.
4. Kistler Instrument Corp., Model 568 Universal Electro-
static Charge Amplifier, North Tonawanda, N.Y.
5. Kistler Instrument Corp., Technical Note-Usin$ Ceramic
Accelerometers With Electrostatic Charge Amplifiers,
TN133762, North Tonawanda, N.Y.
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4.4 TEST PROCEDURES
The various test requirements were met by employing five different
chamber configurations. These included a 5" diameter by 5' long shock
tube driver, a 26' long shock tube (including the driver), a 24" diam-
eter chamber, an 18" diameter chamber, and an 8" diameter chamber.
All systems employed similar provisions for evacuation of the chamber_
injection of Oxygen and Hydrogen gases, monitoring of the static pres-
sure, and measuremenLs of the dynamic reaction pressures.
Prior to each test the applicable chamber was evacuated to
approximately i/2" water gauge pressure by means of a mechanical vacuum
pump. The integrity of the chamber was verified by valving off the
vacuum pump and monitoring the chamber pressure to determine that no
significant leakage existed.
After verifying that the chamber was leak-tight, the system was
isolated from the vacuum pump and prepared for injection of the
Oxygen and Hydrogen gases. Gas delivery was from standard 2200 psi gas
cylinders, through two-stage regulation, followed by two 1/4" needle
valves in series. The needle valves provided fine sensitivity control
for injection of low pressure gases. A calculated partial-pressure of
Hydrogen gas was injected into the chamber initially, its pressure
monitored both on a mercury manometer and an aneroid type pressure
gauge with readability to .I" water gauge pressure. After attainment
of the partial-pressure of Hydrogen, the Hydrogen system was valved off
and a similar procedure was employed for the injection of Oxygen gas.
After achieving the required pressure of Oxygen, all valves to the
chamber were sealed and the mixture was ignited by means of the
applicable ignition source from the instrumentation room.
Pressure transducers mounted in the chambers were monitored both
by means of oscilloscope and tape recorder. In all cases, Polaroid-
type photographs were taken of the oscilloscope data. The magnetic
tape recorder was ultimately played back into an oscillograph. Prior
calibrations of the transducer permitted evaluation of pressure condi-
tions. During each test a 1KC sine wave was played into one channel
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of the tape recorder, to provide a constant time base reference,
regardless of the tape speed employed for tape play-back into the
oscillograph.
Certain test requirements provided for inclusion of various
predetermined pressures of atmospheric air in the test chamber. This
was accomplished by providing a bleed valve in the system and moni-
toring the chamber pressure while slowly bleeding air into the pre-
viously _-= .... ; ....A_xj=uL=u mixture of Oxygen and Hydrogen. For _h_ case of air
dilution at atmospheric pressure, the vacuum system was not employed.
Ambient atmosphere was the initial condition in the chamber and Hydro-
gen and Oxygen gases were then injected, to the computed partial-
pressures above atmosphere, as required.
Tests which used the sealed canister to represent the Apollo
module were conducted in a similar manner. However in this case the
canister was installed in the chamber and both canister and chamber
were evacuated through a manifold. Following evacuatio_ the manifold
was closed and the canister isolated and pressurized in the manner
previously described. The chamber was retained at vacuum or atmos-
pheric air was bled in as required by the particular test condition.
The igniter, installed in the canister, was initiated from the
instrumentation room. (See figures 4.4-i, 4.4-2 and 4.4-3.)
4.5 TEST RESULTS
4.5.1 Series I: Flammability/Explosivity Range
A series of tests was conducted to determine the limiting values
of pressure and pressure-ratio conditions under which approximately
pure mixtures of Oxygen and Hydrogen would react when subjected to an
ignition source. Tests were conducted in the 8", 18" and 24" diameter
chambers and in the 5" shock tube driver. The various techniques con-
sidered for ignition sources were electrical spark, hot wire, detonator,
and radiant energy (two #5 photoflash lamps in parallel).
A series of spark initiated reactions was attempted over the range
of 1.51Psia to 0.408 psia, using Oxygen to Hydrogen mass ratios of 5,
11.4 and 30. Under no conditions were detonations established.
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Reactions occurred at all pressures down to I.II psia for the mass
ratio of 5; 0.700 psia for the 11.5 ratio and .608 psia for the 30
ratio. During the highly oxygen rich test conditions (mass ratio 30),
reaction occurred between the excess oxygen and insulation material
after the subject reaction was completed. This resulted in deposition
of contaminants on the electrode. Spark ignition attempts with the
contaminated electrodes and at a mass ratio of 30 yielded reactions
to 0.408 psia, the lowest level tested.
The hot wire ignition source caused reactions at all pressures
tested over the range of 1.50 to 0.241 psia at an 11.5 mass ratio.
Detonator initiation was attempted at 3 pressure levels; reaction
occurred at each of the .75, 1.0 and 2.0 psia conditions at the
stoichiometric ratio of 8. Radiant energy ignition was not achieved
at either of the two conditions tested (0.75 and 1.50 psia, mass ratio
of 11.4).
_1_ A __I _©=_= _ _'_h,,l_t_nnnf the annlicable tests which
established the reaction limitations.
4.5.2 Series 2: Wave Front Velocity
A series of tests was conducted to determine the velocity of a
pressure or detonation wave traveling across a chamber. A shock tube
was employed to establish a test configuration of approximately 26
feet linear travel. A hot wire ignition source was established at
one end of the shock tube and three pressure transducers installed at
increments along the tube. Four test conditions were used with the
Oxygen/Hydrogen mass ratio retained constant at 11.4 and the absolute
pressure of the mixture varied from .57 to 1.50 psia. In each test
case a shock wave was produced which traversed the tube at velocities
ranging from 1260 ft/sec to 1435 ft/sec, followed by a detonation
wave. Of the four conditions tested_ the detonation wave velocity was
established for just two conditions due to limitations of the instru-
mentation. The measured velocities were 4750 ft/sec at an initial
condition of .57 psia, and 6800 ft/sec at an initial condition of
i. I0 psia.
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The following data represents the conditions and results
achieved :
Initial Velocity, Velocity Velocity
pressure, first shock second shock detonation
psia pulse, fps pulse, fps wave_ fps
0.57 1260 1220 4750
0.75 1280 1280 --
I.I0 1435 None 6800
1.50 1400 1410 --
Transducer #I was located in an enlarged (driver) section of the
shock tube which apparently damped or otherwise affected the shock
waves to a level below the sensitivity of the instrumentation settings.
I
I
I
I
I
Transducer #2 was a low-sensitivity sensor which was not excited
by the low pressure shock wave, nor by two of the four detonation con-
ditions.
......... _ _ -- _ + _ _ 1 = _ _ _-fl_cted shock waves for
both the first and following pressure fronts. Transducer #3 was
operated with the amplifier gains set at a level anticipated for shock
wave amplitudes and established shock wave velocities. The energetic
impulse of detonation occurring caused saturation of the amplifier,
and the relatively long time required for recovery voided its ability
to serve for the desired velocity measurement.
I
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4.5.3 Series 3: Volume Effects
A series of tests was conducted on chambers of various volumes to
provide scaling information which would enable application of test
results to Chamber A at NASA, Houston. Chambers of comparable size to
the Houston chamber were, of course, not available. Scaling factor
tests were conducted in a 24" diameter (15 cu/ft volume) chamber,
18" (4.4 cu/ft volume) chamber, and 8" (0.40 cu/ft volume) chamber.
Additional information was acquired during this test series on the
effect of the type ignition source on the level of reaction pressure.
An analysis can be made for the conditions of spark versus hot wire
ignition, with some inference to the effects of a detonator cap
ignition.
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The effects of volume upon peak pressure for various conditions
of reaction are presented in Figures 4.5-1 and 4.5-2. It is shown
that increasing volume produces a decay in the peak reaction pressure
with an approximate logarithmic relationship. The comparison of
ignition methods (spark versus hot wire) is presented in Figure 4.5-3.
This indicates that the spark ignition produces a higher pressure than
the hot wire ignition. Tests conducted with a detonator cap were not
directly comparable, due to the limited quantity of tests, variety of
initiation pressure conditions and non-comparable mass ratio. However,
the reactions obtained, see Figures 4.5-4 and 4.5-5, with the detonator
cap do indicate that peak pressures would probably be higher for all
combinations.
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4.5.4 Series 4: Ignition Location Effects
Ignition location effects tests were conducted in the 24-inch
diameter chamber, _mploying spark ignition. A series of tests were
conducted at a mass ratio of 11.4, by varying the gas mixture pressure
and the position of the ignitor electrodes. The electrode positions
were at the same elevation as the pressure transducer (at mld-length)
of chamber). Positions were varied radially outward from center, along
a line directly opposite from the transducer. The characteristics of
the pressure wave transient could thus be isolated as a function of its
distance traveled. Figure 4.5-6 illustrates the peak pressures of
reactions initiated at various distances from the transducer. Over
the limited range traversed, pressure is shown to increase as a function
of the distance from the point of initiation.
4.5.5 Series 5: Apollo-Confined Explosion
Extruded polystyrene canisters, forming independent chambers, were
ass_bled to simulate the Apollo module. Five tests were conducted,
in which the canisters were pressurized with 19 psia Oxygen/Hydrogen
mixture at 11.4 mass ratio. The canisters were installed in vacuum
chambers and the Oxygen/Hydrogen mixture ignited to simulate an
explosion within the Apollo module following rupture of the cyrogenic
tanks.
The chamber within which the canisters were placed was evacuated
to various levels, including pressures of I, I0, 30, I00 torr, and
finally atmospheric conditions. Ignition of the mixture within the
canister was accomplished by a hot wire igniter. Four tests were
performed within the 18" diameter chamber. A fifth test, at 30 torr
chamber pressure, was performed in the 24" diameter chamber. No
further tests were performed in that chamber because the fixture
containing the canister was destroyed in the first test.
0
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Pressure waves were measured at the outer chamber wall following
rupture of the canister. However, it should be noted that the peaks
may be questionable and unduly high because of shrapnel from the
exploding chamber striking the sensitive surface of the transducer.
The following tabulation of data represents the pressure peaks
indicated by the transducer:
Initial
Chamber Peak Reaction Peak Total
Pressure Pressure Pressure
Chamber psia psi psia
18" .0193 41.2 41.2
18" 0.193 Not determined ....
24" 0.579 Not determined ....
18" 1.93 9.20 11.13
18" 14.68 4.35 19.03
A number of reactions were photographed by runs of full-color,
hlgh-speed cine'photography at various speeds (from about 2000 to 4500
frames per second). Projectile velocities from canlster-burst tests
were computed from these films. The films are extremely interesting
when played back in slow-motion; however, they are not suitable for
printing into this report. After a detailed study of the runs, several
sequences of frames were selected for "still" prints, but so much detail
is lost in reproduction that they prove meaningless. (The films are
now stored in NSL vaults and will be presented to NASA upon completion
of the report period.)
4.5.6 Series 6: Air Dilution Effects
Ten test firings were conducted, to explore the effects of air
dilution upon the reaction characteristics of the Oxygen/Hydrogen
mixture. Tests were performed with an initial condition of approxi-
mately 0.75 psia Oxygen/Hydrogen mixture (except one case at .65 psia).
An 11.4 mass ratio was used in all cases but two at 8:1. Air dilution
conditions varied from zero psia to atmospheric pressure. Tests were
conducted in both the 18" and 24" diameter chamber, employing the
various conditions of spark, hot-wire, and detonator cap ignition.
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The results of the tests indicate rapid deterioration of the
reaction pressure pulse with increasing dilution of air. Reaction
becomes negligible with air dilution pressures in excess of 5 psla
regardless of the type of ignition source employed. The volumetric
effect on the peak pressure is apparent during this test, as was
previously described in the volumetric test series.
Figure 4.5-7, generated from the following data, is a graphical
presentation describing the characteristics of the pressure pulses and
reaction limitations as a function of air dilution pressures.
Table 4.5-2 gives the complete results of the tests shown in
Figure 4.5-7.
TABLE 4.5-2 PRESSURE PULSES AND REACTION DATA
02/H2 abs Diluent
Test 02/H 2 Pressure, Pressure, Ignition
Chamber Ratio psia psia air Method
Reaction
Pressure, psia
rise / total
I
I
I
I
I
I
|
I
18" 11.4 .75 0 Spark
24" " " 0 "
18" " " .75 "
24" " " .75 "
18" " " i.75 "
24" " " 3.25 "
24" " " 5.25 "
24" 8.0 •65 6 •00 Detonator
18" 8.0 .75 14.68 Detonator
18" 11.4 .75 14.68 Hot wire
4-41
3.39 4.14
1.57 2.32
1.38 2.88
.54 2.04
.34 2.84
.20 4.20
Neglig. 6.00
" 6.65
" 15.43
" 15.43
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CONCLUSIONS
I. Explosive hazards exist in Chamber A when cryogenic Oxygen and
Hydrogen are present in the Service Module. Damage to interior equip-
ment, and particularly to the vehicle and Service Module, is unavoid-
able. This study is based on safe operation criteria for locations
outside the chamber. Proposed design modifications have taken into
consideration the primary requirement of maintaining the structural
integrity of the chamber.
Safe operation criteria were based on Minimum Safe Operation
(Condition i) and Maximum Safety Precautions (Condition 2).
2. Three situations leading to an explosive hazard were considered:
Case I - An explosive gaseous mixture igniting inside the
Service Module (confined explosion), when the chamber is either undeL
vacuum or ambient conditions.
Case II - A gaseous mixture of Oxygen and Hydrogen venting
from the Service Module into the chamber, with ignition occurring in
the chamber (unconfined explosion), either at vacuum or ambient
conditions.
Case III- Rupture of the Oxygen and Hydrogen tanks, with
rapid escape of the cryogenic fluids into the chamber under vacuum
conditions, assuming no ignition source (this is the so-called
"mechanical explosion" case).
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The worst condition was found to be Case I, when the chamber is
under ambient pressure. Case I, with chamber under vacuum, presents
only a fragmentation hazard.
Case II, chamber under vacuum, presents primarily a deflagration
hazard. When the chamber is under ambient pressures, the mixture
ratios for Case II are below the flammability limits for uniform
mixtures, but a definite explosive hazard will exist for non-uniform
mixing, especially directly below the chamber's top hemispherical head
(stratification).
Hazards under condition of Case III are minimal, excluding con-
siderations of some damage to interior items.
3. The transient pressure pulse from a confined explosion and frag-
mentation (projectile size and impact velocity), as well as quasi-
steady pressures due to deflagration, were estimated quantitatively
and used to compute the dynamic response of the structural elements.
Twenty-four items were individually analyzed, ranging from the chamber
shell to the diffusion pumps. Failure conditions were determined for
comparison with the results from dynamic response calculations.
Pressure, rather than fragmentation, controlled the assessment of
structural integrity. Of the twenty-four items considered, the follow-
ing were found to be critical: the support system for the lunar plane,
the 40-foot diameter door, and the manlocks.
4. It is feasible to satisfy the conditions for minimum safe operation
and for maximum safety precautions by introducing design modifications
that strengthen various structural elements, add auxiliary structural
supports, and control venting to areas outside the chamber. Local
failures that can be subsequently repaired should be tolerated in
order to achieve feasible minimum design modifications.
5. Spills of liquid nitrogen cause high thermal stresses at the
welded joints between the bottom shell and the cylindrical lunar plane
housing structure, as well as near the free surface of the spilled
liquid pool boundaries where high thermal gradients exist. Catastrophic
failure of the shell is not anticipated, but some permanent local
deformations will occur, and repair of some welds may be required
following a spill.
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6. The cost estimate for the suggested design modifications indi-
cates $63,000.00 for minimum safe operation and $172,000.00 for maximum
safety precautions.
7. The construction schedule, assuming an uninterrupted sequence of
effort, but including the time required for engineering design and
material procurement, is 4 - 5 months.
8. Fire hazards inside the chamber are considered to be greater when
the chamber is in Stand-by Condition than when in vacuum service. The
suspected hazards would be due to maintenance and handling procedures
of an industrial nature. Exotic hazard detection and suppression
systems appear unwarranted because of the problems they present, and
the undetermined need.
9. Much information regarding reactions of Hydrogen and Oxygen at
very low pressures has been obtained during this study. The findings
are of considerable value in space technology; however, it must be
emphasized that the experiments were of brief duration and not ex-
haustive in parameter variations.
5-3 NSL 65-136- I
II
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
'1i
I
I
I
NORTHROP SPACE LABORATORIE6
SECTION 6.0
OVERALL RECOMMENDATIQN S
1. Further analytical work may not appreciably modify the conclusions
in this study. The uncertainties of explosive hazards developing from
cryogenic spills in confined and unconfined conditions do not warrant
refinements in the dynamic response analyses of the structures.
Although the analysis of the thermochemical reactions has been estab-
lished on a sound basis for the definition of hazards, further study
would increase the understanding of many elusive factors associated
with hazardous mixtures of the cryogenic fluids, and it would form the
basis for further experimental work.
2. There is a definite need for design modifications in the chamber
structure if cryogenic fluids wlll be introduced during test operations.
A preliminary study has shown the feasibility of these modifications,
and it is believed that the recommended schemes will not interfere
with test performance requirements. For a more thorough assessment of
the detailed impact of the design modifications, a preliminary design
of the required structural changes must be completed.
3. A very comprehensive gas-detection and fire-detection system is
recommended, primarily for use in Stand-by Conditions. Numerous
sensor units should be installed inside the chamber, and at the site
of delivery vehicles for LH 2 and LO 2. Alarm signals should be observed
at a fire-control command console.
4. Portable CO 2 extinguishers are recommended for small, localized
fires. A massive suppression system is also recommended, employing
high-expansion foam as the suppressant. Zone-control of activation
should be remotely triggered from the fire-control command console.
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5. Further experiments in a very large reaction vessel would be of
definite value. Scaling factors related to reaction effects could be
improved thereby. Furthermore, the major objective would be to deter-
mine whether reactions would develop in similar fashion as observed in
smaller vessels, or would deviate widely. It has been determined that
a large vacuum sphere (of approximately I00,000 cu. ft.) might be
made available for this purpose. It is recommended that further
experiments in such a vessel be conducted.
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